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Abstract
This thesis studies the effects of the credit ratings in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
The first chapter establishes that credit ratings affect the choice of payment method in 
mergers and acquisitions. I find that bidders holding a high rating level are more likely to use 
cash financing in a takeover. I attribute this finding to lower financial constraints and 
enhanced capability of highly rated firms to access public debt markets as implied by their 
higher credit quality. The second chapter investigates the effect of the proximity to credit 
rating changes on the acquisition decisions of the bidding firms. I apply different measures to 
proxy for a potential credit rating change and I find a non linear association between firms’ 
real credit rating levels (credit quality) and acquisition decisions. Furthermore, I show that all 
my proxies for future credit rating upgrades (downgrades) are positively (negatively) 
associated with acquisition decisions. Overall the findings in this chapter support my 
hypotheses and specifically, document the real impact of CRAs’ ratings and opinions on 
firms’ takeover policies. The third chapter re-examines the shareholder wealth effects around 
the announcements of mergers between bidders and targets that complement each other on 
the levels of debt capacity and growth opportunities, when high degrees of information 
asymmetry prevail. In sum I find that this type of merger transactions creates value for the 
combined firms as also for the bidding firms. Regarding the target firms there is some 
evidence of value destruction which nonetheless, comes at the benefit of the combined and 
bidding firms as the latter firms avoid overpayment. Additionally, the significant effect of 
the complementary fit on synergy, bidding and target firm returns is mainly driven by the 
group of target firms that operate under a high information asymmetry environment.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) produce and disseminate qualitative information about 
the creditworthiness of corporate entities and their financial obligations. In order to 
accomplish that, CRAs analyze information related with the issuer, its market and its 
economic state of affairs. In the majority of the cases the final outcome derived from this 
analysis materializes to a single credit rating. This rating is a letter grade measuring the 
creditworthiness of a firm and can be translated as the opinion of rating agencies regarding 
the likelihood that the issuer will be able to meet its contractual and financial debt 
obligations, when they become due. The use of credit ratings has expanded in recent years 
mostly due to the globalization of financial markets, the growing complexity of financial 
products, and a sheer increase in the usage of ratings in financial regulation and contracting 
(Kisgen (2006, 2009), and Frost (2007)). The function and effectiveness of CRAs in capital 
markets has continuously been brought into the public’s and regulators’ attention, especially 
after major incidents like the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997), and the bankruptcies of 
Enron (2001), and Worldcom (2002) however, it has never been so pronounced as during the 
recent financial crisis.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of CRAs’ actions and decisions on a 
set of different Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) outcomes, and bring together two very 
generic strands of literature. Few economic phenomena receive so much attention and 
empirical research, as the numerous forms of transactions in what Manne (1965) named “the 
market for corporate control". Corporate takeovers are among the largest investments that a 
company will ever undertake thus, providing a particular research setup into the value
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implications of managerial decisions, incentives, bid strategies, and set of complex 
contractual devices that have evolved to enable the deals to go through (Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorbum (2011)). In the presence of information asymmetries the supply of credit and 
ultimately the access to public debt markets as it is certified by the credit ratings, can 
influence the firms’ financing and investment decisions. Specifically, in the context of M&As 
the relevance of debt capacity and credit quality (credit rating levels) can be crucial, since 
some of the most important M&As’ aspects like the choice of payment method, the decision 
to acquire another firm, and the value creation for the shareholders are intrinsically tied to the 
ability of firms to raise debt capital. In particular, it is very likely that bidding firms’ choice 
between cash and stock for the consummation of the deal, or the decision to takeover another 
firm, are related with their capability of using debt capital as, in the former case it is known 
from the existing literature that cash acquisitions are to a great extent funded by debt. In the 
latter, since the Myers (1984) Pecking Order Theory it is widely known that when firms 
decide the source of funds that will use in order undertake any investment project (i.e., 
acquisitions), a higher priority is given to debt over stock capital and consequently, firms 
primarily try to access the debt markets. Furthermore, the ability of the combined firms to 
finance any Net Present Value (NPV) project due to their high debt capacity in the post­
merger period should be reflected on the short run window of the acquisition announcement. 
From the above preliminary remarks and the scarce relevant literature up to date it seems that 
a thorough examination of the credit ratings impact on M&As is particularly interesting. In 
that respect, this thesis examines three different aspects of the M&A process. The bidding 
firm’s decision regarding the choice of payment method used to consummate the deal, the 
acquirer firms’ managerial incentives and decisions to undertake a takeover of another firm, 
and the short-term shareholder wealth creation related with the announcements of 
acquisitions.
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In more detail, the decision to examine the association between credit ratings and the 
method of payment in M&As, is motivated by the importance which the cost of debt and 
financial constraints hold for firms who decide to pay by cash in the acquisition deals. In 
general, firms with higher credit ratings (high credit quality) are able to borrow capital at 
lower interest rates than firms with lower credit ratings (low credit quality), and as a 
consequence high rating firms are more likely to choose cash as the payment method in 
M&As. In the case of firms’ decisions to acquire another firm, current and “expected” credit 
ratings concerns should also have a considerable impact. Anecdotal evidence from a survey 
study (Graham and Harvey (2001)), documents that credit ratings are considered as one of the 
most important factors influencing firms’ corporate decisions. Thus, it is very likely that 
considerations related with the credit rating levels in the post-merger period, should affect 
bidder firms’ management decisions to acquire another company. Finally, following the 
theoretical model of Myers and Majluf (1984), mergers between bidders and targets that 
complement each other on the levels of debt capacity and growth opportunities, should 
promote shareholder wealth creation around the acquisition announcements. By measuring 
firms’ debt capacity with the availability and level of credit ratings, I am able to examine this 
theoretical proposition on an empirical level.
The literature on CRAs argues that credit ratings affect firms’ access to the credit 
markets and ultimately, to the supply of credit, a fact with major implications for firms’ 
capital structure and investment policies. According to the classical finance literature this 
result is counterintuitive, as in perfect frictionless capital markets firms’ investment and 
capital structure policies should be based only on firms’ investment opportunities and their 
demand for capital hence, rendering the source of financing irrelevant for these policies 
(Modigliani and Miller (1958)). This is due to the fact that companies can shift freely 
between equity and debt, when deciding their source of capital. However, in the presence of
16
information asymmetries the type of financing plays an important role on corporate policies 
(Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
and Myers (1984)), and therefore, the impact of credit supply along with that of credit ratings 
gain a paramount significance for corporate policies.
The study of the effects of credit ratings on the choice of payment method in M&As, is 
motivated by the lack of any detailed examination of this topic in the hitherto literature; the 
same is true for the impact of “expected” credit rating changes on the outcome of acquisition 
decisions, whereas the investigation of shareholder wealth effects around the announcement 
of complementary acquisitions, is motivated by the need to re-validate the previous 
theoretical and empirical evidence, while using credit ratings as a proxy for debt capacity.
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of credit ratings existence, and levels on the 
likelihood of using cash as the payment method in M&As. The existing literature 
demonstrates that firms which hold a (highly) rated public debt by a CRA, and consequently 
have access to the public credit markets, face lower levels of financial constraints and exhibit 
higher debt capacity (Bolton and Freixas (2000), Diamond (1991), Fazzari, Hubbard, 
Petersen, Blinder and Poterba (1988), and Whited (1992)). On the other hand, a growing 
body of M&As literature documents that cash-acquisitions are to a great extend funded by 
debt (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), and Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009)). By 
combining these two strands of literature, I attempt to examine how firms’ increased debt 
capacity, as it is implied by the existence of a high credit rating (high credit quality), affects 
the likelihood of paying by cash in merger deals. Additionally the unused debt capacity from 
the bidders’ or the targets’ side, might lead firms to pay by cash in acquisitions since, the 
unused debt capacity in one of the two merging parties will lead bidders to use cash for the 
consummation of the deal, as any increase in leverage associated with cash payments will be 
absorbed by the unused debt capacity of the combined firm.
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These hypotheses were tested on a sample of US public and private acquisitions over 
the period 1998-2009. It is found that bidding firms with a high credit rating on their debt 
(high credit quality), are more likely to use cash financing in a takeover. 1 attribute this 
finding to the lower financial constraints, and enhanced capability of highly rated firms to 
access public debt markets, as it implied by their higher credit quality. In economic terms one 
point rise in bidder rating level increases the likelihood of cash means of financing used in an 
M&A transaction by 6.52% over the sample average. Moreover, unused debt capacity, 
measured with the relative credit rating level of bidder to target, also appears to be a 
determinant of cash financing in M&As, corroborating the view that credit ratings are related 
with the choice of payment method in acquisitions. Finally, my results appear to be robust 
even after 1 control for the potential endogeneity bias of the existence and level of credit 
ratings, suggesting that the findings are not an artifact of a specification error in my variables.
Chapter 3 addresses the influence which “expected” credit rating changes exert on 
bidder firms’ management decisions to acquire another company. While the importance of 
credit rating changes has been documented in the context of capital structure (Kisgen (2006, 
2009), and earnings management decisions (Jung, Soderstrom and Yang (2012), and Alissa, 
Bonsall Iv, Koharki and Penn Jr (2013)), the literature still remains relatively silent when it 
comes to firms’ investment decisions, and particular M&As. The traditional finance logic 
posits that the relationship between cost of capital and investment is a linear one, as under 
market conditions firms that face low cost of debt are able to borrow at any point in time, and 
undertake every positive NPV project when the investment opportunity arises. Nevertheless, 
the previous literature on credit ratings documented that due to a number of business, 
regulatory and contractual purposes (Cantor and Packer (1997), Kisgen (2006), and 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2012)) credit ratings entail discrete benefits and costs for firms. 
Due to this fact, very often firms’ management takes into account the firms’ past and future
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credit ratings when deciding their corporate policies; a circumstance resulting into the 
presence of an atypical investment/financial behavior.
The effect of the proximity to a credit rating change on firms’ acquisition decisions is 
examined using a sample of US public and private acquisitions over the period 1996-2009. In 
order to measure the imminence of a credit rating change I apply three different measures. 
Credit rating outlook reports, the lagged credit rating changes, and the deviation of firms’ real 
rating from an “expected” empirically modeled credit rating. It is found for a first time in the 
literature, a non linear association between firms’ real credit rating levels (credit quality) and 
acquisition decisions. Furthermore, positive (negative) rating outlooks are positively 
(negatively) associated with acquisition decisions. Regarding past upgrades (downgrades) 
there seems to hold a positive (negative) relationship with acquisition decisions. Additionally, 
the association between the estimated deviation from an “expected” credit rating and takeover 
decisions is a positive. My results are statistically and economically significant, even after 
controlling for variables related with the likelihood of undertaking a takeover, and after 
controlling for the endogeneity of credit ratings. Overall my findings support the hypotheses 
and specifically, document the real impact of CRAs’ ratings and opinions on firms’ takeover 
policies.
Chapter 4 investigates the shareholder wealth effects around the announcements of 
mergers between bidders and targets that complement each other on the levels of debt 
capacity and growth opportunities, when high degrees of information asymmetry prevail. 
Theoretical literature explains that information asymmetry problems might lead to the 
distortion of “optimal” investment thus, leading to “underinvestment” (Myers and Majluf 
(1984)). The same literature suggests that one way to resolve “underinvestment” is through 
the conduction of a complementary acquisition. In particular, a complementary fit between a 
high debt capacity bidder facing limited investment opportunities and a low debt capacity
19
target facing high investment opportunities, along with high information asymmetry can 
create value through the undertaking of the positive NPV projects by the financially 
unconstrained bidder, which the financially constrained target, might pass up. The importance 
of this theoretical proposition for the amelioration of information asymmetry, and the 
creation of shareholder wealth is of a great magnitude however, the empirical literature on the 
topic is still scarce and sporadic. The study tries to shed more light on this issue by using a 
new data set, and a different research design from the one which has been used so far.
In order to re-examine this topic the study uses a sample of US public acquisitions over 
the period 1996-2009. One of my innovations is the use of bidders’ and targets’ credit ratings 
to proxy for debt capacity, and the relative creditworthiness between the firms. In sum I find 
that synergy gains are positively associated with the magnitude of complementarity in debt 
capacity and growth opportunities between the bidder and the target. The bidder returns are 
positively related with the degree of complementary fit between the bidder and the target. 
When it comes to target returns there exist a negative relationship with the amount of 
complementarity, as it appears that bidders avoid overpayment. Additionally, the significant 
effect of the complementary fit on synergy, bidding and target firm returns is mainly driven 
by the group of target firms that operate under a high information asymmetry environment. 
Finally the main results remain robust after testing for endogeneity bias in credit ratings.
Overall, the results of all three studies broadly support the existence of a material 
impact of CRAs actions and decisions on the outcomes of M&As.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 investigates the impact of credit ratings on 
the method of payment in M&As. Chapter 3 examines the effect of “expected” credit ratings 
changes on the likelihood of acquisitions. Chapter 4 re-investigates the shareholder wealth 
creation from complementary acquisitions. Each study is presented in a self-contained way. 
Final remarks and conclusions are given in the closing section.
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Chapter 2 
Credit Ratings and the Choice of Payment Method in Mergers and 
Acquisitions
2.1 Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have an important role in the finance world by 
evaluating the creditworthiness of a particular firm, security or obligation (see Securities and 
Exchange Commision (2003)) and assigning a rating. CRAs disclose and publicize this 
information (see Healy and Palepu (2001)) to the market, reducing information asymmetry 
and, as consequence, lowering the firm’s cost of capital. Additionally, previous literature 
gives evidence on how a firm’s capability to access public debt markets, implied either by the 
existence of firm credit rating (see Cantillo and Wright (2000), Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006), Lemmon and Zender (2010), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), and Flarford and Uysal 
(2012)) or rating level (see Bolton and Freixas (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), Diamond 
(1991), Rauh and Sufi (2010), and Radhakrishnan, Song and Yerramilli (2013)) can affect 
capital structure or investment decisions. In this respect, Kisgen (2006, 2009) documents that 
firms regularly target either specific rating levels or seek to preserve a certain threshold (for 
instance, investment grade); specifically, in order to secure the rating, firms adjust their 
capital structure policies by issuing equity, buying back debt or through assets sales and 
dividend cuts. Similarly, Koziol and Lawrenz (2010) argue that due to the presence of rating- 
triggered events, as step-up bonds, loss of access to the commercial paper market and 
strategic benefits in bidding for contracts, credit ratings have an impact on firm capital 
structure decisions.
In turn, the capital structure decision has been demonstrated to have a high importance 
in the corporate financing decision of merger and acquisition (M&As) investments. Bidding
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firms consummate M&As by using either cash or stock as the sole consideration in the 
transaction, while some transactions apply a mixture of cash and stock means of payment.^ A 
developing body of prior M&A studies has indicated that cash-financed acquisitions are to a 
great magnitude funded by debt (see Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), Faccio and Masulis
(2005), Harford et al. (2009), and Uysal (2011)). Additionally, in the literature which 
associates investment decisions with financial constraints, Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that 
information asymmetry influences firm investment decisions since, it forms financial 
constraints in the credit markets. Along these lines, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Whited (1992), and Campello and Chen (2010) use credit 
ratings as a proxy of firm financial constraints in the credit markets and propose that the 
existence of credit ratings mitigates information asymmetry about firm value, thus reducing 
financial constraints. This allows firms with rated publie debt to issue funds in a short notice 
according to their investment needs. However, one could argue that the simple existence of a 
credit rating does not prove ex-ante that a rated firm possess a higher capability to borrow 
funds. To illustrate this, assume we have two firms A and B. Firm A has high growth 
opportunities and a strong financial structure, but is deprived of public debt and credit rating. 
On the other hand, firm B has lower growth opportunities and a very low credit rating, as it 
faces a high debt burden and large default costs. Apparently, in this ease the unrated firm A 
has a higher debt capacity than firm B, instead of the fact that it does not carry a credit rating. 
The above argument raises two interesting questions in relation to the association between 
bidders’ credit ratings, as implied by their capability to access public debt markets, and the 
choice of method of payment. Does the mere existence of the bidding firms’ credit ratings - 
regardless of the level - affect the financing decision in M&As? What is the impact of a 
rating level on the choice of the acquisitions’ mode of exchange?
' The use o f  cash as a method o f payment in corporate takeovers was prevalent during the 80’s, followed by a 
decline during the 90’s, and it became popular again over the first decade o f  the new century (see Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001), and Martynova and Renneboog (2008)).
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Motivated by the low financial constraints of (highly) rated firms due to their relatively 
higher debt capacity and credit quality, I focus on these questions and investigate the role of 
credit ratings in the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. Regarding to debt 
capacity, various prior studies (see Cantillo and Wright (2000), Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006), and Lemmon and Zender (2010)) apply credit rating existence as a measure of debt 
capacity. There are two main interpretations proposed for the relationship between debt 
capacity and credit ratings: 1) the demand and supply factors of debt capacity,^ and 2) the 
pecking order theory. By stating that debt capacity is driven by demand and supply factors, 
these studies document that firms with credit ratings have relatively more tangible assets and 
fewer growth opportunities (demand side), lower levels of information asymmetry and less 
external frictions of debt in the form of credit rationing and reorganization costs (supply side) 
hence, being more leveraged (see Cantillo and Wright (2000), and Faulkender and Petersen
(2006)). Specifically, Faulkender and Petersen (2006)) empirically demonstrate that firms 
holding credit ratings are, in general, more leveraged; in particular, they employ 35% more 
debt in their capital structure implying relatively higher debt capacity. Secondly, Lemmon 
and Zender (2010) show that in the group of firms having a credit rating, the pecking order 
theory of capital structure is a good first-order explanation of their financing policy. That is, 
firms first select to use internally generated cash; however, when it comes to the choice of 
debt versus equity, financially unconstrained firms use firstly debt and lastly equity. 
Specifically, they face favorable borrowing costs up to the point where they do not surpass 
their debt capacity and consequently the use of extra debt does not comprise a burden in their 
value (see Myers (1977)).
 ^ On the demand side, firms with stable cash flows, higher proportions o f  fixed assets and low growth 
opportunities have higher debt capacity and therefore higher demand for debt financing (see Myers (1977)). On 
the supply side, asymmetric information between firm management and investors (see Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)) and debt market frictions (see Faulkender and Petersen (2006)) can impede firms’ capability to issue 
more debt, mainly due to credit rationing from the lenders and imperfect access to public debt markets.
23
Accordingly, Billett, Hribar and Liu (2011) state that firms with higher credit ratings 
face lower cost of debt, which, ceteris paribus, prompts an enhanced debt capacity. 
Regarding credit quality, Liu and Malatesta (2005), and Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that 
the higher the level of credit ratings, the lower the information asymmetry and the adverse 
selection problem confronted by firms. In a different framework, theoretical studies that 
investigate firms’ debt composition suggest that as credit quality improves, it is more 
probable for firms to choose “arms length” than bank-debt funding (Boot and Thakor (1997), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Diamond (1991), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and 
Bolton and Freixas (2000)). Specifically, firms face a choice between bank- and public-debt. 
On the one hand, banks are more efficient in minimizing the cost of financial distress through 
their monitoring function; nevertheless, they bear intermediation costs that are passed out to 
the borrowers creating bank debt more expensive than public debt. On the other hand, bonds 
carry lower interest rates however; public borrowers incur higher costs if they become 
distressed. The final corollary of the proposed models is that firms with high credit quality 
borrow from public bond markets, while it pays off for firms with low levels of credit quality 
to turn into bank (monitored) financing. Along the same lines, Rauh and Sufi (2010) 
document empirically that low credit quality firms seem to depend more often on costly types 
of debt financing that include secured bank-debt with tight covenants for liquidity, and 
subordinated public-debt relative to high credit quality firms.
Furthermore, Radhakrishnan et al. (2013) demonstrate that firms with high credit 
ratings face a lower exposure to rollover-risk and their bonds trade at lower yield spreads 
than firms with low credit ratings. Similarly, evidence from studies that investigate in 
particular the impact of credit rating levels on bond yield spreads (see Bderington, Yawitz 
and Roberts (1987), Liu and Thakor (1984), West (1973), Ziebart and Reiter (1992), and 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007)) document a strong negative relationship. Finally, several
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regulations of financial institutions and other intermediaries are directly fixed to credit ratings 
issued by “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (NRSROs) (see Kisgen
(2007)). Specifically, a high number of institutional investors are prohibited from investing in 
low credit rating firms or below a certain threshold (investment grade) due to considerations 
associated with investors’ wealth conservation. Hence, firms with high levels of credit ratings 
avoid these regulatory constraints and face a larger “investor base” when seeking to borrow 
capital for the financing of their investment projects.
In this study, I use a sample of US acquisitions of publicly traded bidders over the 
period 1998-2009 in order to investigate my main hypotheses which are outlined as follows: 
1) bidders holding a credit rating should have better access to public debt markets. Thus, this 
lack of financial constraints makes them less hesitant to use their cash in the present as it will 
be relatively easier for them to borrow “fresh cash” in the future whenever it is required.^ 
However, this hypothesis does not capture the full dimensions of a firms’ debt capacity status 
as discussed above. In fact, the simple existence of bidder firms’ credit rating does not 
necessarily implies higher debt capacity than unrated firms and hence, does not entail ceteris 
paribus a positive relation with the use of cash financing in M&As. Therefore, the sign and 
magnitude of the association between rating existence and cash mode of exchange is a matter 
of empirical investigation; 2) bidders with a higher credit rating level (i.e., better credit 
quality) have relatively better opportunities to borrow as they incur lower cost debt and 
higher demand for their debt securities. Hence, it is expected a positive relationship between 
rating level and cash method of payment in M&As.
However, previous literature, which investigated the determinants of the method of 
payment in acquisitions, documents that this choice is driven either by other variables used to
 ^Note that cash used in M&A transactions may be sourced either from past operations or from additional debt; 
the source o f accumulated cash is beyond the scope o f this work. The point I wish to make here is that, 
regardless o f the source o f cash, rated bidders might have higher propensity to make use o f  it due to their ease o f  
access to the credit markets in the future.
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measure debt capacity (see Faecio and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009), and Uysal 
(2011)) or other factors such as growth opportunities (see Martin (1996)), information 
asymmetry about the bidding or target firm value (see Eekbo, Giammarino and Heinkel 
(1990), Hansen (1987), and Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009)), corporate control 
issues (see Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), Ghosh and Ruland (1998), Martin (1996), and 
Faceio and Masulis (2005)), concerns relating to the potential competition for the target (see 
Fishman (1989), and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)), agency costs of free cash flow (see 
Jensen (1986)), market timing (see Shleifer and Vishny (2003), and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004)), target status and diversification effects (see Faceio and Masulis 
(2005)), and the mode of acquisition (see Martin (1996)). Therefore, 1 am examining if these 
hypotheses are still valid, after taking into account the impact of all the above factors. In my 
investigations 1 control for these determinants by including the variables suggested in prior 
studies.
Different econometric methodologies are employed to estimate the probability of the 
choice of payment method and it is found that: 1) The likelihood of a cash offer or fraction of 
cash used as payment method in the takeover bid are not significantly associated with bidder 
credit rating existence; 2) The likelihood of a cash offer or fraction of cash used in the 
acquisition bid have a strong positive relationship with bidding firm credit rating level. In 
economic terms, after transforming the coefficients of the regressions into average marginal 
effects, one point rise in bidder rating level increases the likelihood of cash means of 
financing used in an M&A transaction by 6.52% over the sample average; 3) Unused debt 
capacity, measured with the relative credit rating level of bidder to target, also appears to be a 
determinant of cash financing in M&As corroborating the view that credit ratings are related 
with the choice of payment method in acquisitions; 4) My main results continue to hold even
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after taking into aeeount the possible endogenous nature of the main variables of interest, 
credit rating existence and credit rating level.
This study has several contributions in the M&As, capital structure and credit ratings 
literature. First, it adds to the existing literature on the determinants of method of payment, 
and especially the relationship between a firm’s credit rating and the use of cash or stock 
financing in acquisitions. Second, it investigates both credit rating existence and credit rating 
level as measures of the firm’s capability to access public debt markets. Third, it presents 
more evidence regarding the association between credit ratings and firm’s capital structure 
policies; in particular, the financing decision in takeover bids. Generally, my results imply 
that credit ratings ameliorate information asymmetry and, consequently, reduce bidding 
firms’ cost of capital; firms having a high rating incur lower financial constraints and can 
issue public debt for investment purposes with relatively less frictions. My findings also 
provide straightforward implications for academics and practitioners. Specifically, bidding 
firms with high credit quality and access to public debt markets are able to conduct cash 
acquisitions and, therefore, rip the benefits related to that form of payment. In particular, 
prior literature demonstrates that bidders using cash currency enjoy non-negative abnormal 
returns in acquisitions of both public (see Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Moeller, 
Sehlingemann and Stulz (2004), Travlos (1987), and Sehlingemann (2004)), and private 
targets (see Chang (1998), Moeller et al. (2004), and Officer, Poulsen and Stegemoller
(2009)). Furthermore, there exists empirical evidence that the usage of cash meets low target 
managerial resistance and inhibits competition from rival bidders during takeover contests 
(see Betton, Eekbo and Thorbum (2009), Fishman (1989), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), and 
Chemmanur et al. (2009)).
This study is related to a number of previous works. For instance, studies that 
investigate the determinants of the method of payment choice, such as (Amihud et al. (1990),
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Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), Eekbo et al. (1990), Fishman (1989), Hansen (1987), 
Jensen (1986), Martin (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Chemmanur et al. (2009), Faceio 
and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Uysal 
(2011)). In fact, Faecio and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009), and Uysal (2011) who 
study particularly the impact of a firm’s debt capacity on the eash-stoek choice of payment 
are more directly associated to this work. Faceio and Masulis (2005), employ bidder’s 
leverage, collateral and interlocking directorships, while Harford et al. (2009), and Uysal 
(2011) use the deviation from bidder’s target debt ratios as a proxy of debt capacity. 1, 
instead, apply credit ratings as measures of debt capacity and credit quality. Sufi (2009) 
examines the impact of the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings on various firm 
financing and investment decisions, including the decision to pay with cash for the 
consummation of an acquisition. In this work, 1 concentrate on the relationship between long 
term bond ratings and payment method in corporate acquisitions. More recently, Alshwer, 
Sibilkov and Zaiats (2011) examine the relationship between financial constraints and the 
choice of payment method in M&As. My study focuses specifically on the direct impact of 
credit ratings in the M&As’ financing method by employing various credit rating variables in 
the empirical analysis. Moreover, Harford and Uysal (2012) study the effect of bidding firm 
access to bond markets, as implied by the existence of credit ratings, on the decision to 
undertake a takeover and shareholders’ wealth creation. In this study, 1 focus on the influence 
of both credit rating existence and credit rating level in a different acquisition decision; that 
is, the choice of payment method. Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Lemmon and Zender
(2010), and Kisgen (2006, 2009) investigate the impact of credit ratings on firms’ capital 
structure policy. Here, 1 examine the effect of credit ratings on firms’ financing decision -  
that is, in turn, associated with their capital structure -  in the context of M&As.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the 
determinants of the choice of method of payment in M&As documented in prior literature 
providing also the variables definitions used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 describes 
the sample. Section 2.4 analyzes the methodology and findings of the empirical tests. I 
present further robustness checks of my results in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes 
the chapter.
2.2 Determinants of the Method of Payment Choice and Variables Definitions
2.2.1 Debt Capacity y Financial Condition, Market Credit Risk and Method o f Payment
Prior literature has shown that there are several factors that capture debt capacity. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) use the collateral variable, which is the ratio of property, plant 
and equipment (PPE) to book value of total assets at the year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement to proxy for debt capacity. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) report a 
strong positive effect of tangible assets to the firm’s level of debt. The bidder’s size is another 
variable of relevance, as larger firms are more diversified and, hence, have a lower 
probability of default, enabling them to issue more debt. To account for this effect, the 
variable size is used, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 4 weeks 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, financial leverage controls for bidder’s 
financial condition. The variable leverage is measured by the ratio of a firm’s total financial 
debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to the book value of total assets in the 
fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. The predicted sign of this variable is 
ambiguous as Faccio and Masulis (2005) find a negative association between leverage and 
the likelihood of cash, while Harford et al. (2009) report a positive relation. Finally, in order 
to capture the effect of market credit conditions, Harford (2005) uses the variable interest 
rate spread, which is the spread between the average rate on commercial and industrial loans
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and the Federal Funds rate. This variable is provided by the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer’s (SLO) survey and proxies for the ease of fmaneing or credit constraints in the 
economy."  ^ When the spread is low, and therefore firms face relatively lower cost of debt 
capital, the likelihood of cash acquisition should be higher. Therefore, a negative relationship 
between the interest rate spread and the likelihood of cash deals is predicted.
2.2.2 Growth Opportunities, Market Timing and Method o f Payment
The investment opportunities theory posits that a relation between acquirer valuation 
and mode of acquisition exists, as long as the firms with more growth opportunities avoid 
underinvestment problems caused by high levels of debt finance; in response to that, they 
prefer to use stock (see Martin (1996), and Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996)). To proxy for growth 
opportunities, the bidder’s book to market ratio is used and a positive relationship with the 
likelihood of a cash consideration is expected. The variable book-to-market is defined as the 
book value of equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement divided by 
the market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement.
Moreover, according to the market overvaluation theory (see Shleifer and Vishny
(2003), and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)) acquirers favor stock acquisitions when 
their equity is relatively overvalued to target firms’ equity in order to decrease acquisition 
costs. Faccio and Masulis (2005) use run-up to measure bidder overvaluation. Run-up is the 
bidder market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the period (-205, -6) days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.
I also use in the robustness section analysis an additional proxy o f market credit conditions; this is the yield 
spread between BBB-AAA bonds (see Longstaff (2004)).
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2.2.3 Asymmetric Information, Target Status and Method o f Payment
Hansen (1987), and Chemmanur et al. (2009) suggest that bidder information 
asymmetry plays a significant role in the choice of payment method in M&As. Particularly, 
in cases where bidders possess proprietary information about their own value, they are more 
likely to use stock when their firm stock is considered relatively “overvalued” and cash when 
their firms stock is considered relatively “undervalued”. Accordingly, the higher the degree 
of information asymmetry faced by target firms when evaluating bidders’ offer, the higher the 
likelihood of accepting a cash offer as the acceptance of bidder’s equity might turn out to be a 
costly option if the bidder is overvalued. To control for information asymmetry, the variable 
intangibles is employed, which is estimated as the ratio of the firm’s total intangible assets to 
the book value of total assets in the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition.^ Barth and 
Kasznik (1999), and Officer et al. (2009) argue that information asymmetry increases with 
the level of intangible assets.
Additionally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) take into aeeount the effect of target status on 
the choice of payment method. This is justified on the grounds that in deals where an unlisted 
target is involved, the seller’s consumption/liquidity needs have to be considered. These 
sellers are likely to prefer cash due to the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio 
holdings in a timely attempt to cash out their wealth opportunities. To capture target status, 
the private variable is used, which is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for an unlisted 
target and 0 otherwise.
 ^Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Chemmanur et al. (2009) I also use other measures o f  
information asymmetry such as the analysts forecasts' error and the standard deviation o f  analysts’ forecasts 
with data retrieved from IBES for the last month or three last months o f  the fiscal year preceding the acquisition; 
the results remain qualitatively similar, however, the sample reduces significantly due to the low coverage o f  
analysts forecasts’ data.
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2.2.4 Firm Control, Monitoring and Method o f Payment
In the spirit of Stulz (1988), and Jung et al. (1996) the likelihood of losing control in 
their firm leads managers to prefer debt or internal resources relative to equity when deciding 
to finance an acquisition; this is due to the fact that issuance of new stock is likely to dilute 
their stake in the bidding firm leading to a loss of control and outside intervention. Thus, 
managers with higher ownership stakes in the bidding firm are more likely to use cash as a 
payment form in takeover bids (see Amihud et al. (1990), Ghosh and Ruland (1998), Martin
(1996), and Faceio and Masulis (2005)).
Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) 
argue that blockholders can monitor the action of corporate managers which helps align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and leads to better corporate performance. Among 
others, one of the major actions that large investors can take to improve corporate 
performance is to advise and put pressure on bidder’s managers to proceed to a potential bid 
or abandon it. These actions include judgments about the terms of the acquisition bid such as 
the choice of the payment method. Given the empirical evidence on the wealth effects of 
stock-financed public acquisitions, which demonstrates a significant reduction of bidder’s 
shareholders wealth (see Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Travlos (1987), and Sehlingemann
(2004)) the likelihood of pure stock takeover deals should be lower when blockholdings are 
higher. To capture these effects, the variable hlockholder ownership is employed, which is a 
measure of the aggregate holdings of blockholders who own at least 5% of the firm’s stock.
2.2.5 Pecking Order, Free Cash Flow and Method o f Payment
Myers (1984) in his pecking order theory, argues that managers follow a financing 
hierarchy; that is, they use firstly internal finance, then debt, and finally external equity 
financing. Moreover, Jensen (1986) states that firms with large amounts of free cash flow are
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likely to conduct value destroying acquisitions with cash. In particular, firms with large 
amounts of cash, cash flow or sufficient amount of debt capacity are more likely to use cash 
to finance their various investment projects. To control for this effect, cash flows to assets 
variable is used, which represents the income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by firm’s book value of total assets 
at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. It is expected a 
positive association between this variable and the likelihood of a cash acquisition.
2.2.6 Hostility, Competition, Mode o f Acquisition, Relative Size, Intra-Industry Deals and 
Method o f Payment
In addition, the characteristics of a takeover deal might have an influence on the 
payment method. In hostile acquisitions or in eases where more than one bidders compete for 
a particular target, the bidder might want to consummate the deal relatively quickly and deter 
competition (see Fishman (1989), and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)) thus choosing cash 
as medium of exchange. Therefore, hostile deals variable is used, which is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 for hostile acquisitions and 0 otherwise. The variable 
competition proxies for the degree of competition the bidder faces during a takeover; this is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when more than one bidders enter the bidding 
contest and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, in tender offers when the bidder incumbent management desires to close 
the deal earlier, cash is also preferred. That is because tender offers with stock must be made 
in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933, which entails a substantial delay, mainly 
because the registration statement must be reviewed by the SEC (see Martin (1996)). Tender 
offers is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions labeled as tender offers and 0 
otherwise.
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Moreover, the likelihood of using eash is likely to decrease by the size of the target 
relative to the bidder, because it is more difficult to raise large amounts of eash as the size of 
the deal increases to very high levels. To control for this effect, Harford et al. (2009) employ 
the variable relative size. Relative size is defined as the value of the transaction divided by 
bidder market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement.
Finally, the industry diversification effect is another important determinant of the 
choice of the payment method. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that in unrelated industries 
in which sellers are not well acquainted with the industry risks and prospects of the bidder’s 
business sector, they should be relatively more reluctant to accept stock as a method of 
payment, primarily because of bidder’s overvaluation risk. In this case, sellers are likely to 
prefer cash in order to mitigate the overvaluation problem. To capture this effect, the 
diversifying deals variable is used, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for inter­
industry transactions, and 0 for intra-industry transactions. Industries are defined at the 2- 
digit SIC level from the Thomson Financial SDC.
2.3 Sample and Data
2.3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
I download a sample of US domestic acquisitions announced over the period January 1, 
1998 and December 31, 2009 from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. The start date of the sample was driven by the availability of data for all variables 
used in the empirical analysis.^ The sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful 
deals. It is required deals to have non-missing transaction value and payment method 
information. Bidders are listed firms and targets are either listed or private firms. The original
 ^ Specifically, this is due to availability o f  blockholder ownership data from the Thomson ONE ownership 
database. This database provides ownership data starting from 3 f ‘ March 1997 and therefore I prefer to start the 
sample from f ‘ January 1998 in order to have a more coherent collection o f years. In fact, the main results are 
similar when I include the remaining observations o f the year 1997.
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sample ineludes 13,048 deals. I remove from the sample all deals classified as repurchases, 
liquidations, restructurings, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, reverse takeovers, privatizations, 
bankruptcy acquisitions and going private transactions. This reduces the sample to 10,828 
observations. Furthermore, to include in the sample deals that represent a transfer of control, 
it is required that the bidder owns less than 10% of target shares before the announcement 
and seeks to acquire more than 50% after the acquisition. There are 10,166 transactions that 
meet these criteria. Furthermore, deals worth less than US$ 1 million and less than 1% of a 
bidder market value are dropped to avoid noise in the analysis. Eventually, there are 6,819 
deals that satisfy the above requirements.
Credit rating information for the bidder is collected from COMPUSTAT. Credit ratings 
represent the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit ratings. In my 
sample, the highest level of bidder one month prior to the acquisition announcement is AAA 
and the lowest is CCC. Out of the 6,819 transactions, 1,747 transactions involve bidders with 
a credit rating and 5,072 transactions with unrated firms. The main variables of interest are i) 
the rating existence, which is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a bidding firm has a credit 
rating one month prior to the acquisition announcement, and 0 otherwise; and ii) the rating 
level, which is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 22/^
2.3.2 Sample Statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and by payment method 
(i.e., more than 50% eash and less than 50% cash). For the entire sample of 6,819 
acquisitions, 3,156 targets are acquired with more than 50% eash and 3,583 acquisitions 
comprise less than 50% eash means of transaction. There are also 80 acquisitions that are
’ A higher rating level corresponds to a larger number (i.e., 22 for AAA and 1 for D -  in my case the lowest 
number is 5 as the lower credit rating level is CCC). See Appendix B for a correspondence between each credit 
rating level and the number assigned to it.
 ^ In the robustness checks section I also proxy for bidders’ credit quality by using a dummy variable for 
investment-grade firms (i.e., firms with a credit rating BBB- or above).
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financed exactly with 50% eash and 50% stock. Panel A demonstrates bidder specific 
characteristics, which appear to differ between the two payment types. The proportion of 
bidders holding a credit rating {rating existence) is higher in cash-dominated financed deals 
(27.8%) than bidders in acquisitions with less than 50% eash (24.1%). The mean difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Mean bidder size for cash-dominated deals is US$ 
3,672.396 million, whereas the average bidder size for non-cash dominated deals is larger 
(US$ 5,092.108 million). Bidders in cash-dominated deals have significantly higher mean 
and median leverage and collateral relative to bidders in non-cash dominated deals. 
Furthermore, bidders book-to-market mean (median) ratio is significantly higher in cash- 
financed acquisitions 0.530 (0.417), than in acquisitions with less than 50% eash (0.442 
(0.339)), which is consistent with the growth opportunities story. Additionally, bidders mean 
(median) run-up is significantly lower in eash deals (0.010 (-0.069)) relative to non-eash 
dominated acquisitions (0.209 (-0.027)). The figures from the run-up variable support the 
overvaluation theory. Regarding blockholder ownership, in cash acquisitions bidders have 
relatively more concentrated ownership with a mean (median) of 25.97% (22.63%), while in 
non-cash dominated deals they are the more widely diffused (17.59% (11.82%)). This finding 
is in line with the corporate control hypothesis. Cash flows to assets is significantly higher in 
cash acquisitions with a mean (median) of 0.052 (0.074) than in non-eash dominated 
acquisitions (-0.046 (0.013)), in support of the free cash flow hypothesis. Finally, intangibles 
appear to differ between the two methods of payment, as the mean (median) intangibles are 
0.205 (0.142) for eash deals and 0.123 (0.034) for less than 50% eash financed deals, 
respectively.
Panel B presents the statistics for target characteristics. Target mean (median) leverage 
is significantly lower in eash deals (0.174 (0.108)) than in non-eash dominated deals (0.204 
(0.153)). Concerning target book-to-market ratio I am not able to establish a significant mean
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or median difference between the two methods of payment. Additionally, target mean and 
median blockholder ownership, intangibles and profitability are significantly higher in eash 
deals than in non-cash dominated financed deals.
Panel C presents the statistics for deal-specific characteristics, which, again, appear to 
differ between the two financing categories. The mean (median) interest rate spread is 
significantly higher in cash-financed acquisitions 2.188 (2.120), than in less than 50% eash 
financed acquisitions (2.090 (2.050)). The average (median) size of the target relative to the 
bidder {relative size) is lower for cash deals 23.0% (8.6%), than the relative size of non-eash 
dominated deals 33.2% (13.0%). Consistent with the previous analysis, the percentage of 
bidders and targets being in the same industry is lower for non-cash dominated deals 
(34.22%), while eash deals have a higher proportion of diversifying deals (38.47%). The 
statistics for the hostile deals support the mode of acquisition hypothesis as the percentage of 
hostile acquisitions is higher in eash deals (2.19%) than in less than 50% eash acquisitions 
(0.81%). Moreover, 8.40% of cash-financed acquisitions represent tender offers, while only 
1.28% of non-cash dominated form of financing are tender offers. In eash deals the 
percentage of acquisitions of private targets accounts for 72.66% of the overall sample, while 
in non-cash dominated deals acquisitions of private targets represent the 57.10% of the 
overall sample. Finally, the number o f bidders is significantly higher, on average, in cash 
deals (1.035) than in non-cash dominated deals (1.024).
[Please Look Table 2.1]
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics by rated and unrated bidders. The statistics 
from this table will shed further light on the relation between the method of payment and 
credit ratings. Panel A presents bidder characteristics. Rated bidders are, on average, larger 
(US$ 12,920.240 million) than unrated ones (US$ 1,508.230 million). Further, rated bidders
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have significantly higher mean and median leverage, collateral, book-to-market and lower 
mean and median pre-aequisition run-up than unrated bidders. The average (median) 
blockholder ownership is lower for the rated bidders (18.30% (13.88%)) relative to the 
unrated ones (22.90% (18.71%)). Finally, rated bidders also exhibit higher mean and median 
cash holdings and intangibles than bidders without a credit rating.
Panel B reports statistics for targets characteristics by rated and unrated bidders. Target 
firms receiving bid offers by rated bidders appear to have higher mean and median leverage, 
book-to-market, intangibles and profitability ratios than target firms associated with unrated 
bidders.
With respect to deal characteristics, the relative size of the transactions appears to differ 
as the median value of the rated group is 0.086 and is significantly lower than the unrated 
group (0.111). Further, in the rated group the mean (median) fraction of cash that is used as 
method of payment is greater (0.506 (0.505)) than the unrated group (0.457 (0.424)). 
Concerning hostile acquisitions and tender offers, rated bidders execute more deals of these 
types compared to unrated ones. Finally, I find that rated bidders are involved in less private 
deals and face a higher degree of competition in the takeover contest than unrated ones.
[Please Look Table 2.2]
From the analysis so far, it has been noticed that rated bidders have, for instance, 
significantly larger size and higher leverage, among others, than unrated bidders. 
Additionally, size and leverage are important determinants of the financing method in M&As. 
Therefore, in order to establish a more concrete statistical relationship and uncover the net 
effects of the credit rating variables, I present, in the next section, multivariate analysis 
controlling for several determinants of the choice of payment method. The correlation matrix 
of the above variables is presented in Table 2.3. The main variables of interest - rating
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existence and rating level - do not exhibit high correlation with the control variables. This 
should moderate econometric difficulties (such as multicollinearity concerns) in 
disentangling any effects of the credit rating variables on the choice of the payment method 
in takeover deals.
[Please Look Table 2.3]
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Fractional Logit Regressions
In order to investigate the relationship between credit ratings and the choice of payment 
form in acquisitions, I firstly use as dependent variable the fraction of eash as part of the total 
price offered by the bidder. Since by definition this variable is a fractional response and lies 
in the interval [0, 1], I follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and use a Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) Logit regression where the parameters of the model are obtained by the Quasi- 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE).
2.4.2 Credit Rating Existence and Method o f Payment
Initially, it is examined the relation between bidder credit rating existence and method 
of payment by controlling for various bidder-, and deal-specific characteristics. All 
regressions also control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. 
Additionally, I use heteroskedastieity-robust standard errors adjusted also for bidder 
clustering due to the presence of repeated acquirers in the sample. Table 2.4 presents the 
results, in which the first main variable of interest is the rating existence. Specification (1) 
also includes bidder size. I find that the rating existence coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level. Bidder size has a negative association with the cash
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consideration in contrast to my hypothesis for debt capacity.^ In specification (2) I add further 
bidder- and deal-speeifie characteristics. Noticeably, I observe that the significant 
relationship between cash deals and rating existence disappears. This finding is in line with 
the prediction that the mere existence of credit rating does not prove ex-ante the superior debt 
capacity of rated firms.
Additionally, in the regression I am able to confirm the results from the past literature 
as I find that most of the control variables have a significant relationship with the eash 
consideration. More specifically, independent variables that capture firm’s financial 
condition, such as Leverage and Collateral carry positive and significant coefficients. Book- 
to-market is consistent with the growth opportunities theory as it is positively related with the 
use of eash. Further, I am able to confirm the market timing hypothesis, since I find that run­
up is negatively associated with eash method of payment. That is firms with high pre- 
aequisition valuations are less likely to use cash in the transaction. In addition, I find that the 
higher the concentration of ownership the more likely the use of eash consideration, as 
blockholder ownership holds a positive and statistically significant coefficient at conventional 
levels. The free eash flow hypothesis is also supported by my results; cash flows to assets 
carries a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance level. With respect to 
information asymmetry, I corroborate the past literature and find that the bidder intangibles 
are positively associated with the use of eash. Relative size is negatively related with the use 
of cash in M&As, while the target private status is positively associated with cash financing. 
Lastly, I document that in diversifying, hostile and tender offer deals, cash is more likely to 
be the means of payment.
 ^My results should not be affected by any potential multicollinearity, given the large sample size with sufficient 
variation in our explanatory variables. I still perform a multicollinearity (VIF) test for all specifications 
throughout the study and find that correlation between explanatory variables does not have any material effect 
on the estimates.
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2.4.3 Credit Rating Level and Method o f Payment
In the previous section it is documented that when I take into aeeount a variety of 
factors known to affect the method of payment decision, the relation between the existence of 
credit ratings and the use of eash disappears. In this section, I attempt to shed light on the 
second research question: How is credit quality related with the method of payment in 
M&As? In this respect, I use the rating level as the main variable of interest. Table 2.4 
(spécifications (3) and (4)) presents the results for this analysis. First, in specification (3) I 
also add bidder size. The variable of interest has a positive and significant coefficient at the 
1% significance level. Bidder size exhibits a negative relationship with the use of cash. In 
specification (4) I also control for other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics in the 
sample. Consistent with my prediction, the higher the credit rating level, the higher the 
likelihood of a cash acquisition. This result has a strong economic significance, as one point 
rise in the rating level increases the likelihood of using cash mode of payment in acquisitions 
in the overall sample by 6.52%.^® From the remaining control variables, size, book-to-market, 
cash flows to assets, relative size, diversifying, hostile, tender offers and private acquisitions 
carry significant coefficients at conventional levels with signs consistent to the prior M&A 
literature.
[Please Look Table 2.4]
2.4.4 Probit Regressions
In this section we try to distinguish the qualitative nature of the choice of the medium 
of payment by using Probit regressions. The parameters of the Probit model are computed 
with the method of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). In this respect, the dependent
This is estimated by calculating average marginal effects and dividing the coefficient o f  the main independent 
variable o f interest to the mean value o f the percentage o f eash that is used for acquisitions in the total sample.
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variable takes the value of 1 for deals financed with more than 50% cash and 0 for deals 
financed with more than 50% stock. Table 2.5 presents the results for the Probit regressions.^^
2.4.5 Credit Rating Existence and Method o f Payment
Consistent with the above analysis I examine the relation between credit rating 
existence and the likelihood of using eash as the consideration in M&As. My main variable 
of interest is the rating existence and the control variables are the same as above. The results 
are qualitatively similar with the analysis in Table 2.4, since in specification (1), which 
ineludes only one control variable (i.e. bidder size), the main variable of interest exhibits a 
positive and significant coefficient, whereas in the full model (2) the significant association 
between credit rating existence and the probability of a cash acquisition disappears. All other 
control variables generally exhibit the same relationship with the choice of cash method of 
payment as in Table 2.4.
2.4.6 Credit Rating Level and Method o f Payment
Next, I test the relation between credit rating levels and the likelihood of using cash as 
the method of payment in M&As. The main variable of interest is the rating level and the 
control variables are as above. In specification (3), which adds only bidder size as control 
variable, the rating level is significant at the 1% significance level, and in specification (4) 
which comprises the full model, the rating level is also positive and significant at the 1%
A benefit o f  a Probit regression is that it allows one to focus on the qualitative decision o f firms to finance 
with cash or stock. In many mixed deals the acquirer does not always specify the actual percentage o f  cash 
financing, as target shareholders are offered with a choice o f  cash or stock financing. Thus, the decision can also 
be specified as choosing among cash, stock or a mixture. In that respect, an Ordered Probit regression is 
preferred, in which the dependent variable is 0 for pure stock deals, 1 for mixed deals, and 2 for all cash deals as 
in Faccio and Masulis (2005). In the robustness section I present the analysis by using Ordered Probit and my 
results are qualitatively similar.
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significance level. That is, the higher the credit rating the more likely bidders to use cash in a 
takeover deal.
[Please Look Table 2.5]
2.4.7 Unused Debt Capacity and Method o f Payment
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a specific financial rationale for M&As based on the 
complementary fit between different levels of debt capacity of bidders and targets. Bruner 
(1988) concentrates particularly in the case in which target firms with increased growth 
opportunities face capital constraints regarding the financing of their investment 
opportunities; the author suggests that it always pays for a bidder with higher debt capacity 
and lower growth opportunities to acquire a capital constrained target, since the higher debt 
capacity of the combined firm will help the firm to put forward all the positive NPV projects 
that the constrained firm might pass up. On the other hand. Smith and Kim (1994) 
empirically document that the positive effect of unused debt capacity materializes to the 
opposite direction; that is, a capital constrained bidder acquires an unconstrained target. 
Hence, considerations of unused debt capacity between the merging firms can influence the 
likelihood of using cash as a method of payment; this is mainly due to the fact that the unused 
debt capacity in one of the two merging parties will lead bidders to use cash for the 
consummation of the deal, since any increase in leverage associated with cash payments will 
be absorbed by the unused debt capacity of the combined firm.
To measure unused debt capacity, the BRating/TRating variable is proposed, which is 
the ratio of the bidder credit rating level to target firm credit rating level measuring the 
difference in debt capacity between the two merging participants. Additionally, given the
In the robustness section I also put as dependent variable the value o f 1 for deals financed with more than 
50% stock and 0 for deals with more than 50% cash and find the opposite result. In particular, the dependent 
variable experiences a negative relationship with rating levels, implying that stock method o f payment is a 
decreasing function o f rating levels.
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arguments for the existence of a non-linear relationship described above, I include the 
quadratic form of the above variable, (BRating/TRatingfl, which is simply a polynomial term. 
Furthermore, I follow Bruner (1988) and create an interaction variable between 
BRating/TRating and Relative Size of the deal.^^ This can be justified by the fact that the 
impact of unused debt capacity of the merging firms on the choice of cash method of 
payment should decrease in large transaction values, since it is more difficult to raise large 
amounts of cash as the size of the deal increases to very high levels. It is worth mentioning 
that in my sample of 353 deals where both bidders and targets possess a credit rating, roughly 
69% of the deals consists of bidders with a higher credit rating level than targets with a mean 
(median) value of 1.21 (1.13). This is translated in bidders holding approximately 3 (2) 
notches higher credit ratings than targets.
Table 2.6 presents the results for this analysis, which runs second-order polynomial 
(GLM) Logit regressions where the dependent variable is the fraction of cash used in the 
acquisition. We notice that the number of observations reduces significantly due to the 
requirement that target firms should also hold a credit rating, which leaves private deals out 
of this analysis. In specification (1) I also add bidder size. The BRating/TRating coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the {BRating/TRatingŸ variable 
carries a negative and significant coefficient at the 10% significance level. These results 
confirm my prediction for the existence of a non-linear relationship between the unused debt 
capacity of the merging parties and the choice of payment method. Particularly, the 
relationship seems to follow an inverted U-shape (Parabola) curve. This means that the 
positive effect of bidders’ higher credit rating relative to targets increases at a decreasing rate 
and implies that beyond a specific point the effect becomes negative, consistent to the notion 
that the relationship can be positive even when the BRating/TRating is decreasing (i.e., the
The variables BRating/TRating and (BRating/TRatingf are centered around their mean values to avoid any 
multicollinearity issues related with the use o f polynomial terms in these regressions.
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target firm holds a higher credit rating than the bidding firm). In specification (2) I also add 
all control variables used in the previous analysis as well as the interaction variable 
BRating/TRating X  Relative Size. The BRating/TRating carries a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 1 % and the {BRating/TRating^ carries a negative and significant coefficient 
at the 5% significance level, respectively. Moreover, as expected, the coefficient of the 
interaction variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the 
incremental effect of unused debt capacity on the proportion of cash financing decreases as 
the relative size of the deal increases. Overall, the results imply that the existence of unused 
debt capacity constitutes a determinant of the use of cash as a method of payment in M&As 
lending further support to the importance of credit ratings in the choice of acquisition 
financing.
[Please Look Table 2.6]
2.5 Further Robustness Tests
In the previous analysis I provided evidence that firms with high credit quality (i.e., 
firms holding a higher credit rating) are more likely to use cash or a higher fraction of cash 
when they finance an acquisition, while I did not find any strong evidence of a relationship 
between the choice of cash method of payment and credit rating existence. In this section, I 
offer additional auxiliary tests to check the validity of my findings.
2.5.1 Investment-Grade Vs Speculative-Grade Firms
In order to shed further light on the relationship between credit rating quality and the 
choice of payment method in M&As, I investigate, for robustness reasons, the impact of 
investment grade credit ratings. Investment-grade firms are the ones rated with BBB- or 
above as in An and Chan (2008). These firms are, in general, of higher creditworthiness
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relative to the speculative-grade firms (i.e. firms with a credit rating below BBB-). In this 
respect, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), and Chen et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
investment grade firms generate lower bond yield spreads relative to the speculative grade 
ones. Additionally, Molina (2005), and Almeida and Philippon (2007) empirically document 
that default costs are considerably lower for investment-grade firms than for the speculative- 
grade ones. Furthermore, due to the absence of regulation restrictions regarding allocations in 
securities of investment grade firms (see Kisgen (2007), and Kisgen and Strahan (2010)) 
these firms enjoy a larger clientele base and a higher demand for their debt securities. If 
investment grade firms face lower cost of debt capital and have a wider access to investors, 
then it is plausible that they are able to borrow more and use cash more frequently as a 
method of payment in a takeover deal. Thus, I create the variable investment grade dummy 
taking the value of 1 for firms rated BBB- and above, and 0 otherwise. Table 2.7 reports the 
results.
In specification (I) the dependent variable is the fraction of cash as part of the total 
price offered by the bidder and in specification (2) the dependent variable is the choice 
between more than 50% cash and more than 50% stock consideration. In both specifications I 
also incorporate the control variables employed in previous analyses. The coefficient of the 
investment grade carries a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance level in 
both specifications. In economic terms, being an investment grade bidder increases the 
likelihood of using cash as a payment form by 18.94% over the sample average. Overall, the 
results of this analysis add further support to the hypothesis that firms with high credit quality 
are more likely to use cash financing in M&As.
[Please Look Table 2.7]
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2.5.2 Endogeneity Control
2.5.2.1 Propensity Score Matching
So far, in the analysis I treated the credit rating variables as exogenous to my model; 
that is the decision to obtain a credit rating and the level of credit ratings are randomly 
allocated across the sample firms. However, Liu and Malatesta (2005), An and Chan (2008), 
and Harford and Uysal (2012) argue that firms determine, at least partially, whether to obtain 
a credit rating or have a higher rating level after considering the benefits against the potential 
costs. Therefore, it is likely that the decision to obtain a (high) credit rating is based on firm 
specific characteristics and failure to account for these characteristics would lead to biased 
estimates in my analysis. Initially, I use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to 
reduce the potential selection bias in the estimation of the effect of being rated on the choice 
of payment method under a univariate setting. This is of particular interest since in Table 2.2 
I found that the difference in the fraction of cash used between the rated and unrated bidders 
is significantly different. In that respect, I first estimate a Probit model including variables 
that determine the outcome (i.e., fraction o f cash and cash-dominated) as well as variables 
that determine the choice of being rated (i.e., rating existence)}^ I then use the results from 
the Probit regression to compute the bidder’s propensity score (i.e., the probability that the 
firm is rated, given my set of control variables); and finally, I examine the difference in mean 
values of the fraction of cash used in M&As between the treated and matched control firms 
based on the results of the propensity scores. In order to obtain robust estimates from this 
analysis, I use four different matching methods to examine the impact of being rated: 1) One- 
to-One Matching; 2) 50* Nearest-Neighbor Matching; 3) Local Linear Matching with a 
Gaussian Kernel; and 4) Local Linear Matching with an Epanechnikov Kernel.
I refrain from a discussion o f the variables that affect the choice o f being rated in this section and examine the 
issue extensively in Section 5.2.3 below.
However, according to Rosenbaum (2002) the use o f  the PSM comes with some limitations. Especially in the 
choice o f  instruments there might be found departures from random assignment and consequently, this can lead
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Table 2.8 provides the results of this analysis. In Panel A I report the results from the 
unmatched sample (i.e., without taking into account of the propensity scores) and observe 
that rated bidders are more likely to use cash as a payment mode relative to unrated bidders. 
However, after matching the statistical significance of the difference disappears with all four 
different methodologies (Panels B, C, D and E). This confirms the earlier multivariate 
regressions results which suggest that just holding a eredit rating irrespective of its level does 
not prove ex-ante that a bidding firm possesses a higher capability to access public debt 
markets.
[Please Look Table 2.8]
2.5.2.2 Quasi-Natural Experiment for Change in Rating Status
To further alleviate concerns that my results might be driven by firm characteristics that 
are correlated with rating existence, I use an approaeh similar to Harford and Uysal (2012) 
and investigate whether a change in rating status has an effect on the likelihood of using cash 
means of financing in M&As. In particular, I restrict the multivariate regressions in a sub­
sample of bidders that did not have a rating two years prior to the acquisition {t-2) and 
examine whether holding a rating at the announeement year {t-0) has a significant impact on 
the payment choiee decisions at t-0, relative to a sample of firms which did not hold a rating 
at t-2. Specifically, I obtain 255 bidders that satisfy these criteria and run the regressions 
together with all remaining unrated bidders. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 
2.9. Speeifications (1) and (2) present the results for GLM (Logit) and specifications (3) and 
(4) show the findings for Probit analysis. I find that the effect of rating existence replicates 
the findings of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The rating existence variable carries a positive and
to biased inferences. Furthermore, the PSM and the corresponding Mest that is used in order to examine the 
difference in the proportion o f cash are all based on the normality assumptions and this can further lead to 
erroneous inferences. To tackle this issue one can use the permutation and non-parametric methods that are 
discussed in Rosenbaum (2002).
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significant coefficient only in the preliminary regressions (1) and (3), in whieh I include only 
bidder size as control variable, whereas in the full models (2) and (4) the statistical 
significance ceases to exist.
[Please Look Table 2.9]
2.S.2.3 Control Function Approach
Finally, in order to control for a potential endogeneity bias of either rating existence or 
rating level, I use a two-step Control Function Approach. Smith and Blundell (1986), and 
Rivers and Vuong (1988) use this method to aeeount for endogeneity when the second stage 
regression is a Limited Dependent Variable (LDV) model and the Endogenous Explanatory 
Variables (EEVs) are continuous. However, in a recent paper Wooldridge (2013) extends this 
estimator to cases where the struetural regression can be a binary or fractional response 
model, and the EE Vs can be either continuous or discrete in nature; this is particularly true in 
my case. Control Function estimators firstly calculate the model of endogenous regressor as a 
function of instruments, like the “first stage” of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and then 
use the errors from the reduced model as an additional regressor in the struetural model. If the 
coefficient of the included error is not statistieally signifieant, then the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity cannot be re jec ted .In  order to apply this approach and get unbiased estimates, 
instruments are essential; that is, variables that determine the probability of a bidder holding a 
credit rating or having a high rating, and concurrently are not related with the main dependent 
variables (fraction o f cash and cash-dominated) in the structural models. It is likely that 
factors influencing firm’s decision to access public debt markets might also influence firm’s 
decision to use cash as a payment method in acquisitions. In this respect, a better strategy 
would be to avoid firm-specific attributes that determine the probability of having a debt
In that case the coefficient o f the included residual captures the degree o f  correlation “p " among the residuals 
in the reduced and structural regressions, which is a valid and simple test o f  endogeneity (Wooldridge (2002)).
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rating and use industry-specific attributes instead. To accomplish this task I follow the 
literature on firms’ “debt composition” and “determinants of credit rating levels” (Cantillo 
and Wright (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Johnson
(1997), Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999), and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond (2006)) and use variables that have been proposed to account for these effects.
Specifically, Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and An and Chan (2008) suggest that a 
firm is more likely to issue a public bond and obtain a credit rating when it operates in a well 
established industry, since it is possible that the bond market investors already know the 
competitors and are familiar with the economic condition of the industry. Therefore, this 
reduces the potential costs of information collection that the banks incur when they agree to 
underwrite a bond issue. To control for this effect, I compute the fraction of firms with credit 
ratings in the same 3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
and use the log of 1 plus this fraction {industry fraction). Johnson (1997), and Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) argue that public credit markets eater to profitable or safe industries with low 
default risk. Obviously, bondholders prefer to invest their money in safe securities that yield a 
periodical interest (i.e., in effect their opportunity cost of capital), and expect at the maturity 
to collect normally their principal in full. Industries with high and steady cash flows face low 
default probability, since an abundance or low volatility of cash flows serves as a guarantee 
that the firms are likely to fulfill timely their debt obligations. To control for the effect of 
profitability I calculate the median industry profitability (defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets) of bidders’ 
same 3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end preceding the acquisition {industry 
profitability). Accordingly, to measure the impact of credit risk I use the standard deviation of 
the industry’s profitability {industry risk).
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Finally, a number of studies (Smith (1986), Smith and Watts (1992), Krishnaswami, 
Spindt and Subramaniam (1999), and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)) contend that regulated 
firms tap the public capital markets more frequently, thus revealing firm’s cost of capital, 
which is beneficiary for firms in the process of setting their rating. The periodic use of capital 
markets disciplines management and constrains their discretion in investment and operating 
decisions. Furthermore, these papers suggest that, relative to unregulated firms, regulated 
firms engage more rarely in asset substitution and underinvestment as state utility 
commissions and other regulatory authorities supervise managerial decisions. To sum up, it 
follows that firms in regulated industries exhibit low agency costs and, hence, the need for 
the monitoring role of private debt is limited, a fact that leads to a higher reliance on public 
debt when debt capital is required. To deal with this effect, I use an indicator variable that 
equals with 1 if the firm is a financial institution or utility firm (1-digit SIC level 6 or 2-digits 
SIC level 49), and 0 otherwise {regulated industry).
Table 2.10 presents the results of this analysis for different methodologies (i.e.. 
Fractional Probit and Probit).Specification (1) presents the reduced Probit model measuring 
the probability of having a credit rating. Two of the excluded instruments, industry fraction 
and industry profitability carry the expected signs and are significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. To examine the strength of the instruments I follow Stock and Yogo (2002) and 
use the weak identification test critical values for the “maximal IV Wald size distortion”. 
However, as Nichols (2007) notes, these identification statistics only apply to the linear ease - 
not the nonlinear analogs - including those estimated with generalized linear models. 
Therefore, in practice researchers should report the identification statistics for the closest
Note that in this section I use a (GLM) Fractional Probit instead o f a Fractional Logit to be consistent with the 
methodology o f Wooldridge (2013) who extends the use o f the control function approach in fractional response 
models by using as a casework example the Fractional Probit. However, this shift in the model does not affect 
the qualitative nature o f my findings since it has been demonstrated that Logit coefficients are roughly 1.6 times 
the Probit coefficients, and the validity o f the inferences is generally irrelevant o f  whether one uses a Logit or a 
Probit model (Amemiya (1981)).
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linear analog (i.e., in the ease of fractional Probit the closest linear analogs for the first stage 
is a Linear Probability Model (LPM) and for the second stage is a Linear Regression Model) 
and be careful when drawing inferences from their values. In the lower panel of Table 2.10, 
I report the F-test for the joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage 
regression, and the critical values for the desired 10% size distortion on a nominal 5% Wald 
test, computed by the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator. In both 
models (2) and (3) the F-test is larger than the corresponding critical values and, hence, I can 
reject the null of excluded instruments’ weakness. Finally, in both structural equations (2) 
and (3), the rating existence residual is insignificant at conventional levels. These findings 
imply that the variable rating existence is exogenous to my model, which mitigates any 
eoneems of confounding effects due to a potential endogeneity bias.
[Please Look Table 2.10]
With regards to the correction for endogeneity in the case of the variable rating level, I 
apply the same method as above, with the rating level choice equation (OLS) being the 
reduced form, and the method of payment equations (Fractional Probit and Probit) being the 
structural forms. Additionally, I substitute the instrument industry fraction with the variable 
industry level, which is the median credit rating level of the bidders’ same 3-digit SIC 
industry group at the fiscal year-end preceding the acquisition, to control for the credit quality 
level of the industry. Table 2.11 shows the results for this analysis. In the reduced model (1) 
three out of the four instruments {industry level, industry risk and regulated industry) carry 
the expected coefficients and are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the 
results from the identification statistics reject the null of excluded instruments’ weakness. In 
both structural equations (2) and (3), the variable of interest rating level residual, is
This is indeed the case as the F-test from the Probit regression has a value o f 44.01 and is significantly higher 
than the reported F-test values from the LPM regression in Table 2.10. This is due to the fact that the rating 
choice is a binary variable and the Probit regression specifies better this decision than the LPM regression.
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insignificant at conventional levels. These results imply that the rating level variable appears 
to be exogenous in my models. Therefore, given that I am not able to identify any existence 
of endogeneity bias for the rating level in these regressions, I can base my inferences on the 
results of Tables 2.4 and 2.5, in which the regressions are consistent and efficient.O verall, 
the findings support my hypothesis of a positive association between credit rating level and 
the likelihood of using cash as a method of payment in acquisitions.
[Please Look Table 2.11]
2.5.3 Target Firm Characteristics and Method o f Payment
Finally, in this section, I focus on a subsample of public acquisitions and include in my 
regressions target firm characteristics known from the literature to affect the method of 
payment in M&As. In particular, it has been suggested that a target firm’s leverage (Hansen 
(1987)), growth opportunities (Martin (1996)), share ownership (Ghosh and Ruland (1998)), 
and information asymmetry (Chemmanur et al. (2009)) exert an impact on the likelihood of 
using cash as a payment form. In particular, target’s growth opportunities, share ownership 
and information asymmetry are expected to have a negative association with the choice of 
cash in acquisitions, while the predicted relationship of a target firm’s leverage with the 
likelihood of using cash is ambiguous. To control for these effects I add on the top of the 
control variables used in the previous analysis supplementary target firm’s variables 
(Tleverage, Tbook-to-market, Tblockholder ownership, Tintangibles and Tprofitability) and 
report the results in Table 2.12.1 use GLM Logit regressions in specifications (1) and (3) and 
probit regressions in specifications (2) and (4). Specifications (1) and (2) present the results 
where the main variable of interest is the rating existence and specifications (3) and (4) show
It is worth noting that since I employ instruments to measure the choice o f  credit rating level, by eonstruction 
the coefficients o f  rating level in the Control Function Approach regressions exhibit higher standard errors (i.e., 
loss in efficiency) than the regressions which do not account for endogeneity and, hence, it is likely in some 
cases the rating level to appear statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
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the findings for the rating level variable as main variable of interest. With regards to the 
rating existence, I am not able to establish any significant relationship at conventional levels; 
however, the rating level variable continues to be strongly positively associated with cash 
acquisitions as it carries positive and significant coefficients at the 1% level in both 
specifications. From the target control variables only Tleverage is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in specification (3). This last set of results adds more evidence 
regarding the robustness of the basic findings and implies that firms’ credit quality is an 
important determinant of the financing decision in M&As.^^
[Please Look Table 2.12]
2.5.4 Other Sensitivity Tests
In this subsection the robustness of my results is tested with various additional tests. In 
an alternative attempt to capture the impact of market conditions on the cost of debt which 
the bidding firms face, I use the variable BBB-AAA spread. This variable measures the 
difference in yield rates between the average BBB and AAA U.S rated utilities and industrial 
bonds, retrieved from the Federal Reserve’s Selected Interest Rates H.15 release. In Table 
2.13 and Table 2.14 I present the results for the (GLM) logit models and probit models 
respectively. In Table 2.13 the variable rating existence is insignificant while the variable 
rating level is significant at the 1% level thus, corroborating my findings so far. The same 
hold true in Table 2.14 for the two main control variables while I observe that the variable 
BBB-AAA spread does not carry a significant coefficient at any conventional levels.
[Please Look Tables 2.13 & 2.14]
I also employ the Control Function Approach discussed above for the existence o f  endogeneity on this set o f  
regressions which include target firm characteristics and again we do not find any evidence o f endogeneity bias.
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Moreover, in Table 2.15 I try to measure the relationship between method of payment 
and credit ratings by using an ordered probit model. In that ease I use as a dependent variable 
an ordinal variable taking the value of 0 for stoek deals, 1 for mixed deals, and 2 for eash 
deals. In speeifieations (1) through (2) I present the results for the rating existence and in 
spécifications (3) through (4) the results for the rating level. I observe that the rating 
existence holds a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level in both models. The 
same holds for the effect of rating level where I observe that it carries positive and significant 
coefficients at the 1% level in both specifications. These results corroborate my hypotheses 
about the impact of credit quality on the choice of eash while on the same time provide some 
indication about the impact of ratings existence on the method of payment during 
acquisitions.
[Please Look Table 2.15]
Finally, in Table 2.16 I try to measure the effect of credit ratings on the choice of 
payment method by using a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 
when the deal is financed with over than 50% stoek and 0 when it is financed with more than 
50% cash. If the assumptions regarding the positive effect of credit rating levels on the 
likelihood to pay with eash are correct, I would expect in this alternative specification to find 
a negative relationship with the likelihood of paying by stoek. In models (1) through (2) I 
present the findings for the rating existence, and in models (3) through (4) the findings for the 
rating level. In the full model (2) the rating existence does not exhibit any significant 
association with the likelihood of paying by stock whereas in the full model (4), the rating 
level holds a negative and highly significant coefficient at the 1% level. These findings 
further validate the main hypotheses of this study.
[Please Look Table 2.16]
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I present direct empirical analysis of the relation between credit ratings 
and the choice of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. In particular, I examine 
whether rating existence and rating level affect the likelihood of eash being used as a form of 
financing in a takeover bid. In the empirical analysis, I use different econometric approaches 
to examine this relationship and I am able to establish a positive relation between a bidders’ 
credit rating level and cash payment method. The results are attributed to the lower financial 
constraints of firms with a high credit rating, as implied by their higher credit quality. The 
investment grade results also confirm the findings on rating level analysis corroborating the 
view that eash method of payment is an increasing function of credit quality. Further, unused 
debt capacity between the counterparties appears to determine the choice of eash method of 
payment lending further support to the relationship of credit ratings with the financing choice. 
Moreover, my results have a strong economic significance and are robust even after 
controlling for endogeneity issues regarding the main variables of interest.
Additionally, in response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this 
study imply that higher capability to access public debt markets affects the choice of payment 
method in M&As. In particular, high credit quality associated with lower cost and higher 
demand for debt securities allows highly rated bidding firms to be less reluctant to use eash in 
an acquisition investment as it is less painful for them to find eash for new investments in the 
future.
This study adds to the prior literature by providing further evidence on how credit 
ratings affect firm capital structure decisions in general, and financing decisions in the M&As 
process more specifically. In particular, I establish a direct relationship of credit ratings as a 
determinant of the choice of payment method. The positive likelihood of using eash as a 
method of payment in acquisitions in which firms have high credit quality can be considered
56
as a high value asset for bidders’ shareholders, given the well-doeumented faet that eash 
consideration is related with various beneficial outcomes for bidders’ shareholders, sueh as 
favorable valuation effects and determent of competition in the market for corporate control. 
Overall, this chapter highlights the role of CRAs in firm’s capital structure decisions related 
particularly with the financing decision in takeover bids.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Panel A: Measures of Payment Form
Fraction of Cash
Cash-dominated
Fraction o f  cash as part o f  the total price offered by the bidder to the target 
shareholders from Thomson Financial SDC.
Dummy variable: 1 for deals financed with more than 50% cash, 0 for 
deals financed with more than 50% stock from Thomson Financial SDC.
Panel B: Credit Rating Variable
Rating Existence 
Rating Level
Investment Grade
BRating/TRating
Dummy variable: 1 for rated bidders, 0 for unrated bidders.
Continuous variable for rated bidders: 1 to 22, AAA level takes 22 and D 
takes 1.
Dummy variable: 1 for investment grade bidders (above BBB- threshold), 
0 for speculative grade bidders (below BBB- threshold).
The ratio o f  bidder credit rating level to target credit rating level.
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
Size Firm market value o f  equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement 
from CRSP in US$ million.
Leverage Firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by the book value o f total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Collateral The ratio o f  firm’s property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Book-to-Market (B/M) Book value o f  equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement divided by the market value o f equity 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Book value o f  equity is from COMPUSTAT, 
market value o f  equity is from CRSP.
Run-Up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns o f the firm over the period starting (- 
205, -6) days prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP.
Blockholder Ownership Aggregate holdings o f blockholders who own at least 5% o f the company’s 
stock from Thomson One ownership database.
Cash Flows to Assets Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on 
common and preferred stock divided by the total assets at the fiscal year-end 
immediately prior to the announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Intangibles The ratio o f  firm’s total intangible assets scaled by total assets at the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Profitability The ratio o f  earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets at the fiscal year immediately prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
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Panel D: Deal Characteristics
Interest Rate Spread The spread on the interest rate charged for all industrial and commercial loans 
over intended federal funds rate. The spread is from the Survey o f Terms o f  
Business Lending published by the Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York in its 
E2 release.
Relative Size The ratio o f the deal’s value to bidder’s market value o f equity 4 weeks prior 
to the acquisition announcement from CRSP in US$ million.
Diversifying Deals Dummy variable; 1 for inter-industry transactions, 0 for intra-industry 
transactions. Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level from Thomson 
Financial SDC.
Hostile Deals Dummy variable: 1 for deals defined as "hostile" or "unsolicited" by 
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
Tender Offers Dummy variable: 1 for tender offers from Thomson Financial SDC, 0 
otherwise.
Private Dummy variable: 1 for private targets from Thomson Financial SDC, 0 
otherwise.
Number of Bidders Number o f bidders during the takeover deal from Thomson Financial SDC.
Competition Dummy variable: 1 if  more than one bidders enter the contest, 0 otherwise.
Panel E: Instrumental Variables
Industry Fraction Log o f 1 plus the fraction o f  firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry group that 
have credit ratings at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition 
announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Industry Profitability The median ratio o f earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total assets o f  firms in the same 3-digit SIC 
industry group at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition 
announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Industry Risk The standard deviation o f  the ratio o f  earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets o f firms in the same 
3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Industry Level The median credit rating level o f firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry group 
at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from 
COMPUSTAT.
Regulated Industry Dummy variable: 1 if  firm is a financial institution (1-digit SIC level 6) or a 
utility firm (2-digit SIC level 49), 0 otherwise.
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Appendix B. Credit Rating Levels
Credit Rating Level Numerical Value Rating Description
AAA 22 Prime
AA+ 21 High Grade
AA 20 High Grade
AA- 19 High Grade
A+ 18 Upper Medium Grade
A 17 Upper Medium Grade
A- 16 Upper Medium Grade
BBB+ 15 Lower Medium Grade
BBB 14 Lower Medium Grade
BBB- 13 Lower Medium Grade
BB+ 12 Non-Investment Grade Speculative
BB 11 Non-Investment Grade Speculative
BB- 10 Non-Investment Grade Speculative
B+ 9 Highly Speculative
B 8 Highly Speculative
B- 7 Highly Speculative
CCC+ 6 Substantial Risks
CCC 5 Substantial Risks
CCC- 4 Substantial Risks
c c 3 Extremely Speculative
c 2 Extremely Speculative
D 1 In Default
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Table 2.4
(GLM) Logit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f the (GLM) Logit regression analysis o f the fraction o f cash financing on credit rating 
existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample o f  US acquisitions over the 
period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions o f the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes 
the number o f  observations.
All Sample Sample with Rating Data
H) CO (3) (4)
Constant -0.3135*** -2.1626*** 0.6590** -0.9300
(-2.90) (-4.51) (2.15) (-0.76)
Rating Existence 0.3496*** 0.1590
(4.72) (1.51)
Rating Level 0.0875*** 0.1843***
(3.65) (5.51)
Ln (Size) -0.0746*** 0.0318 -0.3455*** -0.4290***
(-4.41) (1.13) (-7.02) (-6.41)
Leverage 0.4711** -0.1681
(2.03) (-0.41)
Collateral 0.2387** -0.1244
(2.31) (-0.74)
Interest Rate Spread 0.0161 0.2148
(0.07) (0.35)
Book-to-Market 0.3715*** -0.3330*
(-1.80)
Run-Up -0.2311*** -0.2313
(-4.20) (-1.46)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0038** -0.0004
(-0.11)
Cash Flows to Assets 2.0221*** 2.5623***
(7.64) (2.60)
Intangibles 0.7765*** 0.5359
(3.91) (1.29)
Relative Size -0.2178* -0.4154**
(-1.65) (-2.24)
Diversifying Deals 0.1286** 0.2763**
(2.00) (2.06)
Hostile Deals 0.8861*** 0.8722*
(2.85) (1.85)
Tender Offers 2.1325*** 2.1774***
(12.16)
Private 1.0574*** 1.1596***
(11.13) (7.12)
Competition 0.1744 -0.0361
(-0.12)
N 6,819 3,793 1,747 1,106
Pseudo R^ 0.084 0.181 0.137 0.271
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Table 2.5
Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f  the Probit regression analysis o f the choice between more than 50% cash and more than 
50% stock on credit rating existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample 
of US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. In all models the dependent variable takes the value o f  1 for more than 
50% cash deals, and 0 for more than 50% stock deals. See Appendix A for definitions o f the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
All Sample Sample with Rating Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.1505* -1.2564*** 0.9169*** 0.1136
(1.82) (4.00) (0.11)
Rating Existence 0.3174*** 0.1406
(5.55) (1.59)
Rating Level 0.0505*** 0.1432***
(2.91) (5.24)
Ln (Size) -0.0924*** -0.0123 -0.2650*** -0.3610***
L7T9) L&55) (-7.16) (-6.46)
Leverage 0.3975** -0.2094
(-0.61)
Collateral 0.2310*** 0.0734
(2.61) (0.48)
Interest Rate Spread -0.0368 -0.1300
(-0.18) (-0.26)
Book-to-Market 0.2748*** -0.1921
(2.99) (-1.21)
Run-Up -0.1491*** -0.0974
(-3.61) (-0.78)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0023 -0.0027
(1.57) (-0.89)
Cash Flows to Assets 1.4864*** 1.3157*
# 5 4 (1.94)
Intangibles 0.6219*** 0.3675
(3.61) (1.01)
Relative Size -0.0642 -0.1726
(-0.95) (-1.40)
Diversifying Deals 0.1090** 0.1479
(1.98) (1.24)
Hostile Deals 0.5366** 0.5081
(2.00) (1.32)
Tender Offers 1.6620*** 1.6816***
(10.45) (7.24)
Private 0.9253*** 1.0507***
(12.81) (7.70)
Competition 0.2252 0.0573
(1.32) (0.21)
N 6,204 3J94 1,607 999
Pseudo R^ 0.099 0.261 0.157 0.351
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Table 2.6
(GLM) Logit Polynomial Regressions of the Payment Form on the Unused Debt Capacity
The table presents the results o f  the (GLM) Logit Polynomial regression analysis o f  the fraction o f  cash financing 
on the ratio o f  the bidder to target credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a 
sample o f US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All 
regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
i l l
Constant 
BRating/TRating 
(BRating/TRating)^ 
BRating/TRating X Relative Size 
Ln (Size)
Leverage
Collateral
Interest Rate Spread
Book-to-Market
Run-Up
Blockholder Ownership 
Cash Flows to Assets 
Intangibles 
Relative Size 
Diversifying Deals 
Hostile Deals 
Tender Offers 
Competition
0.4224
(0.65)
1.4233***
(3.41)
-0.5035*
(-1.83)
-0.2720***
(-4.20)
2.4402
(0.75)
2.2692***
(3.26)
-1.0096**
(-2.56)
-2.9639**
(-2.27)
-0.2668**
(-2.30)
0.0096
(0.01)
-0.0815
(-0.25)
-1.2209
(-0.78)
-0.1249
(-0.28)
-0.3699
(-1.28)
- 0.0020
(-0.29)
1.8742
( 1.22)
0.2811
(0.35)
-0.5964
(-1.45)
0.2746
(1.03)
0.7667*
(1.80)
1.8470***
(4.38)
-0.2688
(-0.70)
N
Pseudo R^
353
0.136
229
0.264
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Table 2.7
Regressions of the Payment Form on the Investment Grade
The table presents the results o f the (GLM) Logit (specification (1)), and Probit (specification (2)) regression 
analyses o f the choice o f  the method o f  payment on investment grade and other bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics for a sample o f  US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions o f the 
variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
GLM (Logit) Probit
(1) (2)
Constant 0.0092 0.9689
(0.01) (1.01)
Investment Grade 0.5245*** 0.5139***
(2.93) (3.33)
Ln (Size) -0.2576*** -0.2423***
(-4.61) (-5.21)
Leverage -0.3205 -0.2966
(-0.76) (-0.85)
Collateral -0.0988 0.0842
(-0.59) (0.56)
Interest Rate Spread 0.1869 -0.1964
(0.32) (-0.41)
Book-to-Market -0.2310 -0.1284
(-1.24) (-0.82)
Run-Up -0.3068** -0.1490
(-2.03) (-1.23)
Blockholder Ownership -0.0021 -0.0042
(-0.54) (-1.32)
Cash Flows to Assets 2.9747*** 1.7265***
(3.02) (2.59)
Intangibles 0.4322 0.3068
(1.02) (0.84)
Relative Size -0.4425** -0.1833
(-2.30) (-1.49)
Diversifying Deals 0.2780** 0.1369
(2.08) (1.18)
Hostile Deals 0.8386* 0.4399
(1.75) (1.12)
Tender Offers 2.1490*** 1.6582***
(8.65) (7.07)
Private 1.1020*** 1.0042***
(6.71) (7.32)
Competition 0.0197 0.1105
(0.06) (0.42)
N 1,106 999
Pseudo R^ 0.256 0.332
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Table 2.9
Regressions of the Payment Form of Subsample of Non-Rated Firms Two Years Prior to the Acquisition
The table presents the results o f  the (GLM) Logit (specifications (1) and (2)) and Probit (specifications (3) and (4)) 
regression analyses o f  the choice o f method o f  payment on credit rating existence and other bidder-, and deal-specific 
characteristics for a subsample o f  firms that did not have a rating at t-2. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. 
All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
GLM (Logit) Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.4301*** -2.3740*** 0.0735 -1.5604***
(-3.64) (-4.57) (0.81) (-3.42)
Rating Existence 0.2825** -0.0645 0.2802*** 0.0218
(1.96) (-0.35) (2.68) (0.14)
Ln (Size) -0.0395** 0.0716** -0.0685*** 0.0130
(-2.09) (2.14) (-4.76) (0.48)
Leverage 0.7003** 0.5820**
(2.51) (2.57)
Collateral 0.4140*** 0.2963***
(3.06) (2.63)
Interest Rate Spread -0.0182 0.0351
(-0.07) (0.16)
Book-to-Market 0.5098*** 0.3571***
(3.77) (3.06)
Run-Up -0.2162*** -0.1375***
(-3.84) (-3.17)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0060*** 0.0058***
(3.05) (3.44)
Cash Flows to Assets 1.9383*** 1.4593***
(7.41) (7.19)
Intangibles 0.8175*** 0.6807***
(3.78) (3.60)
Relative Size -0.1393 -0.0235
(-0.98) (-0.33)
Diversifying Deals -0.0073 0.0365
(-0.10) (0.58)
Hostile Deals 1.1202*** 0.8615***
(3.13) (2.87)
Tender Offers 2.2212*** 1.7357***
(9.42) (8.90)
Private 1.0850*** 0.9528***
(9.59) (11.16)
Competition 0.3243 0.3008
(1.17) (1.41)
N 5,327 2,842 4,833 2,538
Pseudo R^ 0.072 0.170 0.088 0.257
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Table 2.10
Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Existence; Control Function Approach
The table presents the results o f  the control function regression approach to test for potential endogeneity o f  credit rating 
existence for a sample o f  US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. Specification (1) is the reduced regression. 
Specification (2) is the structural regression for the (GLM) Probit regression. Specification (3) is the structural regression for 
the Probit regression. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the 
number o f  observations. The lower part o f  the table shows the F-test from the linear first-stage regression testing the joint 
significance o f  the excluded instruments and the Stock and Yogo (2002) (LIML) critical values o f  the 10% expected size 
distortion on a 5% nominal Wald test.
(GLM) Probit Pro bit
Reduced Structural Structural
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -6.3832*** -1.4113*** -1.2650***
(-12.77) (-4.66) (-2.88)
Rating Existence -0.1788
(-0.87)
0.0250
(0.09)
Rating Existence Residual 
Industry Fraction 
Industry Profitability 
Industry Risk 
Regulated Industry
1.5498***
(4.51)
1.1482**
(2.45)
-0.0013
(-0.75)
0.1518
(0.96)
0.1261
(1.40)
0.0520
(0.41)
Ln (Size) 0.6540*** 0.0513* 0.0044
(17.19) (1.92) (0.12)
Leverage 3.6083*** 0.4515** 0.4295*
(12.44) (2.46) (1.65)
Collateral 0.3152** 0.1513** 0.2254**
(2.52) (2.29) (2.40)
Interest Rate Spread -0.1495 -0.0165 -0.0719
(-0.66) (-0.12) (-0.34)
Book-to-Market 0.5343*** 0.2280*** 0.2855***
(3.91) (3.79) (3.06)
Run-Up -0.3005*** -0.1380*** -0.1463***
(-5.13) (-4.09) (-3.30)
Blockholder Ownership -0.0004 0.0019* 0.0025
(-0.20) (1.75) (1.64)
Cash Flows to Assets 1.0245** 1.0992*** 1.4444***
(2.48) (8.24) (7.36)
Intangibles 0.9938*** 0.4769*** 0.6018***
(4.30) (3.82) (3.31)
Relative Size -0.0031 -0.0806 -0.0533
(-0.03) (-1.30) (-0.82)
Diversifying Deals 0.2101*** 0.1028** 0.1304**
(2.97) (2.53) (2.26)
Hostile Deals -0.4525** 0.4288** 0.5230*
(-2.00) (2.27) (1.83)
Tender Offers 0.3188** 1.2838*** 1.6769***
(2.51) (12.69) (10.38)
Private -0.2392*** 0.6183*** 0.9089***
(-2.70) (10.61) (11.97)
Competition 0.0220 0.1191 0.2657
(0.12) (1.53)
N 3,629 3,629 3,249
Pseudo R^ 0.529 0.178 0.258
F-test 11.02 10.53
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald 5.44 5.44
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Table 2.11
Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Level: Control Function Approach
The table presents the results o f  the control function regression approach to test for potential endogeneity o f  credit rating 
level for a sample o f  US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. Specification (1) is the reduced regression. Specification 
(2) is the structural regression for the (GLM) Probit regression. Specification (3) is the structural regression for the Probit 
regression. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t- 
statistics in the reduced regression and z-statistics in the structural regressions reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations. The lower part o f  the table shows the F-test 
fi-om the linear first-stage regression testing the joint significance o f  the excluded instruments and the Stock and Yogo 
(2002) (LIML) critical values o f  the 10% expected size distortion on a 5% nominal Wald test.
(GLM) Probit Probit
Reduced Structural Structural
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.2306 -0.3680 0.0936
(0.18) (-0.52) (0.09)
Rating Level 0.0363 0.1601*
Rating Level Residual
(0.60)
0.0735
(1.85)
-0.0211
Industry Level 
Industry Profitability 
Industry Risk
0.1559***
(4.18)
0.8229
(0.90)
-0.0111***
(1.17) (-0.24)
Regulated Industry 
Ln (Size)
(-2.70)
1.1696***
(3.48)
1.3599*** -0.1442 -0.3810***
(19.29) (-1.61) (-2.99)
Leverage -2.3378*** -0.2298 -0.2075
(-4.18) (-0.81) (-0.54)
Collateral 0.6527** -0.0259 0.0978
(2.45) (-0.25) (0.62)
Interest Rate Spread 0.2304 0.0872 -0.1629
(0.47) (0.25) (-0.32)
Book-to-Market 0.6789** -0.1273 -0.1851
(2.45) (-1.05) (-1.04)
Run-Up -0.6959*** -0.1757* -0.0681
(-3.84) (-1.64) (-0.48)
Blockholder Ownership -0.0061 -0.0006 -0.0027
(-1.47) (-0.26) (-0.84)
Cash Flows to Assets 3.8777*** 1.6047*** 1.1237
(2.76) (2.68) (1.53)
Intangibles 0.4018 0.2856 0.3693
(0.73) (1.13) (0.98)
Relative Size -0.1910 -0.2429** -0.1875
(-1.17) (-2.43) (-1.47)
Diversifying Deals 0.4120*** 0.2027** 0.1632
(2.67) (2.45) (1.30)
Hostile Deals -0.6256* 0.4341 0.5499
(-1.84) (1.46) (1.22)
Tender Offers 0.5465** 1.2870*** 1.7081***
(2.27) (9.41) (7.06)
Private -0.1506 0.6711*** 1.0431***
(-0.83) (7.08) (7.75)
Competition 0.3408 0.0588 0.1554
(1.23) (0.32) (0.53)
N 1,039 1.039 939
Adjusted R  ^(Pseudo R )^ 0.653 (0.270) (0.350)
F-test 14.70 13.58
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald 5.44 5.44
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Table 2.12
Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level with Target Firm
Control Variables
The table presents the results o f the (GLM) Logit (specifications (1) and (3)) and Probit (specifications (2) and (4)) 
regression analyses o f  the choice o f method o f  payment on credit rating existence, credit rating level and other bidder-, 
target- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See 
Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
All Sample Sample with Rating Data
GLM Logit (1) Probit (2) GLM Logit (3) Probit (4)
Constant -2.0389* -0.8654 -0.5299 0.4064
(-1.71) (-0.98) (-0.26) (0.29)
Rating Existence 0.1397 0.0366
(0.75) (0.25)
Rating Level 0.1607*** 0.1097***
(3.56) (3.08)
Ln (Size) 0.0556 0.0448 -0.2881*** -0.2035***
(1.04) (1.17) (-2.93) (-2.62)
Leverage -0.4092 -0.4478 -0.6564 -0.5708
(-0.88) (-1.27) (-1.00) (-1.10)
Collateral -0.2748 -0.0939 -0.2591 0.0633
(-1.43) (-0.61) (-1.02) (0.30)
Interest Rate Spread 0.1377 -0.2316 -0.1790 -0.5886
(0.22) (-0.49) (-0.17) (-0.81)
Book-to-Market 0.2761 0.1913 -0.1151 -0.0528
(1.38) (1.48) (-0.44) (-0.23)
Run-Up -0.3405 -0.1360 -0.0807 0.0013
(-1.53) (-1.15) (-0.31) (0.01)
Blockholder Ownership -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0059 -0.0047
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-1.07) (-1.03)
Cash Flows to Assets 1.9646*** 1.2421*** 2.0976* 0.8136
(3.71) (1.81) (0.99)
Intangibles 0.1283 0.2495 0.5133 0.7595
(0.30) (0.86) (1.50)
TLeverage -0.7016** 0.1554 -0.9811** -0.2084
(-2.19) (-2.56) (-0.57)
TB 0 0 k-to-Mar ket 0.0233 0.0350 -0.0828 -0.1659
(0.54) (1.07) (-0.54) (-1.04)
TBlockholder Ownership 0.0021 0.0017 0.0062 0.0050
(0.56) (0.62) (1.13) (1.16)
Tintangibles -0.5868 -0.4858 -0.3230 -0.3466
(-1.43) (-1.52) (-0.61) (-0.78)
TProfitability 0.2239 0.1378 -0.7600 -0.6258
(0.67) (0.58) (-1.36) (-1.34)
Relative Size -0.1601 -0.0655 -0.3718* -0.1962
(-0.61) (-0.63) (-1.78) (-1.19)
Diversifying Deals 0.1497 0.0553 -0.0326 -0.0513
(1.02) (-0.17) (-0.32)
Hostile Deals 0.8654** 0.4916* 0.8894 0.5196
(2.34) (1.69) (1.60) (1.21)
Tender Offers 2.1811*** 1.6126*** 1.9321*** 1.4421***
(10.33) (9.22) (6.88) (5.97)
Competition 0.0675 0.1783 0.0145 0.0512
(0.27) # .9Q (0.04)
N 912 851 497 451
Pseudo R^ 0.243 0.272 0.279 0.301
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Table 2.13
(GLM) Logit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f the (GLM) Logit regression analysis o f  the fraction o f  cash financing on credit rating 
existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample o f  US acquisitions over the 
period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes 
the number o f  observations.
(1) (2)
Constant -2.1308*** -0.4267
(-7.94) (-0.72)
Rating Existence 0.1588
(1.51)
Rating Level 0.1856***
(5.52)
Ln (Size) 0.0319 -0.4307***
(1.13) (-6.42)
Leverage 0.4711** -0.1610
(2.03) (-0.39)
Collateral 0.2385** -0.1329
(2.30) (-0.79)
BBB-AAA Spread -0.0046 -0.1836
(-0.04) (-0.65)
Book-to-Market 0.3719*** -0.3239*
(3.32) (-1.79)
Run-Up -0.2310*** -0.2231
(-4.19) (-1.41)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0038** -0.0005
(2.12) (-0.12)
Cash Flows to Assets 2.0220*** 2.5667***
(7.65) (2.61)
Intangibles 0.7758*** 0.5287
(3.91) (1.27)
Relative Size -0.2177* -0.4153**
(-1.65) (-2.24)
Diversifying Deals 0.1287** 0.2815**
(2.00) (2.12)
Hostile Deals 0.8858*** 0.8727*
(2.85) (1.86)
Tender Offers 2.1324*** 2.1733***
(12.16) (8.97)
Private 1.0573*** 1.1581***
(11.12) (7.10)
Competition 0.1747 -0.0282
(0.82) (-0.09)
N 3,793 1,106
Pseudo R^ 0.181 0.272
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Table 2.14
Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f the Probit regression analysis o f  the ehoiee between more than 50% cash and more than 
50% stock on credit rating existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample 
o f US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. In all models the dependent variable takes the value o f  1 for over 50% 
cash deals, and 0 for less than 50% cash deals. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
(1) (2)
Constant -1.2432*** 0.0653
(0.13)
Rating Existence 0.1400
(1.59)
Rating Level 0.1453***
(5.30)
Ln (Size) -0.0117 -0.3650***
(-6.51)
Leverage 0.3975** -0.2094
(2.06) (-0.61)
Collateral 0.2296*** 0.0628
(2.59) (0.41)
BBB-AAA Spread -0.1150 -0.2497
(-1.09) (-1.00)
Book-to-Market 0.2795*** -0.1986
(3.03) (-1.29)
Run-Up -0.1481*** -0.0939
( j . 6 ^ (-0.75)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0029* -0.0028
(1.92) (-0.92)
Cash Flows to Assets 1.4874*** 1.3036*
(7.54) (1.92)
Intangibles 0.6142*** 0.3585
(3.56) (0.98)
Relative Size -0.0631 -0.1650
(-0.94) (-1.33)
Diversifying Deals 0.1096** 0.1477
(1.99) (1.25)
Hostile Deals 0.5367** 0.5206
(2.01) (1.36)
Tender Offers 1.6656*** 1.6806***
(10.46) (7.25)
Private 0.9241*** 1.0516***
(12.81) (7.68)
Competition 0.2271 0.0535
(1.33) (0.20)
N 3,394 999
Pseudo R^ 0.261 0.352
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Table 2.15
Ordered Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f the Ordered Probit regression analysis o f the choice between stock, mixed, and cash on 
credit rating existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample o f  US 
acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. In all models the dependent variable takes the value o f  1 for over 50% cash 
deals, and 0 for less than 50% cash deals. See Appendix A for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for 
year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
All Sample Sample with Rating Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constantl -0.4069*** 0.7013** -1.0297*** 0.6150
(-6.11) (2.37) (-5.54) (0.85)
Constant! 0.7744*** 2.1345*** 0.1174 2.0929***
(11.55) (7.15) (0.63) (2.84)
Rating Existence 0.3043*** 0.1965***
# ^ 4 ) (3.00)
Rating Level 0.0414*** 0.1186***
2 ^ 4 ) (5.78)
Ln (Size) -0.0520*** 0.0242 -0.1821*** -0.2250***
(1.45) (-5.42)
Leverage 0.3035** 0.1574
(2.39) (0.60)
Collateral 0.1945*** 0.0852
(2.99) (0.84)
Interest Rate Spread 0.1143 0.3833
(0.79) (1.08)
Book-to-Market 0.1753*** -0.1382
(2.94) (-1.25)
Run-Up -0.1147*** -0.1119
(-2.79) (-1.20)
Blockholder Ownership 0.0019* 0.0024
(1.68) (0.98)
Cash Flows to Assets 0.6834*** 1.5619***
(5.08) (2.63)
Intangibles 0.4333*** 0.4339*
(3.55) (1.73)
Relative Size -0.1120* -0.2000**
(-1.73) (-2.20)
Diversifying Deals 0.0746* 0.2022**
(1.83) (2.43)
Hostile Deals 0.5405*** 0.4037
0 .8 ^ (1.55)
Tender Offers 1.1421*** 0.9745***
(10.62) (6.79)
Private 0.5992*** 0.6436***
(9.77)
Competition 0.0560 -0.0226
(0.42) C4A3)
N 6^U9 3,793 1,747 1,106
Pseudo R^ 0.0669 0.123 0.0925 0.178
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Table 2.16
Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level
The table presents the results o f the Probit regression analysis o f the choice between more than 50% stock and more 
than 50% cash on credit rating existenee, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a 
sample o f US aequisitions over the period 1998-2009. In all models the dependent variable takes the value o f  1 for over 
50% stock deals, and 0 for less than 50% stock deals. See Appendix A for definitions o f the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
All Sample Sample with Rating Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.1505* 1.2564*** -0.9169*** -0.1136
(-1.82) (3.03) (-4.00) (-0.11)
Rating Existence -0.3174*** -0.1406
G&55) (-1.59)
Rating Level -0.0505*** -0.1432***
( 4 J n (-5.24)
Ln (Size) 0.0924*** 0.0114 0.2650*** 0.3610***
(7.19) (0.50) (7.16) (6.46)
Leverage -0.3965** 0.2094
0 4 .0 0 (0.61)
Collateral -0.2320*** -0.0734
(-2.62) (-0.48)
Interest Rate Spread 0.0379 0.1300
(0.18) (0.26)
Book-to-Market -0.2752*** 0.1921
(-3.00) (1.21)
Run-Up 0.1487*** 0.0974
(3.59) (0.78)
Blockholder Ownership -0.0029* 0.0027
( ^ 9 0 (0.89)
Cash Flows to Assets -1.4839*** -1.3157*
( 4 ^ 0 (-1.94)
Intangibles -0.6229*** -0.3675
( 4 ^ 0 (-1.01)
Relative Size 0.0638 0.1726
(0.95) (1.40)
Diversifying Deals -0.1096** -0.1479
( ^ 9 0 (-1.24)
Hostile Deals -0.5345** -0.5081
(-2.00) (-1.32)
Tender Offers -1.6615*** -1.6816***
(-10.44) (-7.24)
Private -0.9253*** -1.0507***
(-12.80) (-7.70)
Competition -0.2252 -0.0573
^L32) (-0.21)
N 6,204 3J94 1,607 999
Pseudo R^ 0.0994 0.261 0.157 0.351
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Chapter 3
Do Expectations for Credit Rating Level Changes Drive Corporate 
Investments? Evidence from Acquisitions
3.1 Introduction
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) provide qualitative statements on the creditworthiness 
of corporate entities and their financial obligations. Particularly in the recent years the 
importance of credit ratings has enhanced with survey evidence (Graham and Harvey (2001)) 
demonstrating that managers consider them as one of the most important factors when 
deciding their firms’ corporate policy. Specifically, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show 
that firms holding credit ratings, thus having access to the public debt markets, have a 50% 
higher leverage ratios relative to the ones without ratings. Additionally, Kisgen (2006, 2009) 
argues that given several discrete benefits (costs) from changes in credit rating levels, firms 
adjust their capital structure policies towards the issuance of less leverage (more equity), in 
order to preserve or even achieve a better credit rating. While there is plenty of recent 
evidence regarding the impact of credit ratings on financial decisions,^ ^ very few studies 
(with the exceptions of Nini Smith and Sufi (2009), Chernenko and Sunderam (2012), and 
Harford and Uysal (2012)), have investigated the relationship between credit ratings and firm 
real investment decisions.
Theoretically, in perfect frictionless capital markets firms’ investment policies should 
be based only on their investment opportunities and the source of financing should be 
irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). However, in the presence of information 
asymmetries the source of financing plays an important role in corporate investments (Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), Greenwald et al. (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Myers (1984)) and
Among others, see Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
Mittoo and Zhang (2008), Kisgen (2006, 2009), Sufi (2009), and Rauh and Sufi (2010).
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might distort “optimal investment” (Myers (1977), Jensen (1986), Hart and Moore (1995), 
and Stein (2003)) leading to over or underinvestment. In this respeet, given that credit ratings 
have direct implications on the access to debt financing, the model by John and Nachman 
(1985) provides supportive arguments that high credit ratings ameliorate the underinvestment 
problem
This study examines the effect of credit ratings on firms’ acquisition investment policy 
-  perhaps the most important corporate event with tremendous reallocation of resources 
(Harford and Li (2007)). Prior literature has shown that acquisitions increase bidders’ default 
risk (Dennis and McConnell (1986), Billett, King and Mauer (2004), Furfine and Rosen
(2011), Vallaseas and Hagendorff (2011), and Bargeron, Lehn, Moeller and Sehlingemann
(2012)), and leverage levels in the post-merger period (Ghosh and Jain (2000), Morellec and 
Zhdanov (2008), and Harford et al. (2009)). Therefore, aequisitions are very likely to lead to 
a downward pressure on bidders’ credit ratings, creating eoneems about preserving the rating 
level, which should, in turn, have a considerable impact on firms’ acquisition decisions.
Following the theoretical rationale and empirical findings of Kisgen (2006, 2009), Gul, 
Zhao and Zhou (2011), Chernenko and Sunderam (2012), Flannery, Nikolova and Oztekin 
(2012), Jung et al. (2012), and Alissa et al. (2013), I examine a setting of firms with managers 
that have strong incentives to maintain or obtain higher credit ratings, and the relationship of 
these incentives with acquisition decisions. These are firms which exhibit a close proximity 
to a future credit rating change (upgrade or downgrade), implying that the expected benefits 
or costs associated with these potential rating transitions are major for managers’ investment 
decision making. The above argument must hold true especially for the investment-grade eut-
In particular John and Nachman (1985) link firms’ decision to invest in high quality (high cash flows) projects 
, and ultimately their ability to repay their debt obligations on time with the assignment o f  a high credit rating. 
In their dynamic sequential equilibrium model firms’ reputation derived from the high quality rating at time t 
has a consequent beneficial effect in all the future time periods t+n  which the firms will try to access the bond 
markets, in the form o f low interest rates, and less restrictive constraints in the bond covenants on maximal 
payouts or minimum investment than those o f the low rated firms. Eventually, this state o f  affairs reduees the 
agency cost o f debt and mitigates the underinvestment problem (Myers (1977)).
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off (i.e., BBB-); this cutoff is the distinction between investment- and speculative- grade 
firms and is considered as one of the most prominent market segmentations in the capital 
market (Chernenko and Sunderam (2012)). Ex ante, it would be expected that the relationship 
between credit rating levels (credit quality) and real investment to be linear as the higher the 
credit rating level (i.e., the lower the cost of debt) the easier it is for firms to access credit 
markets and invest. Nevertheless, Kisgen (2006, 2009) show the importance of seeking or 
maintaining specific rating levels (i.e., investment grade cut-off) in their corporate policy, 
since on that distinction a large number of regulations, contracts and investment charters base 
their policies. Therefore, firms with a rating around the investment grade cut-off will deviate 
from the conventional linear relationship between cost of capital and investments and will 
avoid acquisition investments. Based on the preceding discussion, my first hypothesis is the 
following:
HI: The relationship between credit rating levels (credit quality) and the likelihood to 
conduct an acquisition investment is non-monotonic, as firms around the investment-grade 
threshold should exhibit a more conservative investment policy (i.e., abstain from takeovers) 
in order to secure or achieve an investment-grade rating on their publicly traded debt. 
Nevertheless, before and after this cut-off it is expected the traditional finance intuition to 
hold; that is a positive relationship between credit rating levels and acquisition investments.
In addition to the hypothesized significance of the generic rating class (i.e., investment
grade cut-off) on acquisition investments, I follow Kisgen (2006, 2009) and consider further
measures for estimating the proximity to credit rating changes on various micro levels (i.e.,
A-, BBB+, BB-, etc). In general, rating transitions on a micro level are considered all the
upgrades/downgrades that might incur to the firms’ creditworthiness, irrespective of the prior
credit rating that the firm might hold. That is, a downgrade of a firm’s rating from BB+ to BB
is defined as a rating change to a lower micro level. Similarly an upgrade from A- to A is
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defined as a rating change to a higher micro level. One of the measures I use to capture the 
closeness to a rating change includes S&P’s outlook reports. A rating outlook is a report from 
a rating agency analyst and is similar to reports provided by an equity analyst or an 
investment bank (Hull, Predeseu and White (2004)). Prior literature suggests that rating 
outlooks are the strongest predictors of future credit rating changes (Hamilton and Cantor
(2004), and Hill, Brooks and Faff (2010)). They can be viewed as an indication that a shift in 
firm’s risk profile has been observed, but its permanence has not yet been established 
(Hamilton and Cantor (2004)). Usually rating outlooks represent agencies’ opinions over the 
medium term (12-24 months) and can fall into four categories: negative, positive, developing 
and stable (Standard & Poor's (2008)). Additionally, credit ratings are determined by CRAs’ 
evaluation of the distribution of future cash flows to bondholders, which, is in turn, related to 
firms’ future cash flows. Hence, changes in credit ratings represent shifts in firms’ 
fundamentals. In this respect, Whited (1992) argues that credit ratings measure firms’ future 
growth opportunities, while CRAs state that their assessment of rating factors are forward 
looking and expand into the future (Standard & Poor's (2008)). Given that credit rating 
outlooks represent forward-looking agencies’ opinions, I would expect a firm with a positive 
(negative) outlook on its debt to conduct more (less) acquisitions, since these firms are likely 
to face lower (higher) “expected” cost of debt and higher (lower) growth opportunities. The 
above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Firms with positive (negative) credit rating outlooks have higher (lower) likelihood to 
conduct acquisitions.
A list o f various factors that CRAs consider when they evaluate firms’ creditworthiness contains: 1) product 
positioning and brand reputation; 2) market shares, the installed customer base and geographic coverage; 3) 
distribution capabilities; 4) customer relationships; 5) technology/manufacturing capabilities; and 6) meaningful 
barriers to entry (Standard & Poor's (2008)).
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Furthermore, previous literature has demonstrated that credit ratings affect firms’ cost 
of borrowing (West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), Ederington et al. (1987), Ziebart and 
Reiter (1992), Chen et al. (2007), and Radhakrishnan et al. (2013)). Moreover, Jensen and 
Meekling (1976), Myers (1977), and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms with better 
creditworthiness are less constrained by the debt overhang problem and have higher 
investment levels. When firms’ default risk is declining (increasing), firms’ bargaining power 
in the credit markets is likely to increase (decrease), and thus firms’ financial constraints will 
be less (more) severe. Hence, firms with higher (lower) creditworthiness face lower (higher) 
cost of debt capital, which, in turn, is likely to result in higher (lower) levels of M&A 
investments. I employ lagged rating actions as another measure of the proximity to credit 
rating changes. Altman and Kao (1992), Lando and Skodeberg (2002), and Christensen, 
Hansen and Lando (2004) demonstrate that credit rating changes exhibit a positive serial 
autocorrelation (“rating momentum”). That is a past downgrade tends to be followed by 
another downgrade. Since past credit rating changes serve as a good signal for upcoming 
rating shifts, I expect that they should exert an influence on firms’ management takeover 
decisions. This leads to the following testable hypothesis:
H3\ Firms received an upgrade (downgrade) on their publicly traded debt in the recent past 
are more (less) likely to conduct an acquisition.
Finally, I employ my last proxy to capture the possible direction of a rating change, by
examining the deviation of an empirically modeled (“expected”) credit rating from firm’s
ratings at time t-1 (where t-1 is the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition).
Kisgen (2006), Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman (2009), Alissa et al. (2013), and Baghai et
al. (2013) employ a similar approach to investigate firms’ capital structure, as well as
investment and earnings management decisions, when firms exhibit a large estimated
deviation from the “expected” credit rating at a given year. Following this rationale, I would
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anticipate that a large deviation might serve as a good candidate for measuring the likelihood 
and direction of credit ratings transitions in the future; this should, in turn, impact firms’ 
management acquisition decisions.
H4\ Given the positive relationship between the absolute difference from the expeeted-rating 
and the probability of a future credit rating change, below- (above-) expeeted-rating firms are 
more (less) likely to conduct acquisitions.
Using a sample of US acquisitions of publicly traded bidders over the period 1996-
2009,1 explore the effect of credit ratings on acquisition investments and find strong support 
to my conjectures. In particular, this study provides evidence of i) a non linear association 
between credit rating levels (credit quality) and acquisition decisions at the 1% significance 
level; ii) a strong positive (negative) association between positive (negative) rating outlooks 
and acquisition decisions at the 1% significance level; iii) a positive (negative) relationship 
between past upgrades (downgrades) and acquisition decisions; and iv) a positive association 
between the estimated deviation from an “expected” credit rating and takeover decisions. My 
results appear to be both statistically and economically significant, even after controlling for 
potential endogeneity of credit ratings. Economically, firms having a positive (negative) 
outlook on their debt increase (decrease) their acquisition investments by approximately 30% 
(34%) over the sample average. Similarly, firms experiencing an upgrade (downgrade) on 
their debt increase (decrease) their acquisition investments by roughly 20% (68%) over the 
sample average. Furthermore, a one point increase in the estimated credit rating deviation 
leads to an increase in aequisitions of approximately 5% over the sample average. Overall 
the findings in this work support my hypotheses and highlight the importance of CRAs on 
firms’ acquisition policy.
This study has several contributions to the M&As and credit ratings literature. First, it
provides evidence on the importance of credit ratings on corporate control decisions.
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Particularly, I show that the relationship between credit quality and takeover decisions is non­
linear since firms near the investment-grade cutoff follow a more conservative investment 
policy in order to avoid being downgraded in the junk status or achieve being upgraded in the 
investment grade status. To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine and uncover this 
non-linear association between credit rating levels and corporate investment decisions. 
Second, I offer new evidence regarding the relationship between different types of rating 
information, such as rating outlooks and lagged rating changes, and acquisition investments. 
Third, it adds to the existing literature on the determinants of M&A likelihood and 
particularly the association between credit ratings and the propensity of an acquisition 
investment. Fourth, it provides further evidence to the recent literature that investigates how 
credit supply frictions affect investment decisions (Cantillo and Wright (2000), Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006), Chava and Roberts (2008), Leary (2009), Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009), 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010), and Chernenko and Sunderam (2012)); in particular, I study the 
effect of credit rating benchmarks (i.e., investment-grade cut-off) and specific CRAs’ 
opinions (i.e, outlooks) on acquisition investments.
Finally, it can reasonably be argued that this study has implications regarding the 
impact of credit supply uncertainty on corporate policies (Morellec (2010), and Massa, 
Yasuda and Zhang (2013)). It has been argued contrary to the irrelevance theorem of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), and the demand-driven approach to corporate finance, that 
firms can face uncertainty related with their future access to credit markets, and as a 
consequence they have to seek for creditors when raising debt financing. The implications 
derived from the above setting are numerous with some examples including the hampering of 
investments, and the usage of less than optimal leverage on capital structures. The findings in 
this study imply that the function of debt certification in the form of rating outlook opinions 
that are provided by the CRAs, is likely to mitigate firms’ credit supply uncertainty when
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considering their future access to credit markets, and therefore makes them less reluctant to 
conduct an investment. Outlook opinions are perceived as a form of certification on the 
firms’ ability to repay their debt obligations in the future, and therefore provide a signal to 
potential creditors regarding their decisions to borrow capital to the firms. Since, the rating 
outlook is public information known both to firms, and the creditors it can help mitigate 
information asymmetries (Healy and Palepu (2001)), and narrow the gap between the demand 
and supply side of capital thus, enhancing market clearance, reducing supply uncertainty, and 
helping firms’ investment decisions.
This work is related with a number of different branches of literature. For instance, it is 
related with studies that examine the predictability of takeovers such as Palepu (1986), 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Comment and Schwert (1995), Billett (1996), Harford 
(1999), Almazan, De Motta, Titman and Uysal (2010), Billett, Jiang and Lie (2010), Uysal
(2011), and Harford and Uysal (2012). This study is particularly related with papers that 
investigate the acquisition likelihood from the bidder’s side (Harford (1999), Almazan et al. 
(2010), Uysal (2011), and Harford and Uysal (2012)). These studies use the amount of cash 
reserves (Harford (1999)), firms’ locations (Almazan et al. (2010)), and the deviation from 
target leverage (Uysal (2011)) as the main predictor variables in their analysis. In this work, 
instead, I use credit rating level as the main variable of interest. A very recent study which is 
close to my work is the one by Harford and Uysal (2012), who examine the effect of credit 
rating existence on the likelihood of an acquisition. Their study pools together rated and 
unrated firms without considering the particular effect of credit rating levels; my study 
differentiates to the extent that the focus is solely on a sample of rated firms and therefore I 
am able to examine the impact of credit quality on acquisition decisions considering also 
different types of rating information. Furthermore, another paper closely to my study is by 
Billett (1996), who examines the relationship between the likelihood of a target firm
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receiving a takeover bid and its debt riskiness as measured by the investment and speculative 
grade differential. This study differs from Billett (1996), since it examines the effect of bidder 
credit rating level on acquisition probability. Moreover, Kisgen (2006), Shah (2008), 
Hovakimian et al. (2009), Jung et al. (2012), and Alissa et al. (2013) demonstrate that firms 
are concerned about their credit rating levels and adjust their corporate policies accordingly 
in order to attain or maintain these rating targets. My work is in line with these studies 
offering evidence in an M&A setting.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents my sample. 
Section 3.3 analyzes the methodology and findings of the empirical tests. I present further 
robustness tests to my results in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Sample and Data
3.2.1 Sample Statistics
The sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms listed on the 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial files, with a credit rating over the period from 1995 to 
2008.^ "^  The sample is composed of 3,205 firms for a total of 23,044 firm/year observations. 
Acquisition data are obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Aequisitions 
Database and the sample includes successful and unsuccessful aequisitions of rated bidders 
over the period 1996 to 2009. I require deals to have non-missing transaction value and 
payment method information. Bidders are listed firms and targets are either listed or private 
firms. I remove from the sample all deals classified as repurchases, liquidations, 
restructurings, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, reverse takeovers, privatizations, bankruptcy 
acquisitions and going private transactions. Furthermore, to include in the sample deals that
Firms with a rating o f  D (default) or SD (selective default) are the most severely vulnerable firms and, hence, 
are excluded from the analysis similar to Alissa et al. (2013), and Alp (2013).
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represent a transfer of control, I require that the bidder owns less than 10% of target shares 
before the announcement and seeks to acquire more than 50% after the acquisition. 
Furthermore, I drop deals worth less than US$ 1 million and less than 1% of a bidder market 
value to avoid noise in the analysis. All these restrictions results in a sample of 1,695 
acquisition deals. After merging the two samples, 1 find that 926 acquirers conducted 1,695 
transactions over the sample period.
Table 3.1 presents the sample of aequisitions by announcement year. On average, 
takeovers of publicly listed targets represent the 61% of the M&A activity in the sample. 
Further, the vast majority (92.98%) of the deals announced during the whole sample period 
were successfully consummated. Finally, the average target size relative to the bidder is 
24.71%; however, this magnitude varies considerably across the full sample period.
[Please Look Table 3.1]
In this study 1 use the S&P domestic long term issuer credit rating as a measure of 
firms’ credit quality from COMPUSTAT.^^ Table 3.2 presents data for the average credit 
quality in the full sample partitioned by the acquisition announcement year. The average 
credit quality of US firms exhibits a decreasing trend consistent with Blume, Lim and 
Mackinlay (1998), Alp (2013), and Baghai et al. (2013). Moreover, a noticeable result is the 
monotonie decrease in the volatility of the US firms’ credit quality, a finding which entails a 
trend towards the stability of CRAs’ opinions about firms’ creditworthiness.^^
[Please Look Table 3.2]
The credit rating level is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 22. A higher rating corresponds to a larger 
number (i.e., 22 for AAA and 1 for D-, in my sample the lowest number is 3 as the lower credit rating is CC).
According to CRAs a credit rating system's performance can be measured mainly by two objectives. Rating 
accuracy (i.e., the correlation between ratings and defaults) and rating stability (i.e., the frequency and 
magnitude o f ratings changes) (Cantor and Mann (2003)).
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In addition to firms’ credit rating levels, in this study I apply other information 
produced or derived by CRAs in order to measure firms’ proximity to a future credit rating 
change. Specifically, I use: i) the credit rating outlooks^^; ii) the change in credit ratings 
between firms’ time t-1 and time t-2 (where t-1 represents fiscal year-end immediately prior 
to the acquisition year); and iii) the estimated deviation from an empirically modeled 
expeeted-rating. Particularly, in the case of the empirically modeled difference I follow 
Kisgen (2006), and use a surrogate expeeted-rating model of the form:
R atingit-x  =  4.7307 +  1.2743Lo^(AT)it_i -  3.W 79Qleverageit-^  +  9 .7 1 ^ 9 P ro fita b ility it-x  (1)^^/^
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for these credit rating related variables.^^ Panel 
A shows the number of rating outlooks partitioned by type in the full sample. The total 
number of firm/year observations with rating outlooks reported in COMPUSTAT’s 
RatingsXpress is 15,546. I observe that the positive outlooks represent the 9.71% of the full 
sample while the negative outlooks represent the 20% of the full sample. Moreover, the 
percentage of stable outlooks over the full sample is 69.79% while the percentage for 
developing outlooks is a marginal 0.005%. Panel B presents the number of rating changes 
and the average number of notches’ transitions partitioned by the direction of change. 
Upgrades amount to 2,074 with a mean upgrade change of 1.32 notches. Downgrades amount 
to 2,953 with an average downgrade change of 1.67 notches. The remaining 15,870 firm/year 
observations constitute data unaffected by any shift in credit risk. Finally, Panel C shows the 
number and average values for the estimated deviation of the expected rating of model (1) 
from firms’ original rating at time t-1. The 50.87% of the observations is comprised of firms 
rated below their expeeted-rating, implying that these firms anticipate a possible upgrade on
Rating outlooks were collected from the COMPUSTAT RatingsXpress database.
The model is estimated using OLS with year and industry (12 Fama-French industries) fixed effects and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted also for clustering at firm level. The adjusted R  ^o f  this model 
is a satisfactory 0.618, similar with the results in Kisgen (2006).
Where i represent firms and t-1 represent time.
All the variables are defined later in the variables selection subsection and in the Appendix A.
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their rated debt. The remaining 49.13% constitutes firms rated above their expeeted-rating 
reflecting that these firms expect a likely downgrade on their rated debt.
[Please Look Table 3.3]
3.2.2 Variables Selection
In the empirical analysis 1 control for a number of variables that are known from the 
prior literature to affect the propensity of an acquisition investment. Large firms are more 
likely to make an acquisition, since they are more diversified and are able to obtain capital in 
order to finance acquisitions in a short notice (Almazan et al. (2010), and Uysal (2011)). 
Hence, 1 include the market value of the firm at the fiscal year-end as proxy for size.^^
To control for the operating performance of the firms, 1 include the ratio of EBITDA to 
total assets (profitability) as more profitable firms have a higher propensity to conduct 
acquisitions (Harford (1999), and Uysal (2011)). Furthermore, cash rich firms are more likely 
to undertake aequisitions according to Jensen (1986), Harford (1999), and Faccio and Masulis
(2005). For that reason 1 include the variable cash reserves which is defined as the ratio of 
cash holdings over total assets.
1 also control for firms’ age as older firms might be more likely to engage in 
acquisitions (Almazan et al. (2010)). The age variable is defined as the number of years the 
firm is covered in COMPUSTAT until the time t (year of the acquisition announcement). 
Moreover, to control for the potential effects of growth opportunities and misvaluation 
(Harford (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Uysal (2011), and Harford and Uysal (2012)) 1 
add stock-return and market-to-hook. The former variable is defined as the market adjusted 
(relative to the value weighted CRSP index) monthly excess return for the last fiscal year 
before the acquisition announcement, and the latter is defined as the ratio of market value of
I also use the log o f  sales and log o f total assets as another way to measure size and the results are 
qualitatively similar.
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equity to the book value of equity, at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement.
I also include the leverage variable, which is defined as the ratio of total debt (short- 
and long-term debt) over the total assets of the firm, to disentangle the effects of credit rating 
levels from leverage. The relationship of leverage with the acquisition propensity is mixed; in 
particular, Harford (1999) finds no evidence that leverage affects the probability to buy other 
firms, while Faccio and Masulis (2005) document a positive relation between leverage and 
the propensity of an acquisition. Uysal (2011) observes that overleveraged firms are less 
likely to carry out acquisitions.
To account for the liquidity of corporate assets within an industry (i.e., M&A waves), 1 
include in my regressions the M&A liquidity variable, similar to Uysal (2011) and Harford 
and Uysal (2012). Industry concentration might also influence the propensity of firms to 
conduct acquisitions as firms in highly concentrated industries have fewer competitors that 
can serve as targets, a fact that can hamper the number of within-industry aequisitions. 
Hence, 1 add the variable Herfindhal Index following Uysal (2011), and Harford and Uysal
(2012), to control for this effect.
Table 3.4 presents summary statistics for the above control variables. The average 
market capitalization in the sample is $7.64 billion. Further, the mean profitability is 11.70% 
and the average age is 20 years. Moreover, the mean market value is 3.34 times larger than 
the book value, and the average leverage is 36.28%. Finally, the average (median) industry 
concentration is 0.15 (0.10), a finding which implies the existence of unconeentrated 
industries.
[Please Look Table 3.4]
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Credit quality and acquisition investments
In this section I present a multivariate analysis ineluding several variables that might 
affeet the propensity to engage in acquisitions.^^ The main variable of interest is the rating 
level which measures firms’ credit quality. According to hypothesis (HI) it is expected a non­
linear relationship between rating level and the likelihood of acquisitions. Thus, in order to 
measure this anticipated non-linearity, I include in my main regressions polynomial terms of 
the variable rating level up to the 3^  ^ order.^^’^ "^ Therefore, I also add in my regressions the 
rating level squared and rating level cubic along with all the other control variables in my 
sample. Finally, in my regressions I include year- and industry- (12 Fama-French industries) 
fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Moreover, I use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors adjusted also for clustering at firm level. Table 3.5 presents the results. 
Specifications (1) through (3) show the results for probit analysis, where the dependent 
variable is the acquisition dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the firm made at least one 
acquisition in a given year, and 0 otherwise. In specifications (4) through (6) I present the 
results for the tobit analysis, where the dependent variable is the DVA /TA, which is the sum 
of the deal values of acquisitions made in a given year scaled by firms’ total assets in the 
previous year. In models (I) and (2) the coefficients on both variables of interest (i.e., rating 
level and rating level squared) are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, a
In Appendix B is presented the correlation matrix o f  all the variables used in the empirical analysis in order 
mitigate any concerns related with multicollinearity among the main and other control variables in the 
regressions. The results should not be affected by any potential multicollinearity, given the large sample size 
with sufficient variation in the explanatory variables. I still perform a multicollinearity (VIF) test for all 
specifications throughout the study and find that correlation between explanatory variables does not have any 
material effect on the estimates.
The validity o f the usage o f  3'^ '* order polynomials is examined by including in one step at a time a higher 
order polynomial (i.e., first the rating level to the power o f 2 and then the rating level to the power o f 3) and 
observing whether the Pseudo in every consequent model increases. Another rule o f thumb that justifies the 
selection o f 3'^ '* order polynomials is the mere observation that the coefficients in the regressions are significant 
for all three polynomial terms o f rating level.
Since by construction the usage o f higher order polynomials might create a multicollinearity bias in my 
regressions, I center the variable rating level around its mean value and derive accordingly the higher order 
polynomials from that centered variable.
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result that is a first indication of a non-linear relation. Finally, in model (3) which comprises 
the full model I observe that the coefficient on rating level cubic is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This finding implies that the cubic polynomial has a positive 
leading coefficient and the functional relationship between credit rating levels and probability 
of acquisition has two turning points indicating a non-linear relationship. In particular, it 
firstly exhibits a local maximum, and secondly a local minimum.^^
Moreover, I measure the specific turning points in this non-linear relationship between 
credit quality and the likelihood of acquisitions which allows to accept or reject the 
hypothesis about the impact of the investment-grade cut-off on acquisition investments.^^ 
According to hypothesis H I, I predict the turning points of the above relationship to be close 
to the investment-grade cut-off. In particular, I identify the first turning point (local 
maximum) around the credit rating level BB which is two notches below the rating level 
BBB-. This means that when firms’ debt is rated two notches away from an upgrade to the 
investment-grade status (located in the broad rating category BB), bidding firm’s managers 
are not likely to invest in M&As, in order to avoid jeopardizing their firms’ creditworthiness 
and secure the beneficial investment grade status. Regarding the second turning point, I 
estimate the change in firms’ investment behaviour around the rating level A-, which implies 
that firms exiting from the broad rating category BBB start to increase their M&As 
investments. This is probably due to the fact that an imminent downgrade to a junk status is 
considered a relatively remote i nc iden t .The  coefficient estimates for the other control 
variables are consistent with the existing literature. For instance, the coefficient on size is 
positive and similar to the findings of Cai and Vijh (2007), and Harford and Uysal (2012).
In mathematical terms this result is translated as: ( f ix )  —co as x ^  —co) and (/(%) -> +co as x  +co).
I compute the turning points o f the S''* order polynomial by using the formula: t i 2 =  'where
and pS are the estimated coefficients from the full model in specification (3) as in Plassmann and Khanna 
(2007).
In order to measure the non-linear relationship between credit quality and likelihood o f  acquisitions in the 
robustness section I also employ linear spline and restricted cubic spline regressions.
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Profitability, age, stock-return and M&A liquidity hold positive and significant coefficients 
corroborating the findings of Harford (1999), Uysal (2011), and Harford and Uysal (2012). 
Finally leverage exhibits a negative association with the likelihood of undertaking an 
acquisition, consistent with the findings by Almazan et al. (2010).
Regarding the results of the tobit analysis in specifications (4) through (6) similar 
patterns are obtained to the findings of the probit analysis. Specifically, I am able to uncover 
a non-linear relationship between credit quality and acquisition likelihood, since the 
eoefficient on rating level cubic is positive and significant at the 5% level. The remaining 
control variables have coefficients consistent with the previous literature on the M&As’ 
likelihood.
[Please Look Table 3.5]
3.3.2 Proximity to credit rating changes and acquisition investments
This seetion presents an analysis of the relationship between the various variables used 
to measure the proximity to a future eredit rating change and acquisition decisions. I use the 
credit rating outlooks as the first measure. In partieular, the variable outlook positive is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is assigned an outlook with a positive 
direction on its debt and 0 otherwise.^^ Further, I use the variable outlook negative, whieh is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is assigned an outlook with a negative 
direetion on its debt and 0 otherwise.^^ Additionally, I include in my regressions the variable 
investment-grade, which controls for the firm closeness to an upgrade in the investment- 
grade status along with closeness to a downgrade in the speculative-grade status. Specifieally, 
I construct this variable following Kisgen (2006), and calculate the expeeted-rating derived
^ In that case the value o f 0 is assigned to firms with other types o f outlooks (i.e., negative, stable and 
developing) and firms without any rating outlook.
In this analysis I do not assign any particular values on the other two types o f outlooks (stable and 
developing) as, ex-ante, these types should not have any meaningful effect on firms’ investments.
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by equation (1) for firms with rating BB+ or BBB- at time t-1. Then I create the expeeted- 
rating score quartiles for each of these two rating categories, and assign the value of 1 to the 
lowest quartile BBB- firms and highest quartile BB+ firms, and 0 otherwise. By this way the 
dummy investment-grade measures the firms that are very close to a potential 
upgrade/downgrade according to their credit score. The other control variables are the same 
as in the analysis of seetion 3.3.1.
Table 3.6 presents the results of this analysis. In specifications (I) and (2) the 
eoefficients on the outlook positive and outlook negative carry the expected positive and 
negative signs accordingly, and are highly statistically significant. However, the effect of 
negative outlooks is larger than the effect of positive outlooks, a finding whieh implies that 
firms target minimum rating levels, similar to the results of Kisgen (2009)."^  ^ Further, these 
findings confirm hypothesis H2 and imply that firms with positive (negative) outlooks 
regarding their public debt conduct more (less) acquisitions, since firms’ management 
eonceive the future state of business affairs more optimistic (pessimistic). Another 
noteworthy result is the negative sign on investment-grade in specification (I) which 
corroborates my expectations about firm conservative behavior when the impact of market 
segmentation (investment-/speculative-status) is more pronounced. The remaining control 
variables hold coefficients whieh are according with the M&As’ likelihood literature."^^
[Please Look Table 3.6]
Table 3.6 also presents the results for the second proxy of closeness to future rating 
changes; that is the lagged credit rating ehanges. The lagged upgrade is a dummy variable
The Wald test for the difference between the two coefficients rejects the null o f  equality at the 1% 
significance level.
In all the main regressions that are reported in this section and specifically in table 3 .6 ,1 also control for credit 
rating level in untabulated analysis, and the results remain qualitative similar.
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which takes the value of 1 for firms that were upgraded over the last year prior to the 
aequisition announcement year, and 0 otherwise. The lagged downgrade is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 for firms that were downgraded over the last year prior to the 
acquisition announcement year, and 0 otherwise. Given, the notion of “rating momentum”, 
these variables serve as another proxy for potential credit rating change. The results in 
specifications (3) and (4) show that lagged upgrade (downgrade) has a positive (negative) 
association with acquisition investments at conventional significance levels. Again, the 
impact of the downgrade appears to be stronger than the impact of the upgrade, implying that 
potential downgrades are conceived by firms’ management as more important events for their 
creditworthiness than upgrades. These findings corroborate hypothesis H3 regarding the 
differential firm acquisition investment strategy based on their expected eredit rating level. 
The remaining control variables exhibit signs according to the related M&As likelihood 
literature.
Finally, Table 3.6 presents in specifications (5) and (6) the results for the third measure 
of firms’ proximity to future credit rating changes. This variable measures the deviation of 
the expeeted-rating derived from equation (1) from the credit rating of the firms in my sample 
at time t-1 .1 label this variable difference. According to hypothesis H4, it is expected that the 
higher the estimated deviation, the higher the probability of an upgrade and vice versa. In 
models (5) and (6) the main variable of interest, difference, has a positive and highly 
significant relationship with the acquisition propensity, a result that validates the hypothesis 
H4. The remaining eontrol variables hold coefficients with signs eonsistent to the existing 
M&As related literature on M&As. In summary, the results in this section corroborate my 
hypotheses regarding the proximity of credit rating ehanges and acquisition investments 
highlighting that firm corporate investments are eonditional upon anticipated eredit quality.
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3.4 Robustness Tests
3.4.1 Endogeneity o f credit rating levels
So far, in my analysis I treated the rating level variable as exogenous to my model; that 
is the decision to obtain a specific credit rating level is randomly allocated across the sample 
firms. However, Liu and Malatesta (2005), and An and Chan (2008) argue that firms 
determine, at least partially, whether to obtain a higher rating level after considering the 
benefits against the potential costs. Therefore, it is likely that the decision to obtain a high 
credit rating is based on firm- and industry- speeific characteristics, and failure to account for 
these characteristics would lead to biased estimates in my analysis. Given that in the main 
regressions the potential endogenous variable is the rating level with its polynomial terms 
(squared and cubic), a simple two-stage procedure with appropriate instruments is not 
sufficient and can lead to erroneous inferences associated with the “forbidden regression” 
problem discussed in Wooldridge (2002). Therefore, in order to overcome the problem of 
erroneous instrumental variables (IVs) estimation, correcting for the endogeneity bias of the 
rating level, I follow the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002). Specifically, I firstly use a 
list of instruments for the rating level and compute the predicted value ra ting  level from 
this (OLS) regression. As a second step, I choose as a single instrument for rating level 
squared the above predicted value raised to the power of 2, that is ra ting  leveÜ. Finally, as 
an instrument for rating level cubic I follow the same process and use the predicted value of 
the first regression raised to the power of 3, that is ra ting  level^.
The choice of instruments for the rating level is justified by considering the relevant 
literature on firm “debt composition” and “credit rating endogeneity” (Cantillo and Wright 
(2000), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003), Liu and Malatesta (2005), Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006), and An and Chan (2008)). In particular, Johnson (1997), and Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) argue that public credit markets cater to safe industries with low default risk
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and high credit quality. Hence, I use the variable industry level, which is the median credit 
rating level of the bidders’ same 3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end preceding 
the aequisition, to control for the eredit quality level of the industry. Moreover, Denis and 
Mihov (2003), Liu and Malatesta (2005), and An and Chan (2008) propose that the eredit 
quality of the issuer is the primary determinant of the rating level, and firms with the highest 
credit quality are assigned the highest eredit rating level. Thus, in order to account for this 
effect I add as an instrument the variable Altman-Z (Altman (1968)); the Altman-Z seore 
measures the probability of a publie firm to default on its debt within lor 2 years. Finally, I 
employ the two-step minimum chi-square estimator of Newey (1987), which is an 
asymptotically efficient estimator for cases where the main dependent variable is of discrete 
nature, and the endogenous explanatory variables (EEVs) are con t inuous tha t  is precisely 
my case.
Table 3.7 presents the results of this analysis. Specifications (I), (2) and (3) present the 
results for the reduced form regressions measuring the choice of credit rating level for the 
rating level, rating level squared and rating level cubic, respectively. I find that the four 
instruments, industry level, Altman-Z, ra ting  level^ and ra ting  level^ are highly 
significant in all three models. This finding implies that my instruments predict satisfactorily 
the ehoice of eredit rating levels and should mitigate any concerns regarding the weak 
instruments bias."^  ^ Finally, in model (4) whieh comprises the structural regression for the 
probit model, I observe that the main variables of interest, rating level, rating level squared 
and rating level cubic hold the same signs as in section 3.3.1 and are all statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This finding suggests that the variable rating level with its 
polynomial terms is endogenous and gives a justification for the analysis in this section. In
Specifically, the rating level variable is an ordinal variable but it can be modelled without any particular bias 
with an OLS regression (Horrigan (1966), Kisgen (2006), and Baghai et al. (2013)).
I also conduct a Sargan test (Sargan (1958)) in order to examine the validity o f the instruments and I am 
unable to reject the null o f instruments validity.
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addition, in the lower part of Table 3.7 I present the%^ value of the Wald test for endogeneity, 
which shows that the test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 1% level; this 
result adds further validity to my inferences about the existence of endogeneity bias in the 
main results.
[Please Look Table 3.7]
Table 3.8 presents the results for the endogeneity analysis when the main dependent 
variable is DVA/AT. Specifications (1), (2) and (3) present the results for the reduced form 
regressions measuring the choice of credit rating level for the rating level, rating level 
squared and rating level cubic, respectively. In the model (4) whieh comprises the structural 
regression for the tobit model, I observe that the main variables of interest, rating level, 
rating level squared and rating level cubic hold the same signs as in section 3.3.1 and are all 
statistieally significant at conventional levels. This result indicate that the variable rating 
level with its polynomial terms is endogenous and corroborates the findings in Table 3.7 
above for the case of the probit model. Additionally, in the lower part of Table 3.8 I present 
the y  value of the Wald test for endogeneity, whieh shows that the test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 1% level; this result support my inferences about the 
existence of endogeneity bias in the main results.
[Please Look Table 3.8]
3.4.2 What does the CreditWatch tells us?
Finally, as an additional robustness check I examine the impact of CreditWatches on 
firms’ acquisition investments. CreditWatches are stronger statements than outlooks, and 
indicate the potential direction of a rating change that may follow the resolution of particular 
events or trends, usually in a shorter time frame (3 months). A company is placed under
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review as a result of mergers, recapitalizations, regulatory actions or unanticipated operating 
developments (Standard & Poor's (2008)). A rating might be put on a review for a possible 
downgrade or upgrade or with uncertain direction. During the watehlist the rating agency 
collects additional information about the firms it rates, which typically leads to an interaction 
between rating analysts and firms’ management (Bannier and Hirsch (2010)). The 
CreditWatch is finally resolved by the announeement of either a rating change or 
confirmation of the initial rating. Boot, Milboum and Schmeits (2006) construct a theoretical 
model that explores the function of CRAs in capital markets and suggest that CreditWatches 
serve as monitoring devices of firm performance. As long as credit watehes exert an 
influence and require particular actions from the firm management, it should be expected that 
CreditWatches play an important role on firms’ acquisition policy. Similarly, Michelsen and 
Klein (2011), and Kemper and Rao (2013) examine the effect of CreditWatches on firms’ 
capital structure decisions and find conflicting and moderate effects, respectively.
Therefore, I download all CreditWatch placements assigned to firms during the last 
month of the fiscal year preeeding the acquisition year. The data were colleeted from 
COMPUSTAT’s RatingsXpress and consist of 59 positive, 199 negative, and 23 developing 
CreditWatch observations, respectively. Table 3.9 presents the results for the association 
between CreditWatch actions and acquisition investments. The main variables of interest are 
the watch positive and watch negative. They are both indicator variables taking the value of 1 
if the designation is positive or negative, respeetively, and 0 otherwise."^ "^  I find that watch 
positive holds a large positive while watch negative holds a large negative eoefficient 
respectively at the 10% level in both specifications (1) and (2). These findings suggest that 
CreditWatches exert an influence of firms’ management acquisition decisions. The weak 
significance level can be attributed either to the low number of CreditWatch observations in
In this analysis I do not consider the effect o f developing CreditWatches as the sign and interpretation o f  this 
type o f CRAs’ action is ambiguous.
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the sample or to the faet that CreditWatch actions by definition have duration of 90 days, and 
an examination of acquisition investments in the year following the CreditWatch placement 
might not be too revealing.
[Please Look Table 3.9]
3.4.3 Other Sensitivity Tests
In section 3.3.1 I was able to uneover a non-linear relationship between credit rating 
levels (eredit quality), and acquisition decisions by using for this cause a 3^  ^order polynomial 
model. However, I can use other models to capture this non-linear association and validate 
my inferences so far. To accomplish this task in this section I employ linear spline and 
restricted cubie spline regressions (Harrell (2001)). In their general form spline regressions 
require an assignment of specific knots (turning points), in order to investigate the different 
firms’ acquisition policies among the different intervals (credit rating levels). Fortunately, I 
already know from the analysis in section 3.3.1 that this relationship exhibits two turning 
points, the first around the BB rating level, and the second around the AA- rating level, so I 
ean reasonably assign these levels as the turning points in my estimations of the linear and 
restricted cubic spline regressions.
Table 3.10 presents the findings for the linear spline where model (1) is the pobit 
regression with a dependent variable the acquisition dummy, and model (2) is the tobit 
regression with dependent variable the DVA/AT. I can observe from these two models that the 
signs and significance of rating level for the first two intervals are similar with the findings in 
Table 3.5 but, in the last interval the eoefficient is negative and signifieant. This result might 
be driven by the inefficiency of the linear spline to capture very curved functions, since by 
eonstruction the linear spline assume that the relationship is linear between the intervals. 
Assuming that the relationship is linear among the intervals is natural and useful
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simplification nevertheless, I am interested in the non-linearity of the association between 
credit rating levels and acquisition decisions, and a restricted cubic spline is a better choice 
than the linear spline (Harrell (2001)).
[Please Look Table 3.10]
Table 3.11 presents the results for the restricted cubic spline model where model (1) is 
the pobit regression with a dependent variable the acquisition dummy, and model (2) is the 
tobit regression with dependent variable the DVA/AT. I can observe that the signs and the 
significance for the different credit rating intervals in both of the models are similar with the 
results in Table 3.5. These findings validate, and add more support on my main inferences so 
far for the existence of a non-linear relationship between credit rating levels and firms’ 
acquisition decisions.
[Please Look Table 3.11]
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a direct empirical analysis of the impact of credit ratings on the 
firm acquisition propensity. In particular, I attempt to measure the effect of credit rating 
levels (credit quality) on the likelihood to undertake acquisitions and find that this 
relationship is non-linear. This finding is explained by the strategic importance of the 
investment-grade cut-off, since firms close to an upgrade (downgrade) to the investment- 
grade (speculative-grade) status exhibit a conservative investment behaviour which is not 
explained by the traditional finance theory. Furthermore, I apply three different proxies for 
the imminence of a credit rating change (Rating Outlooks, Lagged Rating Changes, and 
Deviation from Expected-Rating), and provide evidence that managerial concerns regarding 
potential rating changes influence their decisions to acquire. This finding suggests that
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different expected credit rating actions (upgrades/downgrades) signal a material change in 
firms’ fundamentals and lead their management to perceive future states of the world under 
alternative perspectives (optimistically/pessimistically). The results support my hypotheses 
even after controlling for potential endogeneity. This study adds to the prior literature to the 
extent that provides anecdotal evidence for a non-linear relationship between credit rating 
levels and acquisition decisions. Additionally, my findings imply that firm management 
schedule their acquisition decisions conditional on their expected creditworthiness, as implied 
by the ratings assigned by CRAs.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Panel A: Acquisition Decisions
Acquisition Dummy Dummy variable: 1 if  the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, 
0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial 
SDC.
DVA/AT It is the sum o f  the announced acquisition deal values in year t scaled by 
firm’s total assets in year t-L  Deal values are from Thomson Financial 
SDC, firm’s total assets are from COMPUSTAT.
Panel B: Credit Rating Variables
Rating Level Continuous variable for rated bidders: 1 to 22, AAA level takes 22 and D 
takes 1. The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT.
Outlook Positive Dummy variable: 1 for positive rating outlooks, 0 otherwise. The variable 
is created using data from COMPUSTAT RatingsXpress database.
Outlook Negative Dummy variable: 1 for negative rating outlooks, 0 otherwise. The variable 
is created using data from COMPUSTAT RatingsXpress database.
Lagged Upgrade Dummy variable: 1 for upgraded firms during the last year preceding the 
acquisition, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from 
COMPUSTAT.
Lagged Downgrade Dummy variable: 1 for downgraded firms during the last year preceding 
the acquisition, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from 
COMPUSTAT
Difference Deviation o f  rating at time t-1 from an empirically modeled expected- 
rating. The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT
Watch Positive Dummy variable: 1 for positive CreditWatch placements, 0 otherwise. 
The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT RatingsXpress 
database.
Watch Negative Dummy variable: 1 for negative CreditWatch placements, 0 otherwise. 
The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT RatingsXpress 
database.
Investment-Grade Dummy variable: 1 to the lowest quartile BBB- firms and highest quartile 
BB+ firms from an expected-rating model, 0 otherwise. The variable is 
created using data from COMPUSTAT.
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
Size Firm market value o f equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement from CRSP in US$ million.
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Leverage Firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by the book value o f total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Stock-Return Market adjusted (relative to the value weighted CRSP index) monthly excess 
return for the last fiscal year before the acquisition announcement.
Market-to-Book Market value o f  equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement divided by the book value o f equity at the fiscal year-end prior 
to the acquisition announcement Market and book value o f  equity is from 
COMPUSTAT.
Cash Reserves The ratio o f cash holdings over total assets in the fiscal year-end prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Age Number o f  years the firm is covered in COMPUSTAT until the time t (year) 
o f the acquisition announcement.
Profitability The ratio o f  earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets at the fiscal year immediately prior to the
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.____________________________
Panel D: Industry Characteristics
M&A Liquidity Sum o f acquisitions value for each year and three-digit SIC code divided by 
the total assets o f COMPUSTAT firms in the same three-digit SIC and year.
Herfindahl Index Sum o f squares o f the market shares o f all firms sharing the same three-digit 
SIC, where market share is defined as sales o f  the firm to sum o f  the sales
with the industry._______________________________________________________
Panel E: Instrumental Variables
Industry Level The median credit rating level o f  firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry group 
at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from 
COMPUSTAT.
Altman-Z Is calculated from the formula Z = 6.56 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 
3.26 (Retained Eamings/Total Assets) + 6.72 (EBIT/Total Assets) + 1.05 
(Book Value o f  Equity/Book Value o f Total Liabilities).
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics on Acquisitions
The table presents yearly descriptive statistics for a sample o f acquisitions by US rated publicly listed bidding 
firms announced over the period between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2009. N  denotes the number o f  
acquisition announcements by year. An acquisition is considered public (private) when the target firm is a 
publicly listed (private) company. An acquisition is considered completed when the offer is successful and the 
deal consummated. Relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market capitalization o f the acquirer 
at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement.
Year N Public Private Completed Relative Size
1996 135 82 53 124 12.81%
1997 168 104 64 158 12.94%
1998 199 134 65 179 34.39%
1999 188 136 52 173 35.25%
2000 148 97 51 134 37.78%
2001 105 66 39 99 20.84%
2002 84 42 42 81 12.31%
2003 89 48 41 84 18.21%
2004 112 63 49 109 24.32%
2005 114 58 56 111 31.86%
2006 130 79 51 122 25.53%
2007 101 62 39 94 13.16%
2008 76 34 42 62 20.21%
2009 46 29 17 46 33.42%
Total 1,695 1,034 661 1,576 24.71%
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics on Credit Rating Levels
The table presents yearly descriptive statistics for the average credit quality o f  the universe o f  US rated publicly 
listed firms over the period between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2008. Specifically it reports the average, 
median and standard deviation o f the credit rating level by year.
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. N
1995 13.88 14 3 J 9 1,307
1996 13.70 14 3.75 1,474
1997 13.47 14 3 J 2 1,607
1998 13.33 13.5 3.71 1,772
1999 13.15 13 3 J 2 1,792
2000 13.07 13 3.70 1,777
2001 12.99 13 3.71 1,733
2002 12.85 13 3^3 1,714
2003 12.80 13 3.55 1,724
2004 12.75 13 3.49 1,738
2005 12.79 13 3A5 1,693
2006 12.73 13 3.50 1,647
2007 12.73 13 3 j 3 1,581
2008 12.63 13 3.57 1,485
Total 13.05 13 3 j # 23,044
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Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics on Credit Rating Changes Proximity Measures
The table presents yearly descriptive statistics for the various credit rating changes proximity measures o f  the universe 
o f US rated publicly listed firms over the period between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2008. Panel A reports the 
number o f  rating outlooks by type (positive, negative, stable and developing). Panel B reports the number and mean 
rating change by type (upgrade, downgrade and unchanged). Panel C reports the number and mean estimated 
deviation by type (above expected-rating and below expected-rating).
Panel A: Rating Outlooks Positive Negative Stable Developing
N 1,510 3,110 10,850 76
Mean 0.10 0.20 0.70 0.00
Panel B; Lagged Rating Changes Upgrades Downgrades Unchanged
N 2,074 21,953 15,870
Mean 1.32 1.67 0.00
Panel C: Rating Deviations Difference Below Above
N 21,903 11,142 10,761
Mean 42 3 1.71 1.77
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Table 3.4
Descriptive Statistics on Firm and Industry Characteristics
The table presents descriptive statistics for the universe o f US rated publicly listed firms over the period 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2009. See Appendix A for definition o f  the variables. The average, 
median, standard deviation and number o f observations for the control variables used in the empirical analysis 
are reported.
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. N
Size ($1,000,000) 7,642.24 7,655.46 1.8786 21,834
Profitability 0.1170 0.1140 0.0948 21,970
Cash Reserves 0.0804 0.0415 0.1074 22,982
Age 20.47 17.00 12.9293 23,044
Stock-Return 0.0074 0.0133 0.0317 20,835
Market-to-Book 32A% 1.8807 65.9920 21,832
Leverage 0.3628 0.3289 0.2479 22,915
M&A Liquidity 0.0243 0.0013 0.1378 23,044
Herfindhal Index 0.1505 0.1003 0.1478 23,044
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Table 3.5
Credit Rating Levels and Acquisition Investments
The table presents the results for probit analysis in models (1) to (3) and the results for tobit analysis in models (4) to (6). The 
dependent variable in probit models takes the value o f  if  the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, and 0 
otherwise. In tobit analysis, the dependent variable is the sum o f the announced acquisition deal values in year t scaled by 
firm’s total assets in year t-1. See Appendix A for definition o f  variables. All regressions control for year- and industry- fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  
denotes the number o f observations.
Probit Analysis Tobit Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -2.1318*** -2.0912*** -2.0794*** -2.7495*** -2.7029*** -2.6868***
(-14.50) (-14.04) (-13.93) (-3.62) fr lM ) (-3.62)
Rating Level -0.0448*** -0.0389*** -0.0527*** -0.0617*** -0.0549*** -0.0737***
(-5.93) (-5.04) (-3.08) (4.9% (-2.97)
Rating Level Squared -0.0040*** -0.0049*** -0.0047** -0.0060***
(-3.54) (-4.19) (-2.53) (-2.74)
Rating Level Cubic 0.0005** 0.0006**
(2.24) (2.02)
Size 0.0924*** 0.0911*** 0.0913*** 0.1297*** 0.1283*** 0.1288***
(6.03) (6.02) (3.04) (3.03) (3.02)
Profitability 0.5738*** 0.5029*** 0.4751** 0.7959*** 0.7139** 0.6736**
(3.08) CL68) (153) (173) (2.56) (2.48)
Cash Reserves -0.2272 -0.1422 -0.1298 -0.1119 -0.0107 0.0074
frL3% (-0.88) (-0.80) (-0.59) (-0.06) (0.04)
Age 0.0066*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0064***
(442) (A35) (2.74) (180)
Stock-Return 2.2850*** 2.3310*** 2.3218*** 2.7321*** 2.7842*** 2.7706***
(5.46) (5.49) (5.43) ^14% (3.15) (115)
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.90) (0.92) (0 91) (1.33) (1.34) (13%
Leverage -0.2567*** -0.2026** -0.2055** -0.3418** -0.2786** -0.2819**
(-3.19) (-2.50) (-2.51) (-2.44) (-117) (-2.17)
M&A Liquidity 0.4713*** 0.4649*** 0.4671*** 0.6635*** 0.6564*** 0.6588***
(451) (445) H4% (124) (123)
Herfindahl Index -0.1227 -0.1228 -0.1301 -0.1710 -0.1730 -0.1825
(-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.19)
N 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305
Pseudo R^ 0.0596 0.0612 0.0617 0.0535 0.0549 0.0555
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Table 3.6
Proximity to Credit Rating Changes and Acquisition Investments
The table presents the probit results in odd numbers models and the tobit results in even numbers specifications The 
dependent variable in probit models takes the value o f  if  the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, and 0 
otherwise. In tobit analysis, the dependent variable is the sum o f the announced acquisition deal values in year t scaled by 
firm’s total assets in year t-1. See Appendix A for definition o f variables. All regressions control for year- and industry- fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  
denotes the number o f observations.
Prohit Tohit Prohit Tohit Prohit Tohit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.7436*** -2.2364*** -1.7133*** -2.1983*** -1.8097*** -2.3165***
(-13.29) (-3.62) (-12.96) (-3.60) (-13.70) (-3.63)
Outlook Positive 0.1551*** 0.1677**
(2.94) (2 51)
Outlook Negative -0.1742*** -0.2143***
( 3  62) (-2.88)
Lagged Upgrade 0.1025** 0.1711*
(Z28) (193)
Lagged Downgrade -0.3499*** -0.4174***
(-6.68) (-3.83)
Difference 0.0237*** 0.0291**
U 2% (2.41)
Investment-Grade -0.1544* -0.0028 -0.1464* 0.0052 -0.1569* -0.0073
(-1.82) (-0.02) (1 .71) (0.03) (L M ) (-0.05)
Size 0.0362*** 0.0537** 0.0344*** 0.0511** 0.0412*** 0D595***
P 4% (3.10) (2 44) U 6%
Profitability 0.2817 0.3991* 0.1634 0.2486 0.3510* 0.4812**
(1.55) (172) (0.90) (1.12) (186) (1%%
Cash Reserves -0.0960 0.0758 -0.1090 0.0591 -0.1061 0.0644
(-0.60) (0.43) (-0.68) (033) (-0.66) (036)
Age 0.0053*** 0.0040** 0.0055*** 0.0043** 0.0055*** 0.0044**
(3.34) (214) (3.44) (2.23) (3 48) (2.26)
Stock-Return 2.6954*** 3.3441*** 2.5021*** 3.0761*** 2.6387*** 32568***
(6 33) (3.23) (5.76) (338) (6.32) (3.26)
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
(1.01) (136) (0.75) (120) (0.93) (130)
Leverage -0.1292* -0.1614 -0.1104 -0.1387 -0.1362* -0.1694
(L&% (-1.58) (-1.40) (-1.38) (-1.72) (-1.63)
M&A Liquidity 0.4520*** &6390*** 0.4563*** 0.6431*** 0.4715*** 0.6621***
(4.24) (3.17) (4.24) (3 17) (4.46) (3.22)
Herfindahl Index -0.1373 -0.1941 -0.1299 -0.1863 -0.1139 -0.1668
( 1 0 5 ) (1 .24) (-0.98) (-1.18) (-0.88) (-1.08)
N 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305
Pseudo R^ 0.0582 0.0508 0.0610 0.0537 0.0571 0.0500
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Table 3.7
Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Levels
The table presents the Newey (1987) two-step sequential estimator to test for potential endogeneity o f credit rating levels. 
Specifications (1), (2) and (3) are the reduced form regressions for rating level, rating level squared  and rating level cubic, 
respectively. Specification (4) is the structural regression for the acquisition dummy. See Appendix A for definition o f  
variables. All regressions control for year- and industry- fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The numbers reported in parentheses are 
the two-step adjusted z statistics. N  denotes the number o f observations. The lower part o f  the table presents the value for 
the Wald test o f  endogeneity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -11.8781*** 6.5536*** -309.6855*** -1.8438***
(-81.62) (7.17) (-39.50) (-5.65)
Rating Level 
Rating Level Squared 
Rating Level Cubic 
Industry Level 0.2906*** 0.1646*** 6.2167***
-0.1652***
-0.0089**
(-1.98)
0.0046**
(2.37)
Altman-Z
(39.55)
0.0144*** -0.0588***
(15.71)
0.5855***
R a t in ^ e v e f i
(5.41)
0.0186***
LL51)
0.8260*** 1.8958***
R atingT eveE
(13.65)
-0.0031***
(96.45)
0.0452***
C%.8%
0.1786***
Size
(-19.23)
1.1965***
(44.61)
-0.4550*** 31.7917*** 0.0674
(112.93) (-6.84) (55.70) (1.63)
Profitability 5.8539*** -7.6903*** 171.8216*** 0.2373
(34.54) (-7.23) (18.82) (0.79)
Cash Reserves -3.7264*** 13.7153*** -98.1613*** -0.0417
(-26.81) (15.71) (-13.11) (-0.20)
Age 0.0285*** -0.0334*** 0.3262*** 0.0080***
p 2T 5) L4T3) (5.28)
Stock-Return -10.1188*** -14.4257*** -206.8417*** 2.1450***
(-21.50) (-8.16) (3.98)
Market-to-Book 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0173 0.0001
(1.57) (0.31)
Leverage -3.0646*** 0.8167* -73.7994*** -0.2153*
(-41.05) (1.74) (-18.35) Ll.%%
M&A Liquidity 0.3575** -2.3302*** 3.6386 0.4750***
(2.47) 0 4  57) (0.47)
Herfindahl Index 0.3529*** 0.6153 24.8709*** -0.2024*
(3.39) (0.94) (4.44) L1.T%
Adjusted R  ^(Wald 0.7145 0.3822 0.4538 (561.00)
N 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305
p(value)
16.63
(0.000)
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Table 3.8
Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Levels
The table presents the Newey (1987) two-step sequential estimator to test for potential endogeneity o f credit rating levels. 
Specifications (1), (2) and (3) are the reduced form regressions for rating level, rating level squared and rating level cubic, 
respectively. Specification (4) is the structural regression for the DVA/AT. See Appendix A for definition o f  variables. All 
regressions control for year- and industry- fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The numbers reported in parentheses are the two-step 
adjusted z statistics. N  denotes the number o f observations. The lower part o f the table presents the value for the Wald test 
o f endogeneity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -11.8781*** 6.5536*** -309.6855*** -2.5169***
(-81.62) (7.17) (-39.50) (-6.30)
Rating Level -0.1859***
Rating Level Squared -0.0092*
(-1.66)
Rating Level Cubic 0.0045*
(1.9%
Industry Level 0.2906*** 0.1646*** 6.2167***
(39.55) (15.71)
Altman-Z 0.0144*** -0.0588*** 0.5855***
(5.41) LT51) (4.07)
R a t in ^ e v e f i 0.0186*** 0.8260*** 1.8958***
(13.65) (96.45) (25.80)
R a t in ^ e v e f i -0.0031*** 0.0452*** 0.1786***
(-19.23) (44.61) (20.56)
Size 1.1965*** -0.4550*** 31.7917*** 0.1139**
(112.93) G&84) (55.70) (2.26)
Profitability 5.8539*** -7.6903*** 171.8216*** 0.4928
(34.54) (-7.23) (18.82) (1.34)
Cash Reserves -3.7264*** 13.7153*** -98.1613*** 0.0559
(-26.81) (15.71) (-13.11) (0.22)
Age 0.0285*** -0.0334*** 0.3262*** 0.0076***
(22.15) L4T3) ^ 7 % (4.08)
Stock-Return -10.1188*** -14.4257*** -206.8417*** 2.5405***
(-21.50) LA88) (-8.16) (3.89)
Market-to-Book 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0173 0.0002
(1.57) (1.60) (1.18)
Leverage -3.0646*** 0.8167* -73.7994*** -0.3180**
(-41.05) (1.74) (-18.35) (-2.06)
M&A Liquidity 0.3575** -2.3302*** 3.6386 0.6681***
(2.47) LZ57) (0.47) (5.54)
Herfindahl Index 0.3529*** 0.6153 24.8709*** -0.2488*
(3.39) (0.94) (4.44) (H 7%
Adjusted R  ^(Wald ]^) 0.7145 0^8% 0.4538 (475.81)
N 19,305 19,305 19,305 19,305
11.81
p(value) (0.008)
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Table 3.9
CreditWatch Placements and Acquisition Investments
The table presents the results for probit analysis in specification (1) and for tobit analysis in specification (2). 
The dependent variable in probit model takes the value o f if  the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, 
and 0 otherwise. In tobit analysis, the dependent variable is the sum o f  the announced acquisition deal values in 
year t scaled by firm’s total assets in year t-L  See Appendix A for definition o f variables. All regressions control 
for year- and industry- fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
(1) (2)
Constant -1.7601*** -2.2561***
(-13.40) (-3.63)
Watch Positive 0.3828* 0.5222*
(1.74) (1.90)
Watch Negative -0.3579* -0.4508*
(-1.89) (-1.84)
Investment-Grade -0.1458* 0.0061
(-1.71) (0.04)
Size 0.0370*** 0.0545**
Profitability 0.3407* 0.4677**
(1.87) (1.97)
Cash Reserves -0.0843 0.0902
L 0J3) (0.51)
Age 0.0049*** 0.0036*
(3.06) (1.91)
Stock-Return 2.7366*** 3/3811***
(6.47) (3.25)
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0003
(1.24)
Leverage -0.1418* -0.1764*
(-1.82) Ll.7%
M&A Liquidity 0.4629*** 0.6513***
(4.39)
Herfindahl Index -0.1277 -0.1821
(-0.97) (-1.15)
N 19,305 19,305
Pseudo R^ 0.0565 0.0495
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Table 3.10
Credit Rating Levels and Acquisition Investments
The table presents the results for the linear spline probit analysis in models (1) to (3) and the results for the linear spline tobit 
analysis in models (4) to (6). The dependent variable in probit models takes the value o f if  the firm announced at least one 
acquisition in year t, and 0 otherwise. In tobit analysis, the dependent variable is the sum o f  the announced acquisition deal 
values in year t scaled by firm’s total assets in year t-1. See Appendix A for definition o f  variables. All regressions control 
for year- and industry- fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
(1) (2)
Constant -2.5064*** -3.1160***
(-10.66) (-3.61)
Rating LeveKBB 0.0574** 0.0635**
(2.47) (2.03)
BB<=Rating Level<A- -0.0546*** -0.0758***
Rating Level>=A- -0.0680*** -0.0851***
(-3.76) (-2.69)
Size 0.0913*** 0.1287***
((kOl) (3.02)
Profitability 0.4497** 0.6443**
(2.38) (2.39)
Cash Reserves -0.1050 0.0364
(-0.64) (0.20)
Age 0.0070*** 0.0065***
(4.39)
Stoek-Return 2.3170*** 2.7630***
(5.41) (3.15)
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0003
(0.94) (1.34)
Leverage -0.2015** -0.2791**
(-2.46) L2 14)
M&A Liquidity 0.4653*** 0.6571***
(4.45) (3.23)
Herfindahl Index -0.1285 -0.1812
(-0.99) (-1.19)
N 19,305 19,305
Pseudo R^ 0.0622 0.0558
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Table 3.11
Credit Rating Levels and Acquisition Investments
The table presents the results for restricted cubic spline probit analysis in models (1) to (3) and the results for the restricted 
cubic spline tobit analysis in models (4) to (6). The dependent variable in probit models takes the value o f  if  the firm 
announced at least one acquisition in year t, and 0 otherwise. In tobit analysis, the dependent variable is the sum o f  the 
announced acquisition deal values in year t scaled by firm’s total assets in year t-L See Appendix A for definition o f  
variables. All regressions control for year- and industry- fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
(1) (2)
Constant -2.5429*** -3.2489***
(-9.02) (-3.40)
Rating LeveKBB 0.0824** 0.1066**
(2.25) (1.9%
BB<=Rating Level<A- -0.1417*** -0.1918**
(-3.01) ( 4 J %
Rating Level>=A- 0.4819** 0.6894**
(2.11) (2.00)
Size 0.0910*** 0.1282***
(3.02)
Profitability 0.4765** 0.6717**
(2.48)
Cash Reserves -0.1292 0.0106
(% j% (0.06)
Age 0.0069*** 0.0064***
(2.86)
Stock-Return 2.3240*** 2.7731***
(5.45) (3.15)
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0003
(0.92) (1.33)
Leverage -0.2058** -0.2818**
L Z 52) L 2T 8)
M&A Liquidity 0.4673*** 0.6592***
(3.24)
Herfindahl Index -0.1296 -0.1825
(-1.00) E l 19)
N 19,305 19,305
Pseudo R^ 0.0615 0.0553
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Chapter 4
Bidders and Targets Made for Each Other: Credit Ratings and Acquisition
Returns
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the use of credit ratings has greatly expanded in 
recent years, mostly due to the globalization of financial markets, the growing complexity of 
financial products and their evolution in financial regulation and contracting (Kisgen (2006, 
2009), and Frost (2007)). On theoretical grounds, prior literature uses credit ratings to 
measure debt capacity (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Bolton and Freixas (2000)). On the 
empirical side, a number of studies consider credit ratings as a direct indicator of firms’ debt 
capacity (Lemmon and Zender (2010), Leary and Roberts (2010), De Jong, Verbeek and 
Verwijmeren (2011), and Hess and Immenkotter (2012)). Additionally, the literature on 
firms’ financial constraints use the existence of rated debt to identify unconstrained firms 
(Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Almeida et al. (2004), and Almeida and 
Campello (2007)). Recently, a still developing literature has examined the effect of credit 
ratings on firms’ financial decisions. Among them, Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis and 
Mihov (2003), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), Kisgen (2006, 
2009), and Rauh and Sufi (2010) demonstrate that credit ratings affect the source of financing 
and the amounts of leverage which firms possess on their capital structures.
Surprisingly, despite the considerable amount of evidence on the implications of credit 
ratings on capital structure decisions, there is limited evidence of credit ratings impact on 
firms’ investment decisions and their wealth effects. This examination is of a particular 
interest, since as it was explained previously in Chapter 3, due to information asymmetries 
the source of financing plays an important role in corporate investments and might lead to 
overinvestment or underinvestment respectively. Along these lines, the theoretical model of
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John and Nachman (1985) proposes that high credit ratings ameliorate the underinvestment 
problem."^  ^ Thus, in so far as credit ratings’ have real implications on the access to debt 
financing, considerations regarding credit ratings should affect also firms’ investment 
choices.
Among firms’ investment decisions, an M&A is a major corporate event, since it may 
be the largest investment that a company might ever undertake thus, entailing implications for 
the reallocations of resources within the boundaries of the firm (Harford and Li (2007)) and 
the economy as a whole. A recent study by Harford and Uysal (2012) attempts to address the 
impact of bidders’ access to public debt markets on takeover decisions, and their value 
creation. In particular, the authors measure the access to debt markets by requiring the bidder 
to hold a credit rating, without giving emphasis on the quality and level of the rating per se. 
Consequently, they conduct their analysis and conclude that rated (unconstrained) bidders 
conduct less profitable marginal investment projects relative to the unrated (constrained) 
ones. Specifically, unrated bidders limit their investments to the highest Net Present Value 
(NPV) projects, whereas rated bidders can take all the positive NPV projects hence, the 
marginal project of unrated bidders creates more value than the marginal project of rated 
bidders.
However, it is plausible that credit ratings affect acquisition returns through other 
dimensions. First of all, I contend that credit ratings come into play during takeovers through 
the relative creditworthiness of the bidder to the target. Very often business combinations are 
formed in which the rating level between bidders and targets varies considerably; therefore 
the combined rating is determined by the credit quality difference between the merging 
parties. To exemplify this point, below I provide excerpts from Standard and Poor’s credit 
ratings reports in relation to several acquisitions.
See footnote 22.
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Standard and Poor's (2010): “Standard & Poor's Ratings Services recently placed its 'B' corporate credit rating 
for Continental on CreditWatch with negative implications, and its 'B-' corporate credit rating for UAL and 
subsidiary United Air Lines Inc. on CreditWatch with positive implications, pending completion o f the merger.” 
and “We cunently hold a 'B' rating on Continental and a 'B-' rating on United, and we expect to assign the 
combined entity a corporate credit rating at one o f  those two levels. Reflecting this, we placed the corporate 
credit rating for each company, along with the obligations directly linked to it such as unsecured debt and bank 
loans, on CreditWatch with negative implications for Continental and positive implications for United.”
Standard and Poor's (2012): “On Nov. 1, 2012, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services placed its ‘B B B -‘, corporate 
credit rating on New York City-based The Wamaco Group Inc. on CreditWatch with negative implications 
following the announcement that PVH Corp. will acquire Wamaco.” and “The CreditWatch placement reflects 
our expectation that we will lower our rating on Wamaco following the completion o f the transaction, likely to 
‘BB+’, based on PVH’s weaker credit profile. We believe the combined company’s business risk profile is 
likely “satisfactory” and its financial risk profile is likely “significant.” The combination o f these risk profiles 
could result in a corporate credit rating o f ‘BB+’.”
In an adjacent theoretical setting, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a specific rationale 
for the existence of mergers that is driven by information asymmetry. In the general version 
of their model, information asymmetry problems prohibit firms from issuing equity when 
investment funding is needed, due to their negative effect on firm valuation. Therefore firms 
forgo positive NPV projects which might lead to underinvestment. According to the authors, 
maintaining financial slack is a way to mitigate the impediment on firms’ investment 
decisions imposed by information asymmetry. In their paper “financial slack” is defined as 
cash and liquid assets or the ability to issue default risk free debt. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
also propose that “underinvestment” can be resolved through the conduction of an 
acquisition. More specifically, a complementary fit between slack rich bidders (i.e. those with 
close to default-risk-free debt) and slack poor target firms can create value, through the 
undertaking of additional positive NPV projects by the slack rich bidder, which the slack 
poor target firm, might pass up. As Myers and Majluf (1984) state:
“[...] firms with plenty o f slack should seek out acquisition targets which have good 
investment opportunities and limited slack, and about which investors have limited 
information. [...] A tender offer made directly to the slack poor firm 's shareholders at a price
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(above the discounted value but below the potential value) makes both the bidder and the 
target’s shareholders better o ff ex ante [...] ”
Additionally, the credit quality, which is often measured by the firm rating level 
(Radhakrishnan et al. (2013)), might also affect acquisition returns. It is likely that the value 
effects in M&As vary across the credit quality distribution, since highly rated firms face 
lower cost of debt capital than low rated ones (West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), 
Ederington et al. (1987), Ziebart and Reiter (1992), and Chen et al. (2007)). Consequently, 
bidders with lower cost of debt can achieve higher NPV for the same expected cash flows 
ceteris paribus, due to the lower discount rate that is applied in the valuation of the combined 
firm investment projects.
Motivated by the theoretical framework of Myers and Majluf (1984), the objective of 
this study is to examine the complementary impact of both bidder and target credit ratings, 
which capture debt capacity, and growth opportunities on acquisition returns. Specifically, I 
use a sample of US public acquisitions over the period from 1996 to 2009 and measure the 
effect of the complementary fit in debt capacity and growth opportunities between the bidder 
and the target in different settings of information asymmetry about the value of the target. To 
incorporate Myers (1984) argument that firms might wish to maintain “reserve borrowing 
power [...] to issue safe debt”, I measure debt capacity by the firms’ credit rating quality prior 
to the acquisition announcement. To this end, I use firstly the distinction between investment- 
grade and speculative-grade rated firms in line with Leary and Roberts (2010), and De Jong 
et al. (2011).“^  ^ Molina (2005), and Almeida and Philippon (2007) empirically demonstrate 
that default costs are considerable lower for investment-grade firms than for the speculative-
Longstaff et al. (2005), and Chen et ai. (2007) demonstrate that investment grade firms generate lower bond 
yield spreads relative to the speculative grade ones. Furthermore, due to the absence o f regulation restrictions 
regarding allocations in securities o f investment grade firms (Kisgen (2007), and Kisgen and Strahan (2010)), 
these firms enjoy a larger clientele base and a higher demand for their debt securities lowers their cost o f  debt.
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grade ones. Secondly, I use the level of firm credit ratings. Firms with higher credit ratings 
face lower cost of debt, which, ceteris paribus, leads to increased debt capacity (Billett et al. 
(2011)). Specifically, my prediction based on Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that when a 
bidder with investment-grade rating or highly rated in general (i.e., high debt capacity), and 
low growth opportunities acquires an unrated target or lowly rated in general (i.e., low debt 
capacity) with high growth opportunities and high information asymmetry, financial 
synergies are created. This is translated into higher synergistic gains, as well as bidder 
returns.
Overall, the empirical evidence of this study generally supports the hypotheses about 
the beneficial effect of financial complementarity on takeover gains. The main results I 
demonstrate are: 1) synergy gains are positively associated with the magnitude of 
complementarity in debt capacity and growth opportunities between the bidder and the target; 
2) bidder returns are positively related with the degree of complementary fit between the 
bidder and the target; 3) target returns have a negative relationship with the amount of 
complementarity as it appears that bidders avoid overpayment; 4) the significant effect of the 
complementary fit on synergy, bidding and target firm returns is mainly driven by the group 
of target firms that operate under a high information asymmetry environment, a result which 
is perfectly aligned with the specific propositions of Myers and Majluf (1984); 5) the main 
results remain robust after testing for endogeneity bias in credit ratings.
This work contributes to the literature related with M&As wealth effects and credit 
ratings impact on investment outcomes. First, it supports empirically various propositions of 
the Myers and Majluf (1984) theoretical takeover model. Second, it sheds further light on the 
shareholders’ wealth effects of credit ratings in corporate takeovers. Third, my results echo 
the findings of Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and 
Viswanathan (2005), and the literature of “who buys whom?” suggesting that wealth effects
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can be generated when an acquirer with low asset valuation purchases a target with high asset 
valuation. Fourth, it provides further evidence on the importance of credit ratings in the value 
effects of corporate investments. My results have also important implications. First, to the 
extent that a complementary fit of debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding 
and target firms lead to value creation in M&As, it implies that credit ratings help to reduce 
underinvestment in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) proposition. Additionally, the 
evidence on the wealth effects of the combination where a low valuation bidder buys a high 
valuation target, suggests that it is against the conventional wisdom of the Q theories of 
takeovers (Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), Servaes (1991), Martin (1996), and Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006)) where the typical merger involves a high valuation 
bidder purchasing a low valuation target. On the other hand, it is reminiscent of Jensen 
(1986) incentives for merger activity, where he proposes that bidders with low growth 
prospects use acquisitions as a channel for buying growth when their market’s growth 
expectations are saturated.
This study is related with a number of previous works. Harford and Uysal (2012) 
examine the effect of bidder credit rating existence on takeover decisions and their value 
effects. This study we goes one step further and examines the joint impact of credit quality 
for both bidding and target firms on acquisition returns. Moreover, Bruner (1988), and Smith 
and Kim (1994) attempt to investigate the theoretical implications of Myers and Majluf
(1984) takeover model. Bruner (1988) focuses only on the difference in debt capacity without 
considering the growth opportunities aspect. Further, he uses the net debt and debt ratio as a 
measure of debt capacity. Smith and Kim (1994), on the other hand, take into account both 
the difference in debt capacity and growth opportunities but they omit the information 
asymmetry element of the theory. Additionally, their evidence supports the complementary 
fit from the opposite side (i.e., slack poor bidder-slack rich target) than originally stated by
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Myers and Majluf (1984), and they use as a measure of debt capacity variables related with 
the firm income generation ability. 1, instead, take into account the complementary fit in debt 
capacity and growth opportunities along with the information asymmetry regarding the target 
firm. Further, 1 measure debt capacity by the quality of bidder credit ratings prior to the 
acquisition. Hennessy (2004), and Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007) examine how debt is 
related with underinvestment and show that better rated companies exhibit higher firm values 
than lower rated ones, as measured by the Tobin’s Q. In this work, 1 study the effect of credit 
quality on bidding firm returns in acquisitions as an implied outcome of mitigation in 
underinvestment. Finally, the Q theory of takeovers (Lang et al. (1989), Servaes (1991), 
Martin (1996), and Dong et al. (2006)) documents that the combination of bidders with 
higher investment opportunities or better management than the targets (high buys low) create 
value during acquisitions, mainly because target assets are redeployed more efficiently. In 
this study instead, motivated by the theoretical propositions in Myers and Majluf (1984), 
while considering as critical factor the information asymmetry of the firms as it was 
suggested by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), I turn the Q theory on its head and find empirical 
support for value creation in deals where a “low buys high”, resembling the findings in Ran 
and Vermaelen (1998), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the sample 
and presents univariate statistics. Section 4.3 analyzes the methodology and findings of the 
empirical tests. I check whether my results are biased due to endogeneity in Section 4.4 
Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Sample and Data
4.2.1 Sample Selection Criteria
I download a sample of US domestic acquisitions announced over the period 1996 and 
2009 from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. I require deals to 
have non-missing transaction value and payment method information. In order to have credit 
rating data, bidders and targets are publicly-traded firms. The original sample includes 5,079 
deals. I remove from the sample all deals classified as repurchases, liquidations, 
restructurings, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, reverse takeovers, privatizations, bankruptcy 
acquisitions and going private transactions. This reduces the sample to 4,847 observations. 
Furthermore, to include in the sample deals that represent a transfer of control, I require that 
the bidder owns less than 10% of target shares before the announcement and seeks to acquire 
more than 50% after the acquisition. There are 4,151 transactions that meet these criteria. 
Further, I drop deals worth less than $1 million and those that account for less than 1% of 
bidder market value to avoid noise in the analysis. There are 3,095 transactions that satisfy 
these requirements. I also require the bidding and the target firm to have sufficient data in the 
CRSP database (CRSP share codes 10 and 11; cases with multiple classes of common stock 
are excluded) to calculate announcement period returns. The remaining sample is 2,585 
transactions.
Finally, I require that bidders are only rated firms and that credit rating information for 
the bidding and the target firms should be available from COMPUSTAT; this requirement 
leads to a final sample that includes 1,299 deals. Credit ratings represent the Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit ratings. Appendix A presents the number of 
deals for each bidding and target firm credit rating level one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Credit ratings range from AAA (highest credit rating) to D (lowest credit 
rating). In my sample, the highest bidder level is AAA and the lowest is CCC. As for the
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target ratings, the highest level is AA+ and the lowest is CCC+. Out of the 1,299 acquisitions, 
431 deals involve targets with a credit rating and 868 deals with unrated targets.
4.2.2 Key variables
I measure the complementarity of debt capacity and growth opportunities between the 
bidder and the target firm with two different variables. Firstly, I create the variable 
ComplFitl. To construct this variable, I primarily calculate the difference in debt capacity by 
creating an indicator variable investment-grade taking the value of 1 for bidders rated BBB- 
and above, and 0 otherwise for the group of bidders that merge with targets without a rating. 
This variable measures the impact of bidder’s debt capacity level when acquiring a low debt 
capacity target; that is without access to public debt markets (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
and Bolton and Freixas (2000)). According to my hypothesis the combination of “investment- 
grade bidder/unrated target” will create more value as it is a more optimal blending of 
merging parties’ debt capacity than the combination “speculative-grade bidder/unrated 
target”. As a second step, I measure the mismatch in growth opportunities following Rhodes- 
Kropf and Robinson (2008) with the surrogate variable scaled AB/M, which is computed by 
taking the difference between bidder’s and target’s Ln (B/M) and then scale this spread by the 
bidder’s within-industry"^^ standard deviation of Ln (B/M) for the fiscal year-end prior to the 
transaction announcement; a higher value of scaled AB/M  is translated as the target having 
superior growth opportunities. A firm with a higher value of B/M is conceived as having 
lower growth opportunities."^^ I specifically use this transformed variable since, in the full 
sample approximately 66% of the transactions involve a bidder with a lower Ln (B/M) than
Industries are defined according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification codes, retrieved from the website 
o f Kenneth French ('h ttp ://m b a .tuck .dartm ou th .edu /paR es/facu ltv /ken .french /index .h tm l). My results are still 
consistent with the Fama-French 12 industry classification codes, but in this study I follow the same approach as 
in Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008).
M/B has been used as an empirical proxy o f growth opportunities in other corporate finance contexts (Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), and Johnson (2003)).
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its target/^ and consequently this can lead to a reduced likelihood of encountering a positive 
value on the second part of the interaction term, thus producing biased results towards 
negative values. Particularly, the density distribution of the Ln (B/M) difference is mostly 
concentrated to the left hand side of the origin on the %-axis with a mean (median) value of - 
0.236 (-0.232). ComplFitl value is high when the source of financial synergy is high; that is 
the bidder has higher debt capacity while the target has superior growth opportunities {scaled 
A B/M  carries a positive value). It is worth noting at this point that the construction of 
ComplFitl as a product of two components represents the financial synergy as a source of 
value. Hence, it does not capture the difference in individual components (debt capacity or 
growth opportunities), but their complementarity.
Secondly, I construct the variable ComplFit2 based on the quality of credit rating when 
both bidding and target firms are rated. ComplFit2 is similar to ComplFitl', it is an interaction 
variable between the individual components that capture the difference in debt capacity and 
growth opportunities. The first component ARating is calculated as the difference between 
bidder’s and target’s credit rating level. To construct this component I transform the credit 
ratings into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 22, where 22 represents a rating of AAA and 1 
represents a rating of D, following Liu and Malatesta (2005), and An and Chan (2008).^° 
However, because in my sample the number of target firms that hold a credit rating is very 
small (only 431 observations), I decide to use an empirically modelled rating “pseudo-rating” 
instead of the real rating which target firms hold, and obtain a larger sample of rated firms 
that will help my estimations. By this way, I examine the effect of target’s debt capacity as it 
is measured by an implicit credit rating. This research design does not create any particular 
problems in the inferences, since one of the main objectives in this study is to investigate the
These findings resemble Andrade et al. (2001), who report that 66% o f acquisitions involve a bidder with a 
higher Q than its target, and Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) who show that deals with these characteristics 
occur roughly 60% o f  the time.
See Appendix A for the correspondence between the number o f deals and bidders’ and targets’ credit rating 
levels.
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complementarity in firms’ debt capacities under a generic credit ratings mindset. To derive 
the equation to calculate the pseudo-rating I regress target firms’ real ratings on factors that 
are thought to prediet ratings. Hence, I follow Kisgen (2006) and use a surrogate model of the 
form:
PseudoRatingit =  4.5535 +  1.1600Log(TA)it-i — 2.7598L everageit-i +  4.8821Profitabilityit_p^p'^  (1)
Equation (1) has a satisfactory adjusted of 0.635, roughly similar with the results in 
Kisgen (2006).^^ Finally, I conduet an out-of-sample calculation for each target firm in the 
sample, and round up the scores in order to obtain integer values of eredit rating levels. After 
I compute target firms’ pseudo-rating levels, I calculate ARating as the difference between 
bidder’s real and target’s pseudo credit rating level. A higher value of ARating implies a 
better debt capacity of the bidder relative to the target. In my sample approximately 78% of 
observations involve a bidder with a higher rating than the target. Moreover the average 
difference in rating levels between the bidder and target is 3 notches. The second component 
is the scaled AB/M  which is defined as above. ComplFit2 has a high value when both 
components are increasing and represents the second measure of the financial synergies 
created by the complementarity in debt capacity and growth opportunities between the 
merging firms. Additionally, I create an indicator variable Negative Dummy taking the value 
of 1 when both predietor variables in the interaction term are negative, and 0 otherwise. I 
eonstruct this variable beeause the combination of low debt capacity bidder (negative 
ARating) and low growth opportunities target (negative scaled AB/M), while not the best 
match according with my story enters with a positive sign in the interaction ComplFit2 as
The model also includes year- and industry- (Fama-French 48 classification) fixed effects.
Where i represents firms and t represent time.
The high should mitigate any concerns about a potential errors-in-variables complication, since the 
measure for PseudoRating is measured with error.
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though, by construction two negative numbers are multiplied together. The sign of the 
coefficient may misrepresent the real impact of my main control ComplFitl and therefore I 
aim to eliminate this bias from my tests.
4.2.3 Sample Statistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and for the investment- 
grade and speculative-grade bidders sub-samples, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. Panels A and B display statistics for bidder and target characteristics. The mean 
(median) bidder size in the sample is $16,209,280 ($4,639,001) million. Investment-grade 
bidders are substantially larger ($21,083,840 million) than speculative ones ($3,297,165 
million). Moeller et al. (2004) demonstrate that bidder announcement returns are negatively 
associated with firm size. The mean (median) target size is $2,316.771 ($443.636) million. 
High debt capacity bidders acquire substantially larger firms. Schwert (2000) documents that 
larger targets have lower announcement returns.
The mean bidder (target) book-to-market ratio (B/M) in the sample is 0.427 (0.549). 
High debt capacity bidders seem to have lower B/M ratios. Servaes (1991) shows that bidders 
with higher B/M ratios enjoy lower announcement returns. Targets that are taken over by 
high debt capacity bidders appear to have lower B/M values. Dong et al. (2006) find a 
positive relation between target B/M and target abnormal returns.
The mean bidder (target) run-up in the sample is a negative -0.3% (-1.4%). Highly 
rated bidders experience a lower run-up. Rosen (2006) documents a negative impact of 
bidder’s run-up to acquirer announcement returns. The magnitude of run-up among the 
takeover targets of different debt capacity bidders does not differ statistically. Schwert (1996) 
shows that target returns do not exhibit any significant relation with target run-up.
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The mean bidder (target) free cash flow-to-assets is 0.06 (0.06) in my sample. High 
debt capacity bidders seem to have more free cash flow. Targets acquired by low debt 
capacity bidders appear to have higher levels of free cash flow. The inclusion of free cash 
flow variable is of specific importance for the consistency of my hypotheses as though, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) define financial slack by the amount of cash and liquid assets 
available to the firm or the ability to issue default risk free debt, and hence it is important to 
control for both parameters in my analysis and capture better the theoretical properties of 
their model. Jensen (1986) argues that high free cash flow leads to empire building 
takeovers. Additionally, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) demonstrate that bidder returns are 
negatively related with bidder free cash flow. Smith and Kim (1994) report that target free 
cash flow is positively associated with target returns.
The mean bidder (target) leverage is 0.278 (0.248) in my sample. Highly rated bidders 
appear to be less leveraged than low rated ones. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) suggest that 
leverage provides incentives for firm managers to improve firm performance, though 
managers have to relinquish control to debtors and usually lose their jobs if their firms fall 
into financial distress. They find a positive link between leverage and bidder stock returns. 
Targets acquired by investment-grade bidders appear to be less leveraged. Bauguess, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Zutter (2009) show a negative association between target firms’ leverage 
and their abnormal returns.
The mean (median) target bid-ask spread is 0.009 (0.007) in my sample. According to 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Barclay and Smith (1988) the bid-ask spread measures 
firm information asymmetry. Highly rated bidders acquire targets with lower levels of 
information asymmetry. Officer et al. (2009) demonstrate that bidder returns are positively 
associated with target’s information asymmetry when they use stock as a method of payment.
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Panel C provides statistics for deal characteristics. The mean (median) deal value in my 
sample is $3,292.157 million ($642.800 million). Transactions of investment-grade bidders 
are significantly larger than those of speculative-grade ones.
The mean (median) relative size in my sample is 0.356 (0.142). High debt capacity 
bidders acquire smaller firms relative to their size than bidders of low debt capacity. Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller (2002) report that bidder stock returns are negatively related with the 
relative size of the target in public deals. Officer (2003) finds that target stock returns decline 
with the relative size of the target in public acquisitions.
With respect to the method of payment, around 24% of the deals are ca^'/i-financed, 
approximately 38% represent stock deals and the remaining 38% include mixed means of 
payment. A significantly higher proportion of stock deals are conducted by highly rated 
bidders than low rated ones. On the other hand, investment-grade bidders make less mixed 
payments than speculative-grade ones. Travlos (1987), and Fuller et al. (2002) document a 
negative effect on bidder announcement returns when they use stock as a method of payment. 
Huang and Walkling (1987), and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) report that target firm 
returns are lower in stock swap than in cash deals.
Diversifying deals constitute approximately the 63% of the entire sample. This 
percentage does not differ significantly across the two categories of bidders. Campa and 
Kedia (2002), and Villalonga (2004) show, that after considering the endogenous choice of 
firms to diversify, diversification adds value to firm returns.
Only 5.39% of total deals are hostile. Additionally, high debt capacity bidders engage 
in significantly less hostile offers than low debt capacity ones. Servaes (1991) reports a 
negative association between bidder announcement returns and hostility. On the other hand, 
Schwert (2000) documents that hostile offers have a positive effect on target announcement 
returns.
129
In my sample, 16.86% of the deals comprise tender offers. However, I do not find a 
significant difference between highly rated and low rated bidders. Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
demonstrate that tender offers have an incremental impact on bidder and target stock returns.
Completed deals represent around the 91% of the total sample. Further, investment- 
grade bidders appear to go through more successfully with their takeover attempts than 
speculative-grade ones. Bates and Lemmon (2003), and Billett et al. (2004) both document 
that completed deals do not affect bidder returns however, they are associated with higher 
target returns.
The mean number o f bidders in the total sample is 1.10. High debt capacity bidders 
face a lower degree of competition for the target firm’s control than low debt capacity ones. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) demonstrate that competition decreases the returns to bidders, 
whereas increases the returns to targets. On the other hand, Servaes (1991) reports an 
insignificant relationship with bidder returns and a positive with target returns.
The mean (median) takeover premium in my sample is 40.59% (33.07%). The 
difference in premiums paid between the two bidder categories does not appear to differ 
significantly. The value effects of the complementary fit are measured with 5-day (-2, +2) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). The returns are computed using the market model 
with the market model parameters estimated over the period (-240, -41) days before the 
announcement. The market returns is the CRSP equally-weighted index return. Synergy gain 
is defined, following Servaes (1991), as the total shareholder gain and it is computed as the 
weighted-average abnormal return of the bidder and the target in the event window (-2, +2). 
The returns are weighted by the market values of the respective firms 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Mean (median) synergy gain is 1.00% (0.80%) for the full sample. 
Synergy gain for acquisitions of highly rated bidders is lower than low rated ones but still has 
a positive value (mean of 0.80%). Mean (median) bidder CARs is a negative -1.60% (-
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1.10%) for the overall sample. Additionally, high debt capacity bidders experience less 
negative announcement returns than low debt capacity ones. Mean (median) target CARs is a 
positive 21.80% (18.00%) for the full sample. The announcement returns of targets that 
involve investment-grade bidders are significantly higher than those that involve speculative- 
grade bidders.
[Please Look Table 4.1]
However, I cannot base my inferences solely on the results of the univariate analysis, as 
it does not take into account of any confounding effects. So far, I have noticed some mixed 
evidence regarding the impact of debt capacity on synergy, bidder and target firm 
announcement returns. However, the main hypothesis regarding the financial synergies is 
derived from the complementary fit of debt capacity and growth opportunities between 
bidding and target firms, by taking also into consideration the information asymmetry 
regarding target firm value. Moreover, Moeller et al. (2004) show that bidder firm returns are 
a decreasing function of their size whereas, Schwert (2000) demonstrate the same pattern for 
target returns. Additionally, Wang and Xie (2009) provide evidence that synergy gains and 
target firm returns are higher in tender offers. Therefore, firm and deal characteristics need to 
be controlled in order to reveal the net effect of the complementary fit on shareholders’ 
wealth. This cross-sectional regression analysis is presented in the next section. The 
correlation matrix of the above variables is presented in Table 4.2. The main variables of 
interest -  ComplFitl and ComplFit2 - do not exhibit high correlation with the control 
variables. This should reduce econometric difficulties (such as multicollinearity concerns) in 
disentangling any effects of the complementary fit variables from synergy gains as well as 
bidder and target firm announcement returns.
[Please Look Table 4.2]
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4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Synergy Gains and the Complementary Fit o f Bidding and Target Firms
I first investigate the relationship between the complementary fit of bidding and target 
firms and synergy gains in the context of a multivariate OLS regression analysis by 
controlling for several bidder-, target-, and deal-specific characteristics. All regressions also 
control for year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, and heteroskedasticity- 
robust standard errors adjusted for bidder clustering due to the presence of repeated acquirers 
in the sample. Table 4.3 provides the results. The dependent variable is the 5-day combined 
firm CARs. The main variable of interest is the ComplFitl, which represents the interaction 
variable between investment-grade and scaled AB/M  as defined above and is the first measure 
of complementarity. I also include bidder size, bidder and target book-to-market, bidder and 
target run-up, bidder and target free cash flow-to-assets, bidder and target leverage, relative 
size, premium, stock dummy, completed deals dummy, diversifying deals dummy, hostile 
deals dummy, tender offers dummy and multiple bidders dummy. In specification (1)1 find a 
positive and significant (at the 5% level) effect of ComplFitl on synergy returns by reporting 
a coefficient (1.09%). This result appears to have strong economic significance as it is 
translated to a 109% increase over the sample average.^"  ^ The signs of the control variables 
are generally in line with those in the existing M&A literature. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
theory is based on the fundamental role of information asymmetry on firms’ financing 
decisions and their value implications. In particular, their takeover theory assumes that 
financial synergies generated by the complementary fit of debt capacity and growth 
opportunities between the bidder and the target firm, mainly exist when the target firm 
operates under a high information asymmetry environment. To examine this hypothesis I split
I calculate the economic significance by taking the fraction o f  ComplFitl coefficient to the average synergy 
gains on the overall sample.
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the sample into high and low information asymmetry targets by using target bid-ask spread to 
measure the degree of information asymmetry, and I expect that the positive relation of 
ComplFitl with synergy returns should be more pronounced for the high bid-ask spread 
targets. Specification (2) contains acquisitions of target firms with higher bid-ask spread 
values than the median bid-ask spread of the targets group. The main variable of interest 
ComplFitl continues to carry a positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient (2.13%). 
In economic terms this is translated to a 213% increase over the sample average. 
Specification (3) contains the low information asymmetry targets. The main variable of 
interest ComplFitl is insignificant at conventional levels and reinforces the hypothesis that 
the complementary fit of bidding and target firms should be prevalent under a high 
information asymmetry environment. Overall, the positive association between ComplFitl 
and synergy gains is driven by the group of acquisitions which involve high information 
asymmetry target firms.
[Please Look Table 4.3]
Table 4.4 presents the same analysis as above however, in this case I am using my 
second measure of the complementary fit, i.e. ComplFitl, which is an interaction variable 
between ARating and scaled AB/M. I also include Negative dummy, bidder size, bidder and 
target book-to-market, bidder and target run-up, bidder and target free cash flow-to-assets, 
bidder and target leverage, relative size, premium, stock dummy, completed deals dummy, 
diversifying deals dummy, hostile deals dummy, tender offers dummy and multiple bidders 
dummy. In specification (1) the main variable of interest ComplFitl is positive (coefficient 
0.12%) and significant at the 10% level. In economic terms an increase in Complfitl leads to
In all the regressions that include as main control variable Complfitl, I bootstrap the standard errors and the 
coefficients by running 100 replications, in order to avoid any biased inferences associated with an “generated 
regressor” problem (Wooldridge (2002)). Since, by construction Complfitl includes a generated regressor term 
(i.e., target firm’s pseudo-rating) it can be treated like a generated regressor variable.
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12% higher synergy returns over the sample average. When I split the sample into high and 
low information asymmetry targets I get significant results for the high information 
asymmetry group. In specification (2) the main variable of interest Complfit2 carries a 
positive coefficient (0.19%) and significant at the 10% level. In economic terms an increase 
in Complfitl leads to 19% higher synergy returns over the sample average. In specification 
(3) the results for Complfit2 are insignificant at conventional levels. The signs of the control 
variables are generally in line with those in the existing M&A literature. Collectively, after 
controlling for numerous variables that are known from the literature to affect synergy 
returns, these findings support my hypotheses regarding the positive value effect of financial 
complementarities between bidder and target firms.
[Please Look Table 4.4]
4.3.1 Bidder Firm Returns and the Complementary Fit o f Bidding and Target Firms
In a further step to examine the value implications of the complementary fit between 
the bidding and target firms in acquisitions, this section investigates its relationship with 
bidder CARs. Table 4.5 presents the cross-sectional regression analysis of 5-day bidder 
CARs on my measures of complementary fit and other control variables. In specifications (1) 
through (3) I run the regressions by including the first measure of complementarity, 
ComplFitl whereas in specifications (4) through (6) I use my second measure, ComplFitl. In 
specifications (1) through (3) I also add bidder size, bidder and target book-to-market, bidder 
and target run-up, bidder and target free cash flow-to-assets, bidder and target leverage, 
relative size, premium, stock dummy, completed deals dummy, diversifying deals dummy, 
hostile deals dummy, tender offers dummy and multiple bidders dummy. In Model (1) the 
main variable of interest ComplFitl exhibits a positive and significant (at 5% level) 
relationship (coefficient 1.18%) with bidder returns. The impact of ComplFitl on bidder
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returns appears to have a strong economic significance as it is related with a 174% increase 
relative to the sample average. The signs of the other control variables are generally in line 
with those in the existing M&A literature. In specifications (2) and (3) I follow the same 
method as in the analysis of synergy returns above, and split the sample into high and low 
information asymmetry target groups. In specification (2) the main variable of interest 
continues to have a positive and significant (at 1% level) relation (coefficient 2.15%) with 
bidder returns. In economic terms this is translated to a 234% increase relative to the sample 
average. On the other hand, when I look at the results in specification (3) I am not able to find 
any significant relationship between complementarity and bidder returns at conventional 
levels. These results demonstrate that the positive effect of complementarity in the total 
sample is driven by the high information asymmetry targets, which provides further support 
to my conjectures about the differential impact of complementarity across the target firm 
information asymmetry spectrum.
In models (4) through (6) I use ComplFitl as my main variable of interest and also 
include Negative dummy, bidder size, bidder and target book-to-market, bidder and target 
run-up, bidder and target free cash flow-to-assets, bidder and target leverage, relative size, 
premium, stock dummy, completed deals dummy, diversifying deals dummy, hostile deals 
dummy, tender offers dummy and multiple bidders dummy. In specification (4) Complfitl 
carries a positive and significant (at 5%) association (coefficient 0.15%) with bidder returns. 
In economic terms an increase in Complfitl leads to a 109% higher bidder returns than the 
sample average. When I look at the high and low information asymmetry target groups I 
observe that in the high information asymmetry group (specification (5)) my main variable of 
interest carries a positive coefficient (0.21%) that is significant at the 10% level. 
Economically this is translated as a 113% increase in bidder returns over the sample average. 
In model (6) I am not able to find any significant relation between my main control variable
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and bidder returns. Furthermore, in all of the models ARating carries a positive and 
significant coefficient with bidder returns, a finding resembling the results in Billett et al. 
(2004). All the other control variables have generally signs in accordance with the M&A 
literature. In summary, the findings from both Complfitl and Complfitl support my main 
hypotheses about the creation of value in complementary acquisitions where the target 
operates under a high information asymmetry environment.
[Please Look Table 4.5]
4.3.3 Target Firm Returns and the Complementary Fit o f Bidding and Target Firms
Finally, in order to get the whole picture of the value effects created by the 
complementary fit on acquisition’s shareholder returns, in this section I examine their 
relationship with target firm CARs. Table 4.6 presents these results. As in the analysis of 
bidder returns, in specifications (1) through (3) I run the regressions by including the first 
measure of complementarity, ComplFitl whereas in specifications (4) through (6) I use my 
second measure, ComplFitl. In none of the models (1) through (3) I am able to find any 
significant association of Complfitl with target returns. In my second set of regressions 
(models (4) through (6)), I find a negative relation between ComplFitl and target returns in 
models (4) and (6) at the (5%) level respectively.^^ The rational explanation for this result 
comes when considering the real situation that target firms face. These are firms with high 
growth opportunities and a strong potential for generation of future income notwithstanding, 
due to their limited debt capacity, they encounter problems in accessing credit markets when 
they are in need to fund these future investment projects. Because of this lack on investment 
capital their investment opportunities might be left unexploited and their growth potentials
In unreported regression results I find that ComplFitl is negatively related with the premium paid to target 
shareholders.
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never materialized. Hence, it comes naturally for target firms to start seeking bidding 
candidates and for target shareholders to exhibit minor reluctance on the bidder’s offer, and 
exchange their stocks without demanding high premiums since, by this way they will be able 
to participate on the combined firm’s future growth wave. Indeed, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
specifically comment on the choice that targets face, that is; to forgo the investment 
opportunity or to start seeking for a merger with a cash-rich firm. Collectively, the findings 
for synergy gains and bidder and target firm returns support Myers and Majluf (1984) 
theoretical propositions for the financial synergies created by the complementarity in debt 
capacity and growth opportunities of bidding and target firms.
[Please Look Table 4.6]
4.4 Robustness checks
4.4.1 Endogeneity Control
In the main analysis I treated the ComplFitl variable as exogenous to my model; that is 
the level of complementarity is randomly allocated across my sample firms. However, 
ComplFitl is interaction variable with the first term being a credit rating variable. In that 
respect Liu and Malatesta (2005), and An and Chan (2008) argue that firms determine, at 
least partially, whether to obtain a higher rating level after considering the benefits against 
the potential costs. Therefore, it is likely that the decision to have a high credit rating is based 
on firm specific characteristics and failure to account for that would lead to biased estimates 
for the effect of ComplFitl in my regressions since, it is rational to expect that the interaction 
variable is also endogenous.
To test this hypothesis in the case of ComplFitl, I use an instrumental variables (2SLS) 
method, with two potential endogenous variables Investment-Grade and ComplFitl; the 
Investment-Grade and ComplFitl choice equations represent the reduced form, and the firms’
137
returns equations represent the structural form. Although, the first stage regressions represent 
limited dependent variables, the coefficient estimates from the first stage linear probability 
models that are being used in the 2SLS method are still consistent, and can be used to 
uncover any endogeneity bias in the data as Heckman (1978), and Heckman and Robb (1985) 
demonstrate.
In order to determine the probability of a bidder holding a high rating, I follow Liu and 
Malatesta (2005), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and An and Chan (2008) and use variables 
that have been proposed to account for these effects. Specifically, it has been suggested that a 
firm is more likely to obtain a high rating if it has more tangible assets, is older, and it 
operates in an industry with low default probabilities. Therefore, I use; the ratio of firm’s 
property, plant and equipment to total assets as a proxy for tangibility; the number of years 
the firm is covered on COMPUSTAT to capture the age effect; and the average credit rating 
level of firms in the same 3-digit industry, to control for the existence of low default risk 
when firms operate in high credit quality industries. Since, I have two potential endogenous 
variables investment-grade and ComplFitl that are interrelated by construction, I use the 
above variables as instruments for investment-grade, and the same variables multiplied by 
scaled AB/M  as instruments for ComplFitl.
Table 4.7 presents the results of this analysis. In specifications (1) and (2) I report the 
first stage regression estimates for the prediction of investment-grade and ComplFitl. In 
model (1)1 find that from the included instruments, bidder age and bidder industry level are 
significant and carry coefficients with the expected sign. Moreover, the Adjusted-R^ from the 
first stage regression indicates that the model can explain up to 52% of the choice in 
investment-grade. In model (2) I find that all the included instruments exhibit a significant 
association with the main variable of interest ComplFitL Furthermore, the Adjusted-i?^ from 
the first stage regression indicates that the model can explain up to 79% of the choice in
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ComplFitl. In the structural regressions (3) and (5) I am not able to establish any significant 
relation of the main control variable with the announcement returns. In specification (4) there 
is a positive and significant relationship of Complfitl with bidder CARs. For sensitivity 
reasons, in the lower part of Table 4.7 I present the Wu-Hausman (WH) (Wu (1974), and 
Hausman (1978)) test of endogeneity and its F-values. However, when I examine the WH test 
values, the main variable of interest ComplFitl seems exogenous in all of the models, and 
therefore I can base my inferences in the results of the OLS regressions in Tables 4.3, 4.5 and 
4.6. Finally, I also report the Sargan (1958) test for instruments validity to disentangle any 
concerns that my results are biased due to inappropriate instruments. From the examination of 
the Sargan test values, I am not able to reject the null of instruments validity in any of the 
structural regressions, and hence I can conclude that my results are not driven by any 
misspecification, since, the instruments do not appear to be related with the announcement 
returns in the structural regressions.
[Please Look Table 4.7]
4.4.2 Other sensitivity Tests
Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 present the results for synergy gains, bidder CARs, and 
target CARs using value-weighted CRSP index (instead of equally-weighted) as the market 
return in the market model estimation. The coefficient estimates and their significance 
confirm the main results. Particularly, the positive effect of the complementary fit for my 
measure Complfitl hold for synergy gains and bidder CARs, and it appears to be driven by 
the high information asymmetry target firms group. The positive effect of Complfitl holds for 
the overall sample in synergy gains, and for the overall and high information asymmetry 
group in bidder CARs. Regarding the target CARs, the negative effect of the Complfitl
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indicate that bidders avoid overpayment for the targets and that are able to capture the whole 
gain from the synergies created during the complementary acquisitions.
[Please Look Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11]
Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 present the results for synergy gains, bidder CARs, 
and target CARs using a different abnormal returns methodology than the one that has been 
used so far. Specifically, I employ the market-adjusted abnormal returns (Brown and Warner
(1985)), using the value-weighted CRSP index as the market return in the abnormal returns 
estimation. The coefficient estimates and their significance corroborate once more time my 
main hypotheses about the value creation during complementary acquisitions.
[Please Look Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15]
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the Myers and Majluf (1984) theory of 
takeovers. My findings corroborate their hypotheses regarding the financial synergies created 
when information for target firms is limited, and combinations between high debt capacity 
bidders and high growth opportunities targets are formed. The evidence on this chapter 
demonstrates that mergers reduce underinvestment, with a direct consequence the creation of 
wealth for the merging parties. I am able to show that the market values favorably the 
complementary acquisitions during the period surrounding their announcement. Additionally, 
results of this chapter enhance our understanding on the literature of Q theory of takeovers, 
by showing that the market reacts favorably on mergers where a bidder with limited growth 
capacity acquires a high growth capacity target, contrary to the conventional wisdom.
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Furthermore, my findings have strong economic significance and are robust even after 
accounting for endogeneity bias on the decision to obtain a high rating level. Finally, my 
results, add also further evidence on the role the credit ratings play for the quality of 
investments, and specifically acquisitions.
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Appendix A. Credit Rating Levels and Number of Deals
Credit ratings are from COMPUSTAT and represent the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer 
credit ratings. Number o f  deals is the number o f acquisitions for each bidder and target real credit rating level 
one month prior to the acquisition announcement.
Credit Rating Level Number of Deals (Bidders) Number of Deals (Targets)
D - -
C - -
CC - -
CCC- - -
, CCC 1 1
CCC+ 5 2
B- 18 11
B 27 16
B+ 75 52
BB- 99 49
BB 67 43
BB+ 64 35
BBB- 119 38
BBB 181 52
BBB+ 132 35
A- 149 29
A 174 33
A+ 87 19
AA- 43 9
AA 33 5
AA+ 5 2
AAA 20 -
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Panel A: Measures of Abnormal Returns
Synergy Gain (-2, +2)
Bidder CARs (-2, +2)
Target CARs (-2, +2)
Synergy gain is defined as the total shareholder gain and it is computed as the 
weighted-average abnormal return o f  the bidder and target in the event window (-2, 
+2). The returns are weighted by the market values o f the respective firms 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement. CARs are computed using daily data with a market 
model (equally-weighted CRSP index is the benchmark). The market model is 
estimated over the period starting 240 days to 41 days before the announcement date.
Cumulative abnormal return o f bidding firm stock in the 5-day event window (-2, 
+2) where 0 is the announcement day. The returns are computed using the market 
model with the market model parameters estimated over the period (-240, -41) days 
before the announcement. The market returns is the CRSP equally-weighted index 
return.
Cumulative abnormal return o f  target firm stock in the 5-day event window (-2, +2) 
where 0 is the announcement day. The returns are computed using the market model 
with the market model parameters estimated over the period (-240, -41) days before 
the announcement. The market returns is the CRSP equally-weighted index return.
Panel B: Complementary Fit Variables
ComplFitl 
ComplFit2 
Investment Grade
ARating 
Scaled AB/M
Investment-Grade x Scaled AB/M.
ARating x Scaled AB/M.
Dummy variable: 1 for investment grade bidders (above BBB-), 0 for speculative 
grade bidders for deals that involve unrated targets.
Difference in Credit Rating Levels between the bidder and the target.
Difference in Ln(B/M) between the bidder and the target divided by the standard 
deviation o f bidder’s industry Ln(B/M) at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Industries are defined according to the Fama-French 48-industry 
classification.
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
Size
Book-to-Market (B/M)
Run-Up 
Bid-Ask Spread
Firm market value o f  equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement from 
CRSP in US$ million.
Book value o f  equity divided by market value o f  equity at the fiscal year-end prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Book and market value o f equity is from 
COMPUSTAT.
Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns o f  the firm over the period starting (-205, -6) 
days prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP.
Average Bid-Ask Spread o f the firm daily stock returns measured over the period 
(-186, -6) days prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP.
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FCF to Assets
Leverage
Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common 
and preferred stock divided by the total assets at the fiscal year-end immediately 
prior to the announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by 
the book value o f total assets in the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement from COMPUSTAT.
Panel D: Deal Characteristics
Relative Size
Cash Deals 
Stock Deals 
Mixed Deals
Diversifying Deals
Hostile Deals
Tender Offers 
Completed Deals 
Takeover Premium
Number of Bidders 
Multiple Bidders
The ratio o f the deal value to bidder market value o f equity 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement from CRSP in US$ million.
Dummy variable: 1 for deals entirely financed with cash, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable: 1 for deals entirely financed with stock, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable: 1 for deals where consideration is neither all-cash nor all-stock, 0 
otherwise.
Dummy variable: 1 for inter-industry transactions, 0 for intra-industry transactions. 
Industries are defined at the 4-digit SIC level from Thomson Financial SDC.
Dummy variable: I for deals defined as "hostile" or "unsolicited" by Thomson 
Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable: I for tender offers from Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable: I for deals that terminate successfully from Thomson Financial 
SDC, 0 otherwise.
The difference between the offer price and the target stock price 4 weeks prior to 
the takeover announcement divided by the latter from Thomson Financial SDC; 
values beyond the range o f [0,2] are winsorized following Officer (2003).
The total number o f  bidders entering the contest from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Dummy variable: 1 if  more than one bidders enter the contest, 0 otherwise.
Panel E: Instrumental Variables
Tangibility
Age
Industry Rating
The ratio o f firm’s property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal year- 
end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.
The number o f years the firm is covered in COMPUSTAT at the acquisition 
announcement year.
The firm’s 3-digit SIC industry average credit rating level at the fiscal year-end 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT.__________
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Table 4.3
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on the 
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f  the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0550 0.1060** 0.0435
(161) (2 13) (0.82)
ComplFitl 0.0109** 0.0213*** -0.0071
(2 05) (3.26) (-0.47)
Investment-Grade 0.0080 0.0124 -0.0039
(0 91) (0.96) (-0.27)
Scaled AB/M -0.0066 -0.0060 0.0023
(-1.23) LI 02) (042)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0055** -0.0108** -0.0012
(-2.08) (-2.53) (-0.37)
Bidder B/M 0.0100 -0.0240 0.0255
^ O ) (-1.01) (1.10)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0037 0.0035 0.0250
(0.50) (0 36) # 1 8 ^
Bidder FCF/Assets -0.0059 -0.0624 0.0907
(-0.12) (-0.88) (1.20)
Bidder Leverage -0.0170 -0.0428 0.0042
(-0.74) (-1.14) (0.10)
Target B/M 0.0024 0.0087 -0.0005
(0 21) (0.66) (-0.02)
Target Run-Up 0.0018 0.0033 -0.0261*
(0.82) (1.55) (-1.82)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0254 0.0148 0.1246*
(1.40) (0.77) (197)
Target Leverage 0.0172 0D339 -0.0014
(1.10) (148) (-0.06)
Premium 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0001
(2.02) (248) (0.52)
Relative Size 0.0221 -0.0077 0.0402**
(138) (-0.28)
Stock Dummy -0.0190*** -0.0211** -0.0083
(-3.20) (-2.24) (-0.95)
Completed -0.0101 -0.0160 -0.0392
(-0.53) (-0.71)
Diversifying Deals -0.0026 0.0010 -0.0058
(-0.45) (040) (-0.78)
Hostile Deals 0.0056 -0.0115 0.0155
(-0.61)
Tender Offers 0.0168** 0.0115 0.0114
(2.44) (1.11) # 9 %
Multiple Bidders -0.0158 -0.0065 -0.0303
(-1.08) (-0.33) (-1.28)
N 560 302 2 #
Adjusted R^ 0.099 0.095 0.156
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Table 4.4
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on tbe 
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are bootstrapped 
with 100 replications and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity as also bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0420 0.0091 0.0895***
(15% (0.24) (2.79)
ComplFitZ 0.0012* 0.0019* 0.0004
(1.73) (1.7% # 3 %
ARating 0.0005 0.0007 0.0001
# 3 % (0.45) (0.09)
Scaled AB/M -0.0040 -0.0019 -0.0139*
(-0.80) (-0.24) (-1.65)
Negative Dummy -0.0007 -0.0230 0.0303*
(-0.06) (-1.10) (182)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0037* -0.0025 -0.0070***
(-1.92) (-0.80) (-3.30)
Bidder B/M 0.0123 -0.0059 0.0423***
# 7 % (-0.29) (2 58)
Bidder Run-Up -0.0052 -0.0103 0.0112
(-0.66) (-1.15) (&61)
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0221 -0.0115 0.0878
# 3 % L 049) (163)
Bidder Leverage -0.0043 -0.0021 -0.0032
(-0.23) (-0.06) (-0.11)
Target B/M 0.0051 0.0150 -0.0333*
# 3 % (1.27) (-1.67)
Target Run-Up 0.0005 0.0010 -0.0158
# 4 % # 3 % LL43)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0392** 0.0283 0.0791
# 4 % (107) (1.47)
Target Leverage 0.0059 0.0150 -0.0008
(0.47) (0.65) (-0.04)
Preminm 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002*
# .% ) (2.02) (183)
Relative Size 0.0138* 0.0110 0.0107
(1.91) (0.74) (1.34)
Stock Dummy -0.0089** 0.0035 -0.0113**
(-2.05) (043) (-2.02)
Completed -0.0114 -0.0041 -0.0234*
(-1.07) (-0.25) (-1.83)
Diversifying Deals -0.0037 0.0016 -0.0070
(-0.79) (0 21) (-1.21)
Hostile Deals 0.0006 0.0063 -0.0158
(0D5) # 3 % (-1.27)
Tender Offers 0.0264*** 0.0283*** 0.0227***
(A68) (2.66) # 3 %
Multiple Bidders -0.0178** -0.0119 -0.0277**
L243) (-0.64) (-2.43)
N 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.087 0.044 0.170
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Table 4.5
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Bidder CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f  the bidder firm 5-day CARs on the complementary fit o f  
debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample 
o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low  
information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread values 
than the median bid-ask spread o f  the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the 
number o f  observations.
Bidder CARs Bidder CARs
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0460 0.1082** -0.0154 0.0190 0.0136 0.0435
(1.31) (2 16) (-0.24) (0.70) (036) (1.14)
ComplFitl 0.0118** 0.0215*** -0.0114
(3.27) (-0.64)
Investment-Grade 0.0156* 0.0200 0.0035
(1.73) (153) (0.23)
ComplFitl 0.0015** 0.0021* 0.0005
(1.91) (0.34)
ÂRating 0.0041*** 0.0034** 0.0044**
(3.45) (199) (2.14)
Negative Dummy -0.0034 -0.0277 0.0302
(-0.29) (-1.34) (1.58)
Scaled AB/M -0.0020 -0.0078 0.0273 -0.0023 -0.0044 -0.0016
(-0.39) (-1.42) (1.10) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.13)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0046 -0.0109** 0.0031 -0.0039* -0.0049 -0.0050*
(-1.61) (-2.38) (0.91) (-1.74) (-1.59) (-1.88)
Bidder B/M -0.0071 -0.0218 -0.0234 -0.0016 -0.0089 0.0055
(-0.60) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.12) (-0.42)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0095 0.0077 0.0424 0.0015 -0.0050 0.0149
(123) (1.18) (-0.57) (0.60)
Bidder FCF/Assets -0.0109 -0.0524 0.0676 -0.0083 -0.0262 0.0409
(-0.23) (-0.72) (0.87) (4 T 9 ) (-0.40) (0.66)
Bidder Leverage -0.0028 -0.0431 OfW83 0.0251 0.0163 0.0336
(-0.10) (-1.10) (0.96) (1.09) ^14% (iw%
Target B/M 0.0158 0.0077 0.0571* 0.0144 0.0133 0.0089
(155) (0.62) (195) (1.60) (128) (0.31)
Target Run-Up 0.0026 0.0044** -0.0188 0.0026 0.0028 0.0050
(127) (2.20) 0T 22) (0.75) (0.76) (0.40)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0049 -0.0006 0.0780 0.0268 0.0223 0.0460
(0.26) (-0.03) (1.18) (139) (0.78)
Target Leverage 0.0155 0.0488** -0.0336 -0.0056 0.0119 -0.0269
0:0% H A 2 ) (-0.42) (&53) (-1.52)
Premium 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003**
(0.11) (0.92) (-2.01) ^L% ) (0.00) (-2.46)
Relative Size -0.0318** -0.0538** -0.0172 -0.0123 -0.0277** -0.0083
02  18) (-2.34) (-1.01) CT53) t z i o ) (-0.87)
Stock Dummy -0.0197*** -0.0278*** -0.0073 -0.0084* -0.0064 -0.0054
(-3.27) (-2.85) (-0.74) (-0.81) (-0.76)
Completed -0.0170 -0.0235 -0.0266 -0.0118 -0.0037 -0.0214
(-0.88) (-1.03) (-0.59) (-1.08) (-0.23) (-1.34)
Diversifying Deals -0.0002 0.0029 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0014
(-0.03) ^ 2 % (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.29) (-0.21)
Hostile Deals -0.0066 -0.0094 -0.0056 -0.0069 -0.0072 -0.0052
(-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.12) (-0.64) (-0.47) (-0.32)
Tender Offers 0.0154** 0.0097 0.0134 0.0201*** 0.0185* 0.0181**
(0.92) (1.21) (3.47) (1.75) (2d8)
Multiple Bidders -0.0085 -0.0036 -0.0203 -0.0142 -0.0128 -0.0240*
(-0.55) ( 4  1% (-1.03) (-1.54) (-0.68) (-1.87)
N 560 302 258 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.065 0.128 0.004 0.081 0.094 0.055
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Table 4.6
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Target CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the target firm 5-day CARs on the 
complementary fit o f  debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, 
and deal- characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the overall sample o f  
acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry target 
firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid-ask spread  o f  the target firms in the 
sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Target CARs Target CARs
All Sample High Low All Sample High Low
Information Information Information Information
Asymmetry Asymmetry Asymmetry Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1460 0.1580 0.3970** 0.2090** 0.0836 0.2992***
(1.01) (0.78) (2.52) (237) ^ W ) # 1 %
ComplFitl -0.0344 -0.0364 -0.0528
(-1.44) (-1.10) (-1.15)
Investment-Grade 0.0305 0.0887 -0.0076
(1.61) (-0.18)
ComplFitl -0.0071** -0.0067 -0.0064**
(-2.57) (-1.54) (4 5 %
ARating 0.0158*** 0.0191*** 0.0132***
(4.70) (286) 015%
Negative Dnmmy 0.0784** 0.0634 0.0849***
(2.27) (121) (291)
Scaled AB/M 0.0328 0.0483 -0.0117 0.0409 0.0513 -0.0047
(0.95) (122) (-0.22) (160) (136)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0050 -0.0152 0.0031 -0.0080 -0.0017 -0.0105
(-0.38) (-0.71) # 2 % LI 16) L0 15) (-1.44)
Bidder B/M -0.1084 -0.1819* 0.0483 -0.1011 -0.1474 0.0246
(-1.48) fL 7 9 ) (0.75) LLGO (-1.60) (0.47)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0258 0.0397 -0.0135 0.0163 0.0208 0.0215
(0.97) (130) (-0.21) (0.67) (0J8) 0 5 %
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0936 -0.0336 0.1692 0.0725 -0.0472 0.1921
(-0.13) # 3 % (0.47) (-0.26) (0.79)
Bidder Leverage -0.0046 0.0851 -0.1509 -0.0306 0.0566 -0.0855
(-0.05) (-1.56) (-0.45) (-1.33)
Target B/M 0.1580 0.1929 -0.0647 0.1324* 0.1563* -0.0193
(158) (1.61) (-0.70) (1.91) (L66) (-0.25)
Target Run-Up -0.0152 -0.0145 -0.0978** -0.0200 -0.0175 -0.1447***
(-1.39) (-1.31) (-2.09) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-3.82)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0454 0D683 0.1730 0.1064 0.1681 OBKW
(0.64) (&83) (107) (133) (1.41) (0.60)
Target Leverage 0.0075 -0D252 0.1136 -0.0145 -0.0315 0.0449
(&12) (-0.30) (123) (-0.29) (-0.42) (0.74)
Relative Size -0.0533 -0.0797 -0.0223 -0.0358*** -0.0348 -0.0265**
(-1.55) (-1.34) (-0.56) (-2.65) (-1.06) (-1.97)
Stock Dummy -0.0506** -0.0228 -0.0759** -0.0233 0.0242 -0.0570***
(-2.00) (-0.54) (-2.39) (-1.46) (-2.99)
Completed 0.0535 0.0732 -0.1804** 0.0026 0.0173 -0.0280
(122) (125) (-2.20) (0.09) # 4 % (-1.06)
Diversifying Deals -0.0090 -0.0091 -0.0202 -0.0128 0.0016 -0.0222
(-0.38) (-0.24) (-0.79) (-0.89) (0.06) (-1.16)
Hostile Deals 0.1005 0.0587 -0.0631 0.0311 0.0118 -0.0204
(155) (0 74) (-0.63) (1.03) (129) (-0.61)
Tender Offers 0.0722** 0.0836 0.0703* 0.1043*** 0.1530*** 0.0744***
P l% (1.44) (1.91) (178) (3.07) (283)
Multiple Bidders -0.0617 -0.0290 -0.1357*** -0.0664*** -0.0377 -0.0884***
(-1.58) (-0.51) (-3.46) (-2.77) (-0.99) (-3.63)
N 577 312 265 908 438 470
Adjusted R^ 0.090 0.088 0.113 0.157 0.150 0.217
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Table 4.7
Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating
The table presents the results o f  the instrumental variables regression procedure to control for potential 
endogeneity o f ComplFitl for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009. Specifications (1) 
and (2) are the reduced regressions. Specification (3) is the structural regression for synergy gains. Specification 
(4) is the structural regression for bidder CARs. Specification (5) is the structural regression for target CARs. 
See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. N  denotes the number o f  
observations. The lower part o f  the table shows the F-test o f  the WH test for endogeneity, and the o f  the 
Sargan test for instruments validity with their corresponding p-values in parentheses.
Reduced Reduced S tructu ra l S tructu ra l S truc tu ra l
Investm ent-
G rade
C om plFitl Synergy G ains B idder CARs T arg e t CARs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C onstant -0.6359*** 0.5478** 0.0667** 0.0605* 0.1185
(320) (2.40) (1.99) (1.73) (0.80)
C om plFitl 0.0081 0.0108* -0.0155
(1.23) (1.78) (-0.66)
Investm ent-G rade 0.0102 0.0280 -0.0790
(0.46) (1.32) (-0.93)
Scaled AB/M 0.1513* -0.3522 -0.0066 -0.0026 0.0170
(L6% (-1.60) (-1.19) (-0.50) (0.59)
Ln (B idder Size) 0.0996*** -0.0390** -0.0066* -0.0071* 0.0084
(7.77) (-2.30) (-1.79) (-1.81) (0.46)
Bidder B/M -0.0340 -0.2726*** 0.0115 -0.0064 -0.0972
(-0.55) (-2.76) (0.74) (-0.54) (-1.44)
Bidder Run-Up -0.1352*** 0.0208 0.0046 0.0126 0.0060
(-3.92) (0.44) (0.56) (1.44) (0.21)
Bidder FCF/Assets -0.0226 -0.6036** -0.0145 -0.0110 0.0535
(-0.10) (-2.57) (-0.30) (-0.23) (0.27)
Bidder Leverage -0.5688*** 0.3146*** -0.0153 0.0058 -0.0937
(-5.01) (2.69) (-0.54) (0.18) (-0.78)
T a r  B/M 0.0422 -0.0470 -0.0013 0.0120 0.1581
(0.92) (-0.53) (-0.11) (1.19) (1.55)
T arget Run-Up 0.0026 -0.0264 0.0019 0.0028 -0.0143
(0.50) (-1.63) (0.91) (1.47) (-1.29)
T arget FCF/Assets -0.0127 0.1485 0.0286 0.0080 0.0431
(-0.13) (0.89) (1.62) (0.44) (0.63)
T arget Leverage 0.0005 0.0385 0.0173 0.0130 0.0363
(0.44) (0.37) (1.14) (0.84) (0.59)
Prem ium 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0002** 0.0000
(1.36) (-0.22) (2.19) (0.25)
Relative Size -0.1689*** -0.0027 0.0208 -0.0319** -0.0667*
(-3.35) (-0.03) (1.30) (-2.21) (-1.92)
Stock Dummy -0.0104 0.0659* -0.0202*** -0.0204*** -0.0467*
(-0.31) (1.84) (-3.42) (-3.41) L L M )
Completed -0.0142 0.0212 -0.0143 -0.0220 0.0702*
(-0.20) (0.28) (-0.75) (-1.13) (1.72)
Diversifying Deals 0.0112 -0.0286 -0.0019 0.0002 -0.0051
(0.35) (-0.87) (-0.34) (0.04) (-0.21)
Hostile Deals -0.0504 -0.1902 0.0012 -0.0095 0.0975
(-0.59) (-0.16) (0.06) (-0.52) (1.55)
T ender Offers 0.0291 -0.0069 0.0174** 0.0163** 0.0842**
(0.72) (-0.16) (2.55) (2.46) (2.44)
M ultiple Bidders -0.0809 0.2154*** -0.0166 -0.0089 -0.0729*
(-1.28) (2.68) (-1.16) L&59) (-1.80)
B idder Tangibility -0.0847 -0.3161***
(-0.90) (-3.11)
B idder Age 0.0049*** 0.0046***
(4.45)
Bidder Industry  R ating 0.0469*** -0.0187*
(6.21) (-1.95)
B idder Tangibility * Scaled AB/M -0.1165* -0.6084***
(-1.76) (-4.44)
Bidder Age *Scaled AB/M -0.0007 0.0141***
(-0.86) (8.15)
B idder Industry  R ating * Scaled AB/M -0.0078 0.0577**
(-1.48) (2.40)
N 543 543 543 543 559
A djusted R^ 0.523 0.790 0.103 0.067 0.067
F-test 
W H  Test
0.38
(0.685)
0.29
(0.745)
1.69
(0.186)
/
Sargan Test
3.98
(0.409)
1.84
(0.765)
2.76
(0.599)
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Table 4.8
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f  the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0518 0.0797 0.0437
(152) (157)
ComplFitl 0.0117** 0.0202*** 0.0007
(2.22) & M ) (0 05)
Investment-Grade 0.0092 0.0139 -0.0023
(1.04) (109) (-0.16)
Scaled AB/M -0.0093 -0.0087 -0.0052
LI 62) (-1.37) (-0.26)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0055** -0 0096*» -0.0018
(-2.06) (-2.21) (-0.58)
Bidder B/M 0.0162 0.0016 0.0216
(125) (0.07) (0.87)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0041 0.0024 0.0253
^ % )
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0021 -0.0280 0.0781
(0.04) (-0.38) (100)
Bidder Leverage -0.0240 -0.0455 0.0036
(-1.07) LL%0 (0.09)
Target B/M 0.0019 0.0057 0.0019
^ 1 % (0.42) (0.07)
Target Run-Up 0.0034* 0.0049** -0.0233*
(1.71) # 4 % (-1.66)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0263 0.0183 0.1186*
(1.45) 0191) (189)
Target Leverage 0.0187 0.0355 -0.0025
(1.21) (153) (-0.11)
Premium 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0001
(207) P l%
Relative Size 0.0234 -0.0108 0.0441**
(155) (-0.43) P 5%
Stock Dummy -0.0169*** -0.0150 -0.0104
(-2.87) (-1.61) (-1.21)
Completed -0.0130 -0.0173 -0.0373
(-0.70) (-0.75) (-1.15)
Diversifying Deals -0.0022 0.0026 -0.0044
(-0.38) (0.28) (-0.61)
Hostile Deals 0.0034 -0.0065 0.0179
(0 19) (-0.34) (0.45)
Tender Offers 0.0141** 0.0087 0.0099
(204) (0.90) (&81)
Multiple Bidders -0.0153 -0.0109 -0.0240
(-1.01) (-0.53) (-0.98)
N 560 302 258
Adjusted R^ 0D98 0.084 0.166
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Table 4.9
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are bootstrapped 
with 100 replications and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity as also bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0456* 0.0035 0.0979***
(1.74) (3D4)
ComplFitl 0.0012* 0.0016 0.0009
(182) (159) (0.87)
ARating 0.0007 0.0009 0.0001
(0.67) (0.62) (0.07)
Scaled AB/M -0.0068 -0.0045 -0.0169*
(-1.35) (-0.55) LL%9
Negative Dummy -0.0049 -0.0270 0.0250
(-0.45) (-1.29) (1.54)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0042** -0.0027 -0.0074***
(-2.22) (-0.88) (-3.28)
Bidder B/M 0.0158 0.0056 0.0380**
(1.19) (028) Pl%
Bidder Run-Up -0.0043 -0.0105 0.0119
(-0.57) (-1.15) ^ ^ %
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0143 -0.0139 0.0699
0 3 % (-0.23) (127)
Bidder Leverage -0.0095 -0.0048 -0.0081
(-0.53) (-0.15) (-0.28)
Target B/M 0.0009 0.0085 -0.0325
(OTO) LL%0
Target Run-Up 0.0020 0.0025 -0.0136
(&64) (0.79) (-1.24)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0411** 0.0309 0.0825
(2.24) (122) (1.57)
Target Leverage 0.0055 0.0163 -0.0041
(0.46) (0.73) (-0.23)
Premium 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0003**
(2 55) (227) (2.04)
Relative Size 0.0155** 0.0132 0.0112
(2 16) ^^ % (1.37)
Stock Dummy -0.0077* 0.0068 -0.0135**
(-1.76) (-2.21)
Completed -0.0136 -0.0045 -0.0262*
Li.%0 (-0.27) LL% )
Diversifying Deals -0.0026 0.0034 -0.0061
(-0.61) (0A5) (-1.06)
Hostile Deals 0.0013 0.0097 -0.0146
(0.11) (0.60) (-1.17)
Tender Offers 0.0246*** 0.0263*** 0.0211***
(4.26) (2.80)
Multiple Bidders -0.0200** -0.0171 -0.0284**
(-2.35) (-0.90) (-2.46)
N 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.084 0.042 0.169
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Table 4.10
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Bidder CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f  the bidder firm 5-day CARs on the complementary fit o f  
debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample 
o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low  
information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread values 
than the median bid-ask spread o f  the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the 
number o f  observations.
Bidder CARs Bidder CARs
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0446 0.0837 -0.0137 0.0239 0.0094 0.0529
(122) (161) (-0.21) (0.87) (0.24) (136)
ComplFitl 0.0126** 0.0203*** -0.0032
# 4 % ^ 0 % (-0.17)
Investment-Grade 0.0167* 0.0215 0.0047
(L80) (163) (0.31)
ComplFitl 0.0015** 0.0018* 0.0010
(2.26) (1.74) (0.71)
ARating 0.0043*** 0.0036** 0.0044**
(2 15) (2.22)
Negative Dummy -0.0077 -0.0316 0.0245
(-0.64) LLW) (1.31)
Scaled AB/M -0.0048 -0.0106* 0.0194 -0.0055 -0.0071 -0.0049
(-0.86) (-1.76) (0.75) (-1.00) (-0.37)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0047 -0.0098** 0.0025 -0.0044** -0.0052* -0.0054**
(-1.61) (-2.11) (0.74) (-2.02) (-1.67) Li.& o
Bidder B/M -0.0014 0.0036 -0.0277 0.0018 0.0024 0.0011
(-0.11) (0.14) (-0.95) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0098 0.0064 0.0433 0.0025 -0.0052 0.0161
(1.20) (1.21) (0.31) (-0.59) (0.66)
Bidder FCF/Assets -0.0052 -0.0192 0.0503 -0.0172 -0.0292 0.0213
(-0.10) (-0.25) (0.64) (-0.40) (-0.44) (0.33)
Bidder Leverage -0.0112 -0.0468 0.0458 0.0186 0.0123 0.0274
(-0.42) (-1.16) (0.93) (0.82) (0 36)
Target B/M 0.0152 0.0046 0.0598* 0.0101 0.0067 0.0097
(144) (1.93) (116) (0 64)
Target Run-Up 0.0043** 0.0060*** -0.0164 0.0041 0.0043 0.0073
(2 29) # 1 % (-1.11) (1.30) (1.22) (0.58)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0051 0.0021 0.0719 0TB80 0.0237 0.0498
(0.27) (1.10) (142) (0.84)
Target Leverage 0.0176 0.0510** -0.0340 -0.0052 0.0140 -0.0294
(111) (2 16) LI 45) (0.63) L i.& y
Premium 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003**
(0.20) LL&y (-0.97) (0.22) (-2.16)
Relative Size -0.0304** -0.0572** -0.0129 -0.0107 -0.0258* -0.0078
(-2.14) (-2.55) (-0.80) (-1.37) LI 85) (-0.84)
Stock Dummy -0.0176*** -0.0213** -0.0096 -0.0072 -0.0028 -0.0076
(-2.97) (-2.25) (-1.00) Ll.%0 (-1.01)
Completed -0.0199 -0.0245 -0.0256 -0.0139 -0.0038 -0.0243
(-1.05) (-1.05) (-0.55) (-128) (-0.23) (-1.44)
Diversifying Deals 0.0003 0.0044 0.0006 0.0005 0.0039 -0.0005
(0.04) (0.45) (&08) (OTO) (0.52) (-0.07)
Hostile Deals -0.0098 -0.0055 -0.0042 -0.0067 -0.0045 -0.0040
(-0.53) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-0.62) (4 3 % (-0.24)
Tender Offers 0.0128* 0.0072 0.0120 0.0183*** 0.0165* 0.0165*
(189) (0.72) (1.01) (3.11) (L66) (1.88)
Multiple Bidders -0.0078 -0.0075 -0.0140 -0.0163* -0.0178 -0.0248*
(-0.47) (-0.31) (-0.66) (-1.69) (-0.91) (-1.88)
(-0.17) (-0.50)
N 560 302 258 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.061 0.121 0.002 0.076 0.089 0.057
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Table 4.11
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Target CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the target firm 5-day CARs on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, 
and deal- characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the overall sample o f  
acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry target 
firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid-ask spread  o f  the target firms in the 
sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Target CARs Target CARs
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1382 0.1198 0.4047** 0.2095** 0.0718 0.3101***
(0.97) # 3 % (2.40) (0.54) (3.27)
ComplFitl -0.0354 -0.0392 -0.0480
LI 48) (-1.19) (-1.05)
Investment-Grade 0.0312 0.0884 -0.0061
(160) (4 .14)
ComplFitl -0.0072*** -0.0071 -0.0061**
(-2.64) (-1.62) (-2.51)
ARating 0.0159*** 0.0194*** 0.0131***
(4.64) # 3 % (3.57)
Negative Dummy 0.0740** 0.0588 0.0804***
(2T8) (1.11) (2.79)
Scaled AB/M 0.0333 0.0486 -0.0162 0.0396 0.0500 -0.0062
(0.96) (122) (-0.31) (155) (1.33) (4 .25 )
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0048 -0.0131 0.0022 -0.0082 -0.0016 -0.0108
(-0.36) (-0.61) (018) (-1.19) (-0.14) (-1.50)
Bidder B/M -0.1036 -0.1569 0.0454 -0.0976 -0.1350 0.0212
(-1.47) (-1.57) (0.70) (-1.61) (-1.45) (0.41)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0274 0.0401 -0.0141 0.0181 0.0225 0.0217
(103) (130) (4 .23) (0.73) # 3 % # 3 %
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.1131 0.0123 0.1811 0.0750 -0.0385 0.1884
(0 55) (0.42) #14% L&22) (0.77)
Bidder Leverage -0.0081 0.0861 -0.1494 -0.0305 0.0618 -0.0876
(-0.09) (0.60) LI 54) (-0.45) (0.74) (-1.35)
Target B/M 0.1619 0.1948 -0.0626 0.1320* 0.1535 -0.0189
(162) (163) (-0.68) (1.91) (1.62) (4 .25 )
Target Run-Up -0.0140 -0.0133 -0.0955** -0.0190 -0.0163 -0.1427***
(-1.29) (-1.19) (-2.05) (-0.70) (4 .71) (-3.80)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0585 0.0846 0.1675 0.1178 0.1830 0.0834
(0.82) (142) (1.04) (147) (1.53) (0 61)
Target Leverage 0.0073 -0.0259 0.1109 -0.0170 -0.0328 0.0397
(0.11) (-0.31) (1.21) (-0.34) (4 .43) # 3 %
Relative Size -0.0541 -0.0839 -0.0209 -0.0347*** -0.0327 -0.0265**
(-1.59) (-1.46) (-0.52) (4 3 % (-1.03) (-1.98)
Stock Dummy -0.0481* -0.0175 -0.0762** -0.0220 0.0265 -0.0580***
(-1.90) (-0.41) (-2.41) (-1.36) (-3.06)
Completed 0.0509 0.0727 -0.1816** -0.0009 0.0154 -0.0323
(1.17) (124) (-2.19) (-0.03) (0.40) LL% )
Diversifying Deals -0.0095 -0.0079 -0.0205 -0.0121 0.0031 -0.0220
(-0.40) (-0.20) (-0.80) (-0.84) (0.11) (-1.14)
Hostile Deals 0.1011 0.0667 -0.0640 0.0326 0.0164 -0.0206
(158) (0.82) (-0.63) (1.06) (039) (-0.61)
Tender Offers 0.0708** 0.0826 0.0696* 0.1037*** 0.1531*** 0.0729***
(248) (1.42) (189) (172) (3.04) (2.79)
Multiple Bidders -0.0618 -0.0321 -0.1325*** -0.0690*** -0.0421 -0.0896***
(-1.59) (4 3 % (-3.32) (-2.88) (-1.08) (-3.77)
N 577 312 265 908 438 470
Adjusted R^ 0492 0.089 0.112 0.158 0.150 0.216
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Table 4.12
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f  the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f  debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0402 0.0648 0.0456
(1.17) (127) # 3 %
ComplFitl 0.0119** 0.0225*** -0.0042
# 4 % (3.17) (-0.27)
Investment-Grade 0.0079 0.0142 -0.0056
(0.87) (105) (-0.39)
Scaled AB/M -0.0083 -0.0077 -0.0018
(-1.34) (-1.10) (-0.09)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0047* -0.0083* -0.0020
(-1.75) LL&o (-0.64)
Bidder B/M 0.0164 -0.0003 0.0196
(1.10) (-0.01) (0.77)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0178** 0.0172 0.0345
(1.57) (1.20)
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0110 -0.0175 0.0708
(0 21) (-0.24) (0.94)
Bidder Leverage -0.0256 -0.0456 -0.0020
(-1.18) (-1.24) (-0.05)
Target B/M 0.0042 0.0101 -0.0001
(0 36) (0.74) (-0.00)
Target Run-Up 0.0037** 0.0051*** -0.0240*
(2 15) #.9% (-1.70)
Target FCF/Assets 0D326* 0.0240 0.1273**
(1.76) (1.19) (2.05)
Target Leverage 0.0166 0.0334 -0.0066
(1.07) (143) (-0.30)
Premium 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0001
(2.09) (2 13) (0.76)
Relative Size 0.0276* -0.0030 0.0448**
(179) (-0.11) (231)
Stock Dummy -0.0137** -0.0114 -0.0094
(-2.31) Li.%0 (-1.10)
Completed -0.0072 -0.0122 -0.0290
(-0.37) (-0.51) (-0.87)
Diversifying Deals -0.0013 0.0039 -0.0052
(-0.22) (0.42) (-0.70)
Hostile Deals 0.0058 -0.0061 0.0251
(031) (-0.29) (0.62)
Tender Offers 0.0126* 0.0057 0.0102
(178) # 3 % (035)
Multiple Bidders -0.0111 -0.0082 -0.0170
(-0.74) (-0.41) (-0.71)
N 560 302 258
Adjusted R^ 0.106 0.085 0.187
157
Table 4.13
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Synergy Gains on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f  the synergy gains on the 
complementary fit o f debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, 
target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the 
overall sample o f acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) 
information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid- 
ask spread  o f the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are bootstrapped 
with 100 replications and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity as also bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Synergy Gains
All Sample High Information 
Asymmetry
Low Information 
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.0408 -0.0008 0.0985***
(1.50) (-0.02) # .W )
ComplFitl 0.0013* 0.0019* 0.0008
(189) (179) (0.82)
ARating 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004
(0.65) (0.29) (0.24)
Scaled AB/M -0.0028 -0.0245 0.0257
(-0.26) LL22) (160)
Negative Dummy -0.0070 -0.0047 -0.0179**
(-1.28) (-0.56) (-2.05) ,
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0040** -0.0022 -0.0076***
(-2.19) (-0.72) (-3.46)
Bidder B/M 0.0157 0.0039 0.0405**
(1.01) (039) # 3 %
Bidder Run-Up 0.0098 0.0053 0.0216
(125) (0.54) (1.19)
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0283 0.0108 0.0665
(0.66) (0.17) (124)
Bidder Leverage -0.0101 -0.0078 -0.0067
(-0.57) (-0.24) (-0.22)
Target B/M 0.0018 0.0109 -0.0368*
(038) (0 91) (-1.77)
Target Run-Up 0.0023 0.0028 -0.0139
(0 81) (035) LLM )
Target FCF/Assets 0.0462** 0.0314 03883*
(2 51) (122) (168)
Target Leverage 0.0046 0.0186 -0.0078
# 3 % (0.83) (-0.45)
Premium 0.0002*** 0.0003** 0.0003**
(2.77) (2.47) (2.05)
Relative Size 0.0157** 0.0131 0.0116
(2 15) (035) (137)
Stock Dummy -0.0066 0.0081 -0.0135**
LLW ) (LOO) ( 4  1%
Completed -0.0101 -0.0020 -0.0219
(-0.92) (-0.12) (-1.60)
Diversifying Deals -0.0021 0.0049 -0.0069
(-0.47) (-1.16)
Hostile Deals 0.0042 0.0131 -0.0125
# 3 % (0.78) (-0.95)
Tender Offers 0.0228*** 0.0224** 0.0213***
(3.79) (2 16) (235)
Multiple Bidders -0.0195** -0.0161 -0.0273**
(-2.29) (-0.85) (-2.34)
N 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.081 0.032 0.178
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Table 4.14
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Bidder CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f  the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f  the bidder firm 5-day CARs on the complementary fit o f  
debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, and deal- characteristics for a sample 
o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009.1 also split the overall sample o f  acquisitions into deals that involve high and low  
information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread values 
than the median bid-ask spread o f  the target firms in the sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control 
for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the 
number o f  observations.
Bidder CARs Bidder CARs
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0372 0.0733 -0.0079 0.0208 0.0061 0.0546
(102) (1.37) (4 3 % (0.74) # 3 % (1.44)
ComplFitl 0.0124** 0.0222*** -0.0088
(2.26) (336) (-0.48)
Investment-Grade 0.0150 0.0207 0.0019
(1.60) (148) (0.13)
ComplFitl 0.0016** 0.0021* 0.0010
(2.32) (1.92) (0.68)
ARating 0.0042*** 0.0030* 0.0047**
(181) # 3 %
Negative Dummy -0.0050 -0.0273 0.0244
(-0.44) (-1.31) (l.&B
Scaled AB/M -0.0038 -0.0097 0.0237 -0.0058 -0.0076 -0.0057
(-0.65) (-1.47) (0.92) (-0.98) (-0.88) (-0.46)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0042 -0.0088* 0.0020 -0.0043** -0.0048 -0.0057**
(-1.45) Li.&B (0.61) (-2.03) LI 52) (-2.10)
Bidder B/M -0.0019 0.0010 -0.0301 0.0012 0.0003 0.0029
L035) (0.04) (-1.02) # 0 % (0.02) # 3 %
Bidder Run-Up 0.0246*** 0.0220** 0.0553 0.0179** 0.0110 0.0296
(2.92) (222) (1.53) (2 20) (1.16) (1.21)
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.0017 -0.0123 0.0449 -0.0058 -0.0077 0.0165
# . 0 ) (-0.16) # 5 % L033) (-0.11) (0.26)
Bidder Leverage -0.0133 -0.0477 0.0401 0.0171 0.0077 0.0291
(-0.51) (-1.21) (0.82) (0.77) (0 23) (0.84)
Target B/M 0.0165 0.0078 0.0580* 0.0103 0.0082 0.0057
(L60) (0.60) (1.87) (1.15) (0T6) (0.20)
Target Run-Up 0.0043*** 0.0061*** -0.0193 0.0042 0.0044 0.0047
(3.69) (-1.30) (134) (1.14) # 3 %
Target FCF/Assets 0.0131 0.0096 0.0829 0.0341* 0.0247 0.0579
# 3 % (0.46) (1.27) (1.71) (1.01) 0198)
Target Leverage 0.0165 0.0505** -0.0379 -0.0043 0.0188 -0.0319*
(1.03) (2.11) (-1.62) (-0.32) 0183) (-1.77)
Premium 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003**
(0.25) (0.91) (-1.72) (-0.72) (0.46) (-2.02)
Relative Size -0.0282** -0.0524** -0.0137 -0.0112 -0.0267* -0.0080
L238) (4 8 % (-1.41) LI 85) (4 3 %
Stock Dummy -0.0145** -0.0182* -0.0083 -0.0062 -0.0019 -0.0073
(-2.44) (-1.89) (-0.87) (-1.28) (-0.23) (-0.98)
Completed -0.0139 -0.0192 -0.0191 -0.0104 -0.0008 -0.0207
(-0.70) (-0.78) (-0.40) (-0.92) (-0.05) LL%%
Diversifying Deals 0.0009 0.0055 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0055 -0.0015
(0.15) # 3 % (-0.07) (0.17) (0.72) (-0.23)
Hostile Deals -0.0084 -0.0051 -0.0013 -0.0039 -0.0003 -0.0032
(-0.43) (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.35) (-0.02) (-0.19)
Tender Offers 0.0115* 0.0041 0.0128 0.0167*** 0.0126 0.0169**
(L68) (0.40) (110) (2.75) (125) (196)
Multiple Bidders -0.0032 -0.0049 -0.0061 -0.0154 -0.0171 -0.0229*
(-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.30) (-1.62) (-0.88) (-1.69)
N 560 302 258 885 426 459
Adjusted R^ 0.069 0.115 0.034 0.075 0.071 0.075
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Table 4.15
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis (OLS) of Target CARs on the
Complementary Fit of Bidding and Target Firms
The table presents the results o f the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis o f the target firm 5-day CARs on the 
complementary fit o f  debt capacity and growth opportunities between bidding and target firms and other bidder, target-, 
and deal- characteristics for a sample o f  US public acquisitions over the period 1996-2009. IF also split the overall sample 
o f acquisitions into deals that involve high and low information asymmetry targets. High (Low) information asymmetry 
target firms are the ones with higher (lower) bid-ask spread  values than the median bid-ask spread  o f  the target firms in the 
sample. See Appendix B for definitions o f  the variables. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients 
are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N  denotes the number o f  
observations.
Target CARs Target CARs
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
All Sample High
Information
Asymmetry
Low
Information
Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1212 0.1022 0.4011** 0.2072** 0.0770 0.3100***
(035) (0 51) (2 54) (2 36) (0.58) (3.23)
ComplFitl -0.0361 -0.0390 -0.0519
(-1.51) (-1.20) (-1.13)
Investment-Grade 03286 0.0878 -0.0096
(031) (158) L&22)
ComplFit2 -0.0071*** -0.0067 -0.0063**
(-2.62) LL56) (-2.55)
ARating 0.0158*** 0.0186*** 0.0133***
(4.63) (2.78)
Negative Dummy 0.0752** 0.0569 0.0830***
(2.22) (1.09) (2 85)
Scaled AB/M 0.0352 0.0507 -0.0122 0.0402 0.0503 -0.0055
(1.03) (130) (-0.23) (1.62) (1.35) (-0.21)
Ln (Bidder Size) -0.0031 -0.0110 0.0020 -0.0080 -0.0016 -0.0111
(-0.23) (-0.52) (0.17) (-1.18) (-0.15) (-1.49)
Bidder B/M -0.1070 -0.1646* 0.0353 -0.0996 -0.1399 0.0186
(-1.50) (-1.68) (0.54) LI 62) LI 53) (0.32)
Bidder Run-Up 0.0299 0.0440 -0.0208 0.0222 03288 0.0167
(1.14) (146) (-0.33) (0 91) (1.09) (0.43)
Bidder FCF/Assets 0.1188 0.0238 0.1482 0.0951 -0.0012 0.1716
# 5 % # 0 % # 3 % (031) (-0.01) (0.70)
Bidder Leverage -0.0087 0.0892 -0.1546 -0.0307 0.0609 -0.0903
(-0.09) (0.62) (-1.60) (-0.46) (0T2) (-1.38)
Target B/M 0.1648* 0.1990* -0.0577 0.1323** 0.1548* -0.0172
(169) (1.71) (-0.62) (196) (1.67) (-0.22)
Target Run-Up  ^ -0.0102 -0.0099 -0.0764 -0.0146 -0.0123 -0.1288***
(-0.98) (-0.93) (-1.64) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-3.38)
Target FCF/Assets 0.0594 0.0840 0.1861 0.1167 0.1764 0.0930
(0.84) (102) (1.16) (145) L 4% (038)
Target Leverage 0.0031 -0.0312 0.1122 -0.0214 -0.0393 0.0397
# .M ) (-0.37) (122) (-0.43) (-0.52)
Relative Size -0.0462 -0.0720 -0.0184 -0.0338** -0.0321 -0.0260*
(-1.37) (-1.28) (-0.45) (-2.50) (-1.02) (-1.93)
Stock Dummy -0.0457* -0.0132 -0.0776** -0.0221 0.0268 -0.0594***
(-1.80) (-0.31) (-2.46) (-1.35) (0.95) (-3.07)
Completed 0.0558 0.0754 -0.1691** 0.0023 0.0175 -0.0280
(129) (129) (-2.04) # 0 % (0.45) (-1.06)
Diversifying Deals -0.0064 -0.0059 -0.0178 -0.0106 0.0046 -0.0210
(-0.27) (-0.15) (-0.70) (-0.73) (0.17) (-1.11)
Hostile Deals 0.1062* 0.0649 -0.0394 0.0366 0.0194 -0.0140
(L65) # 3 % (-0.39) (1.21) (0.45) (-0.41)
Tender Offers 0.0695** 0.0822 0.0663* 0.1007*** 0.1487*** 0.0703***
(2.04) (1.41) (130) (3.64) (238) (2.65)
Multiple Bidders -0.0611 -0.0352 -0.1270*** -0.0698*** -0.0444 -0.0892***
(-1.57) (-0.63) (-3.23) (-2.91) (-1.14) (-3.73)
N 577 312 265 908 438 470
Adjusted R^ 0.091 0.091 0.106 0.157 0.150 0.210
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
The primary aim of this thesis was to examine the impact of CRAs’ actions and 
decisions on the process and outcomes of M&As. Specifically, it has investigated the effect 
of credit ratings on the choice of payment method in acquisitions, the influence of credit 
rating changes expectations on the bidding firm’s decision to acquire another firm, and the 
shareholder value creation of complementary acquisitions.
To summarize the results. Chapter 2 has examined one of the most important aspects of 
the M&As process; that is the choice of payment method for the consummation of the deal. 
Given the evidence that cash acquisitions are to a great extent funded by debt while on the 
same time recognizing that, the bidders’ ability to tap the public credit markets as it is 
measured by their credit ratings must exert a huge influence on that decision, I have tried to 
investigate the impact of credit ratings on the payment choice. It has been demonstrated that 
bidding firms holding a high credit rating (high credit quality), are more likely to use cash as 
a payment method in M&As deals. This finding was attributed to the high debt capacity and 
low financial constraints which these firms possess, a fact that facilitates substantially their 
access to the credit markets, and makes them less reluctant to use cash for the consummation 
of the deals. Consistent with the importance which high credit ratings and debt capacity have 
in the choice of payment method, I also found that unused debt capacity from the bidder or 
the target side plays a significant role in this decision.
The findings of this chapter have important implications for financial practitioners and 
academic researchers. On the practical side, the results regarding the impact of high credit 
ratings on the choice of cash as payment method in M&As, imply that bidding firms can 
expropriate benefits related with that form of payment. The literature on shareholder wealth
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effects around acquisition announcements documents that cash acquisitions create non­
negative returns for both public and private deals a fact which entails, that holding a high 
credit rating pays off both to the creditors and to the shareholders of the firm. In a more 
general mindset, it can be reasonably argued that having a high credit quality can mitigate 
some aspects of the bondholder-shareholder conflicts. Additionally, it is known that the usage 
of cash during takeover contests enjoys low target managerial resistance, and impedes 
competition from rival bidders, an implication of paramount importance for the management 
of both bidder and target firms when the deal is considered highly synergetic. On the 
academic side, my results offer a new determinant on the M&As’ method of payment 
literature that was so far unexplored. Therefore, future research on this topic should take into 
consideration among other factors, the credit rating levels which the bidders might hold.
Chapter 3 has investigated another important topic of the M&As’ literature which is the 
decision to initiate an acquisition of another firm. Given the evidence on the credit ratings’ 
significance for various capital structure and investment decisions, and the literature which 
relates M&As with an increase in default risk, I have tried to explore the effect of credit 
ratings’ on the largest investment that a firm might ever undertake. Anecdotal evidence has 
indicated that firms’ management consider future credit rating levels as one of the most 
important factors when deciding their corporate policies and accordingly, adjust these 
policies to credit rating targets. In support of this evidence, I have shown that bidding firms’ 
credit rating changes considerations have a considerable impact on the decision to acquire. In 
particular, firms near the Investment-grade cutoff follow a conservative policy, and abstain 
from acquisitions with the expectation of avoiding a downgrade to the Speculative-grade or 
achieving an upgrade to Investment-grade status. Moreover, I used other proxies to capture 
the imminence to a credit rating change, and find that firms close to an upgrade (downgrade) 
are more (less) likely to undertake acquisitions. These findings are attributed to the fact that a
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large number of business, regulatory, and contractual agreements are tied to various credit 
rating levels that render credit ratings a major component of corporate policies.
The conclusions of this chapter offer valuable insights for both academics and 
practitioners. On a practical level, the results imply that different expected credit rating 
actions (upgrades/downgrades) signal a material change in firms’ fundamentals and lead their 
management to decide their corporate policies conditional on these credit rating actions. 
Overall, they entail that credit ratings considerations have a real impact on firms’ 
management decisions and they should not be treated from practitioners and regulators as 
“mere” opinions of firms’ creditworthiness, but as consequential factors influencing 
corporate policies. This empirical reality is of a paramount importance especially, after the 
severe criticism and discussions about the function of CRAs that was taking place during the 
recent financial crisis. In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act moved towards the right direction, 
as CRAs are now subject to so-called expert liability. This means that CRAs are no longer 
exempt on First Amendment grounds from private rights of action, and they are subject to 
similar standards of liability and accountability as are investment bankers, auditors, and 
security analysts. On an academic level, the results with respect to the non-linear relationship 
between credit rating levels and acquisition investments entail that the traditional finance 
theory, which portrays a linear association between cost of capital and investments cannot 
explain satisfactorily the above relationship. This is a challenging task for academies who 
want to examine in more detail the impact of credit ratings on corporate investments, since it 
can be seen from the results in this chapter and other recent evidence that credit ratings 
display discrete costs and benefits for firms which do not follow a linear logic; in other words 
it can be said that ’'''credit ratings have a merit on their own
Chapter 4 has examined the shareholder value creation from complementary
acquisitions in levels of debt capacity and growth opportunities. Prior theoretical literature
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(Myers and Majluf (1984)) has demonstrated that in states where high information 
asymmetries about the target firms’ values prevail, this type of acquisitions create wealth for 
the shareholders. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence supporting this theoretical argument is 
scarce and in this chapter I have tried to fill this void. In particular, by measuring firms’ debt 
capacity with their credit rating level and growth opportunities with the book-to-market ratio, 
it has been established that mergers between bidders and targets that complement each other 
on the levels of debt capacity, and growth opportunities generate higher synergistic gains. 
These incremental gains are captured by the bidding firms, as bidding firms avoid 
overpayment. These effects are more pronounced when the target operates under a high 
information asymmetry environment, a setting which is perfectly aligned with the theoretical 
propositions that form my main assumptions.
The results of this chapter have critical implications for both academic and practitioner 
worlds. For example, hedge funds and other types of arbitrageurs that are seeking profitable 
investment strategies through M&As deals, should look for transactions that exhibit these 
complementarity characteristics. My results have shown that complementary acquisitions 
generate on average 2.13% abnormal returns over the 5-day window surrounding the 
acquisition date. For academies the findings eoneeming the complementary acquisitions 
indicate that, to the extent that a complementary fit of debt capacity and growth opportunities 
between bidding and target firms leads to value creation in M&As, credit ratings can help to 
reduce underinvestment problems. Additionally, the evidence on the wealth effects of the 
combination where a low valuation bidder buys a high valuation target, suggests that it is 
against the conventional wisdom of the Q theories of takeovers, where the typical merger 
involves a high valuation bidder purchasing a low valuation target.
While the specific way which credit ratings influence the process and outcomes of
M&As varies across the three studies, the general findings broadly support a consequential
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role of CRAs actions and decisions in the M&As, that has been overlooked from the hitherto 
relevant literature.
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